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# Donne's Epistemology and the Appeal to Memory

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One of the on-going arguments among readers of Donne concerns the roles and relative importance of memory, understanding, and will in the sermons. While critics disagree over the extent to which Donne appeals to one faculty or the other, most maintain that Augustine's trinitarian conception of the faculties underlies Donne's appeal. As their arguments proceed, however, these same critics, perhaps inevitably, begin to isolate either reason or memory as being pre-eminent. Those who have argued that Donne makes a platonized Augustinian appeal to memory—John Chamberlin, Janel Mueller, Achsah Guibbory, and Joan Webber, to name a few—see Donne's purpose as being "to get at the memory, not at the intellect, to remind rather than teach."[1] Terry Sherwood, on the other hand, wishing to "reset a balance badly disturbed by over strenuous claims that memory dominates Donne's mature epistemology and psychology" points out that reason "constantly interacts with materials gathered from memory."[2] Nevertheless, Sherwood continues to perpetuate the idea that the two faculties may still be considered independent of each other when he writes that some sermons "may appeal primarily to memory, just as others appeal primarily to the reason or will."[3]

I would like to suggest, in contrast to Sherwood's position, that Donne appeals to memory neither *instead of* nor *in addition to* reason, but rather because memory is a *necessary condition* for the function of reason. If reason is an immediate condition of learning, Donne's purpose is not to remind *rather* than to teach, but to remind *in order to* teach. For Donne, who is, I will suggest, working in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, memory is a prerequisite for understanding; without memory, reasoning is impossible. Thus, in response to Joan Webber, I suggest that Donne "gets at" (to use her words) the intellect or reason by *means* of the memory. While Donne was deeply indebted to Augustine, readings which explore only this influence while ignoring the Thomistic parallels are incomplete. Past readers have failed, I believe, to ask the question of how exactly Donne believes man learns of God in the first place. The answer to this question constitutes a central difference between the epistemologies of Aquinas and Augustine, a difference which must be understood if we are to appreciate the affinity between Aquinas and Donne.

## Augustinian Versus Thomistic Epistemology

The basic difference between the epistemologies of Augustine and Aquinas is that unlike Augustine who believes that men are capable of imageless thought, Aquinas holds that men come to understand even non-corporeal truths only through a process of abstraction from corporeal images. In *Literal Commentary on Genesis*, Augustine discusses the three types of "vision" available to men: the corporeal, the spiritual, and the intellectual. The first involves seeing (actually sensing) bodies by means of the senses. Spiritual vision, on the other hand, is the imaginative level of thinking, wherein the soul views images of bodily things. And for Augustine, the soul can go one step further and is capable of seeing some truths directly without the help of images. These higher visions, which he calls intellectual visions, do not in any way depend on the lower ones. Nor are they in any way dependent upon our senses for their apprehension. Augustine explains, using the verse "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself": "the letters are seen corporeally, the neighbor is thought of spiritually, and love is beheld intellectually."[4]

Thus, Augustine believes that a man can "see and understand love itself" (*LCG*, XII, 6.15; p. 94). In describing the process he writes, "To see an object not in an image but in itself, yet not through the body, is to see with a vision surpassing all other visions" (*LCG*, XII, 6.15; p. 93). According to Augustine memory as it is conceived in Plato's doctrine of recollection is the storehouse of those abstract, non-sensible truths which we see through this third level of vision, the "intellectual vision." He accounts for our ability to apprehend such non-sense-oriented truths with a theory of divine "illumination" or the "inner teacher." Though Augustine argues against the Platonic idea that the soul had knowledge before it existed in the body, he suggests that Christ, the inner teacher, provides the soul with those truths inaccessible via the senses. Thus, for example, the memories of all people contain visions of God. In a passage from the *Confessions*, Augustine describes the experience of "remembering" this vision:

> I entered even into my inward self . . . and beheld with the eye of my soul (such as it was), above the same eye of my soul, above my mind, the Light Unchangeable. Not this ordinary light, which all flesh may look upon, nor as it were a greater of the same kind . . . . He that knows the Truth, knows what that Light is; and he that knows It, knows eternity. (VII, 10.16; p. 127)

In keeping with his trinitarian view of the faculties, Augustine does not distinguish this "remembering" from "understanding."

If Augustine's ideas about memory find their roots in Platonic philosophy, Aquinas's can be traced back to Aristotle. Aquinas rejects the Platonic concept of innate ideas outright, and though, like Augustine, Aquinas also distinguishes between three levels of knowledge, none of them correspond to Augustine's intellectual visions. His three categories include (1) the natural sciences "whose existence and meaning" derive directly from sensible matter, (2) mathematical truths whose meaning and existence do not depend upon sensible matter but of which "an imaginable residue still remains and, consequently, mathematical judgements arising at this stage should square with the data of the imagination," and (3) "objects transcending sense and imagination alike, wholly independent of matter as regards both their being and their being understood."[5] While Aquinas's knowledge of objects transcending sense and imagination may seem on first and isolated reading to correspond with Augustine's third level of thought, further reading in Aquinas reveals that the two differ fundamentally. For while Augustine's visions involve direct understanding of divinely revealed ideas, Aquinas's do not. Notwithstanding his claim that the objects of this vision are "wholly independent of matter as regards their being and their being understood," Aquinas, following Aristotle, insists that "since we reach metaphysical truths through sensible and imaginable entities we can say that their origins and principles rise from them" (*de Trinitate*, VI. 2; p. 23). While the two claims may seem paradoxical, elsewhere he insists, "Human contemplation at present cannot function without images. . . . This applies to the truths of revelation as well as to those of natural knowledge" (*ST*, 2a-2ae. 180.5, ad 2; p. 234).

Aquinas elaborates on this idea in his response to the question "Can we know God by our natural reason in this life?" (*ST*, 1a. 12, 12). Since the soul understands nothing by natural reason without images and "since God is incorporeal," Aquinas tentatively concludes, "there can be no image of him in our imagination. So then he can not be known to us by natural reason." "*ON THE OTHER HAND*," continues Aquinas, "we read in *Romans, What may be known about God is manifest to them*, i.e. what can be known about him by natural reason." Aquinas offers the following, clearly Aristotelian explanation of the apparent paradox:

> *The knowledge that is natural to us has its source in the senses and extends just so far as it can be led by sensible things; from these, however, our understanding can not reach to the divine essence.* Sensible creatures are effects of God which are less than typical of the divine power of their cause, so knowing them does not lead us to understand the whole power of God and thus we do not see his essence. They are nevertheless effects depending from a cause, and so we can at least be led from them to know of God that he exists [italics mine].

What Aquinas describes here is a process of abstraction from sensible forms. He concludes, "God is known to the natural reason through the image of his effects." In this way, we reach metaphysical truths (which are *not* sensible or imaginable) through entities that are.

The knowledge men acquire by natural reason depends on two things according to Aquinas: "images derived from the sensible world and the natural intellectual light by which we make abstract intelligible concepts from these images" (*ST*, 1a. 12, 13). The process by which man comes to know God, then, involves two parts. First, the soul must derive images from sense perceptions, the primary senses being sight and hearing. These images are stored in the imagination and represent God "according to some likeness, as is the way with the divine Scriptures which describe God metaphorically by means of material things" (*ST*, 1a. 12, 4). Obviously, the presence of such images in the imagination does not of itself guarantee that one will come to know God. The incorporeal being must be correctly "abstracted" from the sensible images representing it. Such interpretation is the task of the "natural intellectual light." In fact, suggests Aquinas, "the stronger our intellectual light the deeper the understanding we derive from images." And by what means can this intellectual light be improved? By grace, replies Aquinas. Through the efficacy of grace, he writes, "we have a more perfect knowledge of God than we have by natural reason [alone] . . . for the light of grace strengthens the intellectual light and at the same time prophetic visions provide us with God-given images which are better suited to express divine things than those we receive naturally from the sensible world" (*ST*, 1a. 12, 13). Thus, without grace man achieves knowledge that God exists, but a saving knowledge of God is a result of grace. In both cases, the raw material or medium of the understanding is images.[6] As the storehouse of all images from which an understanding of higher truths can be abstracted, memory, then, plays a central role in man's ability to understand God and his ways.

In summary, according to Augustine God can be known directly, as present in and to the memory which is *not* dependent on sense (or images) but essentially free from sense and therefore by its nature adapted to knowing non-sensible things. Aquinas, on the other hand, following Aristotle, has a doctrine of abstraction (as opposed to Augustine's "illumination"), whereby God who is *not* a particular sense object is known by his works which are. Thus, while some images *are* formed directly in the imagination by divine power (as a result of grace), and thus, it might *seem* that man is capable of deriving some knowledge apart from material things and sense impressions, Aquinas insists that what God gives to men are meanings embodied in *images of sense*. How then can a preacher contribute to his congregation's knowledge of God? By

offering for consideration images of corporeal beings that not only exemplify the universal Being and his actions but that will also be likely to remain in the memory. For if the natural intellectual light is to abstract universals from particulars, the particulars (images) must be readily recollected from memory.

I devote the rest of this essay to demonstrating the Thomistic tendencies of Donne's own epistemology. At the same time, I would like to suggest that Donne's use of Examples (concrete images) to teach Rules (abstract universals) reflects an essentially Thomistic understanding of the way men come to know God.[7] Aquinas is not, of course, the sole proponent of sense-oriented epistemology. As Rosalie Colie points out in *Paradoxia Epidemica: The Renaissance Tradition of Paradox*, both the skeptics and the stoics believed that "one knows by the senses before one can know by right reason" and furthermore, "though Christian Stoics were committed to the orthodox view that ultimate truth is beyond the reach both of reason and the senses, they put their faith in common human reason [informed by the senses] to lead men to the point where faith takes on the burden of truth and makes revelation credible."[8] Thus, while I will be concentrating on the Thomistic parallels in Donne's sermons, I do not wish thereby to imply that Aquinas was the sole source upon which Donne may have drawn in constructing his epistemology. Furthermore, while others have noted Donne's sense-orientation,[9] what I am suggesting is that the Thomistic tendencies of Donne's epistemology are so great as to cast doubt on readings which suggest a belief on Donne's part in the Augustinian idea that certain truths may be understood directly without the aid of the senses.

## Knowing God: Donne's Sense-Oriented Epistemoloy

In *Fulfilling the Circle*, Sherwood argues for the temporal priority of reason over faith in Donne's epistemology. He points to Donne's claim that "by our senses we come to understand, so by our understanding we come to believe"[10] and concludes, "Rational knowledge of principles structuring the natural world is a necessary precursor to faith, since man can determine certain truths about God on the basis of these principles" (IX, 35). Sherwood proceeds to link Donne's conception of the faculty of reason with Augustine's division of reason into two functions, "*ratio* (or *ratio inferior*), leading to knowledge of temporal things, and *intellectus* (or *ratio superior*), leading to wisdom or knowledge of the divine."[11] *Ratio* corresponds to "common Reason" in Donne while "*intellectus*," proposes Sherwood, is the "*new facultie of Reason*" of the "regenerate Christian" (III, 359). He then attributes to Donne Augustine's three-step relationship between faith and reason: "reason's preparation, the act of faith, then understanding the 'content of faith.'"[12]

I agree with Sherwood's reading of Donne's epistemology as far as it goes but would take it a step further. Just as an understanding born of common

reason precurses the act of faith, so memory precurses this understanding, for the memory provides the images without which reason cannot function. Furthermore, the faculty of memory is involved in the third step, "understanding the 'content of faith,'" as well. This understanding, arising as it does from the "new facultie of Reason" of regenerate Christians, functions in the same manner as common reason—through a process of abstraction dependent upon images stored in the memory. The difference between the two faculties, says Donne, is the enlightening power of faith. As Donne explains, "Reason is that first, and primogenial light, and goes no farther in a naturall man; but in a man regenerate by faith, that light does all that reason did and more" (III, 362). William R. Mueller, whose position is essentially the same as Sherwood's, says of the difference between common reason and faith in Donne that the second light is "stronger than the first since it is a source of knowledge rather than of sight."[13] In other words, what one sees with the common reason—that God exists—one understands in all its personal implications *by means of faith* through the newly enlightened faculty of reason. And memory is a prerequisite for both levels of understanding.

In the sermons, of the two books by which we learn about God—nature and the scriptures—nature, or the "booke of Creatures," is described as the "elder book."[14] At one point, Donne asserts that "indeed the Scriptures are but a paraphrase, but a comment, but an illustration of that booke of Creatures" (III, 264). That our initial knowledge of God derives from our observation of his effects is a point upon which Donne insists throughout his sermons. A study of these passages reveals how sense-oriented Donne's epistemology really is. In a sermon on Job 19:26, "And though after my skin, wormes destroy my body, yet in my flesh shall I see God," he quotes the apostle Paul, "Here, in this world, we see God *per speculum* . . . by reflection, upon a glasse; we see a creature; and from that arises an assurance that there is a Creator" (III, 111). In a later sermon, on I Corinthians 13:12, Donne reiterates this belief: "For, here we see God *In speculo, in a glasse*, that is by reflexion, And here we know God *In aenigmate*, sayes our Text, *Darkly*, (so we translate it) that is, by obscure representations" (VIII, 220). Though the emphasis in the later passage is on the obscurity, distortion, and limitations of the knowledge to be obtained by means of reflection, the fact remains that while we are earthly creatures, our knowledge of God derives from just such "obscure representations" as the glass of his creatures provides.

In describing the source of these obscure representations, Donne cites Aquinas as he explains that "our Theatre, where we sit to see God, is the whole frame of nature" (p. 223).[15] The emphasis again is on sight, that most elevated of senses. Donne adds further that the "glasse in which we see him, is the Creature; and our light by which we see him, is Naturall Reason" (p. 223). The knowledge we derive from such "reflected beams" is likened to the information

we receive from a mirror: "That as that which we see in a glasse, assures us, that such a thing there is, (for we cannot see a dreame in a glasse, nor a fancy, nor a Chimera) so this sight of God, which our Apostle sayes we have *in a glasse*, is enough to assure us, that a God there is" (VIII, 223). In fact, Donne's own preaching with its memorably striking images is also a "looking glass of creation."

While these reflected beams are available to all men, the extent to which individuals make sense of these reflections depends, according to Donne, on the use to which they put their reasoning abilities. He illustrates this point with a vivid analogy:

> Divers men may walk by the Sea side, and the same beames of the Sunne giving light to them all, one gathereth by the benefit of that light pebles or speckled shells, for curious vanitie, and another gathers precious Pearle, or medicinall Ambar, by the same light. So the common light of reason illumins us all; but one imployes this light upon the searching of impertinent vanities, another by a better use of the same light finds out the Mysteries of Religion. (III, 359)

In this sermon Donne even seems to indicate that the gift of faith may be related to the diligence with which one applies the common light of reason to the images of God's effects. He explains, "The light of nature is far from being enough; but, as a *candle* may kindle a *torch*, so unto the faculties of nature, well imployed, God infuses faith" (p. 369). The parenthetical "well imployed" is noteworthy. Similarly, Donne elsewhere comments, "The light of naturall understanding . . . when the mind of man, dis-encumbred of all Eclipses, and all clouds of passion, or inordinate love of earthly things, is enlightened so far, as to discerne God in nature" (III, 277). Obviously, though natural reason is common to all, the degree to which an individual frees his thinking from "clouds of passion" and other distractions can vary considerably. What is most interesting about these passages is that they seem slightly at odds with the Protestant notion that grace—the free gift of God—is never earned or in anyway merited. If, however, we recall the passage from Donne's sermon of valediction in which "as a well made, and well plac'd picture, looks alwayes upon him that looks upon it; so shall thy God look upon thee, whose memory is thus contemplating him, and shine upon thine understanding" (II, 237), we see the same emphasis on mutual effort. Certainly, God never loses sight of us, but at the same time we must fix our gaze upon him using whatever means he provides.

Additional evidence for the precedence of understanding via natural reason to faith can be found throughout one of Donne's sermons on the penitential psalms. In his sermon on Psalm 32:8, "I will instruct thee, and teach

thee in the way which thou shalt goe, I will guide thee with mine eye," Donne explains the process as follows:

> The Apostle seems to make that our first step, *Hee that come to God, must beleeve*. So it is our first step to God To beleeve, but there is a step towards God, before it comes to faith, which is to understand; God works first upon the understanding. (IX, 354)

And in this sermon Donne again stresses the active role of the individual: "God doth not determine his promise here, in a *Faciam ut intelligas*, I will cast an understanding upon thee, I will cause an understanding to fall upon thee, but it is *faciam te intellegere, I will make thee to understand*, Thou shalt be an Agent in thine own salvation" (p. 356).

Early to late, throughout his sermons Donne consistently advocates the same process of approaching God—a process rooted in sensory perception of God's effects rather than direct illumination. In one of his earliest recorded sermons, for example, Donne denounces Catholics who deny an "ordinary way of coming to know things" and who claim to learn "not by having any thing presented by the fantasie to the senses, and so to the understanding, but altogether by a familiar conversation with God, and an immediate revelation from God" (I, 186). In a later sermon he similarly ridicules the Pharisee "that dreames of such an union, such an identification with God in this life, as that he understands all things, not by the benefit of the senses, and impressions in the fancy and imagination, or by discourse and ratiocination, as we poor soules doe, but by immediate, and continuall infusions and inspirations from God himselfe" (IX, 169). In these passages the necessity of sense impressions and their priority in time to understanding are simply taken for granted.[16]

While sense perceptions of God's effects provide the basis for our knowledge of God, Donne is at the same time very much aware of the limitations of the natural reason unilluminated by faith. Thus, although he identifies the book of creatures as the first kind of proof, he also calls it the weakest, offering only "a faint knowledge of God, in respect of that knowledge with which we must know him" and incapable of "[imprinting] in us that knowledge which is our saving knowledge" (VI, 133-34). Likewise, in the *Essayes in Divinity* he argues, "Certainly every Creature shewes God, as a glass, but glimeringly and transitorily, by the frailty both of the receiver, and beholder."[17] In a sermon on Romans 13:11 he asserts initially, "Outward and visible means of knowing God, God hath given to all Nations in the book of Creatures. . . .The visible God was presented in visible things" (II, 253). But, he continues, "this is only such a knowledge of God as Philosophers, moral and natural men may have, and yet be farre from making this knowledge any means of Salvation" (p. 253). He illustrates this truth with an example: a traveler who knows the exterior of a

particular house from having passed it many times, but who has no concept of what it might be like to dwell in the house. In the same manner, the knowledge acquired by means of natural reason is by itself insufficient for man's salvation—it merely lets us know that salvation is, indeed, possible.

In a sermon of 1624, as he considers the "ways of imprinting the knowledge of God in man," Donne identifies "the way of Nature, and the book of Creatures" as a "darke and weake way" (VI, 142). Elaborating, he points out that the voice of the creature alone "is but a faint voyce, a low voyce" and that it does not "beget faith" (p. 143). On the other hand, he also argues in this same sermon that the book of Creatures "illustrates and establishes, and cherishes that which we have received by faith, in hearing the Word" (p. 143). This last remark seems to indicate that though natural reason may abstract from God's effects only a limited knowledge of his existence, at the same time, once the divine mysteries have been accepted by faith, the same book of Creatures may yield to the enlighted reason an understanding of these mysteries.

Donne indicates elsewhere as well that even after having received faith, we acquire additional knowledge of God's plan for our redemption by visible, sensory means. In discussing the slighter possibility for salvation of those outside the church than for those within, Donne points out that those outside "have no ordinary nor established way of attaining to it because Christ is not manifested to them in an ordinary preaching of the Word and an ordinary administration of the Sacraments" (II, 253-54). While these people may see God in his effects, they do not, Donne argues, have "salvation presented unto them by sensible and visible means" (p. 253). In other words, while the created world points to God's *existence*, salvation is made plain by the sensible ministrations of the church. What Donne seems to suggest in these passages is that a saving knowledge of God, like the common knowledge that he exists, is also acquired by sensory means. Of course, in order to *receive* salvation, God's children need only accept the Scriptures in faith, but to *understand* the mysteries of their faith, they need to study the sensible and visible means by which God makes plain his divine plan. In addition to the illustrations offered in the Bible, Christians must avail themselves of "sensible and visible means" in the sacraments, the preacher's sermons, and the examples of other Christians. In this way, they become agents of their own salvation.

According to Donne, then, the process by which man comes to know God while on earth involves several steps. First, all people perceive God's handiwork in the creation. These sense perceptions of his work are stored in the memory in the form of images from which the intellectual light or common reason abstracts the existence of a creator. Our knowledge that God exists then leads us "to seeke his revealed and manifested will" (V, 247).[18] God's will is revealed in the Scriptures, and those things which we find in the Scriptures

"which belong to our Salvation, are not *In-intelligibilia*, not In-intelligible, un-understandable, un-conceivable things, but the Articles of faith are discernible by Reason" (IX, 355). Once such articles are understood, "grace finds out mans naturall faculties, and exalts them to a capacity, and a susceptibleness of the working thereof, and so by the understanding infuses faith" (IX, 355).[19] After men accept God's will by faith, the exalted capacity of reason is able to comprehend the "Mysteries of Religion" which were beyond the capacity of the ordinary reason. These "mysteries" include such things as the virgin birth, the incarnation, and the resurrection. The exalted reason comprehends the incomprehensible through the same process of abstraction by which common reason comprehends the understandable. For example, the book of creatures which initially prompts us to learn more about God, now illustrates those truths which have been accepted on faith.[20]

Our ability to know God will not always be so limited, says Donne, for in heaven we will no longer have to rely on our senses for an understanding of rules. He makes this point in the conclusion of a sermon preached "Upon Easter-Munday, 1622" on II Corinthians 4:6. In this sermon also, the sense-orientation (and subsequent fallibility) of man's earthly knowledge is clearly established.[21] In heaven, by contrast, "That great Library, those infinite Volumes of the Books of Creatures, shall be taken away" (IV, 128). In heaven, examples will be superfluous; we will know the rule directly as the following illustration makes clear:

> I shall know, not only as I know already, that a Beehive, that an Ant-hill is the same Book in *Decimo sexto*, as a Kingdom is in *Folio*, That a Flower that lives but a day, is an abridgment of that King, that lives out his threescore and ten yeers; but I shall know too, that all these Ants, and Bees, and Flowers, and Kings, and Kingdoms, howsoever they may be Examples, and Comparisons to one another, yet they are all as nothing, altogether nothing, less than nothing, infinitely less than nothing, to that which shall then be the subject of my knowledge, for, *it is the knowledge of the glory of God.* (p. 128)

Such is the difference between abstracting knowledge indirectly from an example and knowing something directly without the mediation of the senses.

The differences between our earthly knowledge of God and that knowledge which will be ours in heaven are perhaps best delineated in two passages from the sermons, both based on the same metaphor. As to our earthly knowledge, Donne declares:

> For, as howsoever a man may forget the order of his letters after he is come to reade perfectly, and forget the rules of his

> Grammar, after he is come to speake perfectly, yet by those letters, and by that Grammar he came to that perfection; so, though faith be of an infinite exaltation above understanding, yet as though our understanding be above our senses, yet by our senses we come to understand, so by our understanding we come to believe. (IX, 357)

By contrast, in heaven, the faculties of our soul will be "enlarged, and filled at once":

> There she [the soul] reads without spelling, and knowes without thinking, and concludes without arguing . . . . She knowes truly, and easily, and immediately, and entirely, and everlastingly. (VI, 76)

The difference is clear; only after our resurrection will our knowledge of God truly be a direct and complete illumination.

On earth, however, limited to knowing eternal truths only as they are embodied in concrete particulars, Donne must try to convey the glory of God with the examples available to him. His audience, in return, must apply themselves to the examples, as agents in their own salvation. In yet another Easter sermon, he urges his listeners to *see* the face of Christ in the physical manifestation of the Lord's Supper: "See him here, that you may know him, and he you, there . . . see him in the preaching of his Word, see him in that seal, which is a Copy of him, as he is of his Father; see him in the Sacrament" (III, 129-30). In closing this particular sermon, he again reminds his audience in the words of his earlier sermon on memory, that "as a Picture looks upon him, that looks upon it, God upon whom thou keepest thine Eye, will keep his Eye upon thee" (p. 130). As Gale Carrithers notes in *Donne at Sermons: A Christian Existential World*, the implication of this passage is that "God must be deliberately encountered, that human ideas of God are made things and hence relative but may nevertheless suggest something not relative."[22]

In a sermon of 1622, on Job 36:25, "Every man may see it, man may behold it afar off" (IV, 163), Donne investigates further both the initial knowledge of God available to all men through common reason and the more personal vision of God granted to regenerate Christians. This sermon, too, emphasizes each individual's fundamental responsibility to avail himself of the knowledge of God accessible to natural reason. In establishing the structure of this sermon, Donne states his purpose clearly—he must "[bring] God into the eyes of man." Furthermore, he indicates that he will be focusing their attention on particulars (p. 164). He next divides the text into its two parts. The first part concerns the manifestation of "God in his works," a manifestation presented to all "here

below" (p. 164). The second part deals with additional knowledge of "God in his glory," knowledge not afforded to all, but only to him "that hath tasted affliction, and calamity" (p. 165). In each part he proposes to cover three things: the object of the vision, the method or faculty of the vision, and the identity of the viewer.

In the first part of the text, the object, "the *limited* object," which man may see "is a *worke*, and therefore it is *made*" (p. 265). From this Donne deduces, "It hath an *author*, a *creator* and then it is *his worke*, the worke of God, and therefore manifests him" (p. 165). He argues against limiting our vision merely to *perceiving* the creation without questioning what lies behind it. By accepting the creation as self-sustaining, self-begotten, people make the mistake of denying a Creator's existence and then substituting the creation for that Creator. The Bible as well as creation informs us that this world is God's handiwork, and, insists Donne, even if we choose not to read the Bible or the Fathers, other writers will tell us the same thing. In this sermon, however, Donne enumerates the superiority of God's natural revelation. Not only are the "tomes of Gods Creatures" numberless (p. 167), but the knowledge of God to be gained through observation of his creation (as opposed to studying abstract philosophies) is also highly accessible:

> Hast thou not room, hast thou not money, hast thou not understanding, hast thou not leasure, for great volumes, for the *bookes of heaven*, (for the *Mathematiques*) nor for the books of *Courts*, (the *Politiques*) take but the *Georgiques*, the consideration of the *Earth*, a farme, a garden, nay seven foot of earth, a grave, and that will be book enough. (p. 167)

Even within the realm of the concrete particulars of the creation, Donne leads his listeners from the remote to the highly specific—from the earth in its entirety to a seven-foot plot of ground. And Donne's explication becomes even more vividly specific:

> Goe lower; every *worme* in the grave, lower, every *weed* upon the grave, is an abridgement of all; nay lock up all doores and windowes, see nothing but *thy selfe*; nay let thy selfe be locked up in a close prison, that thou canst not see thy selfe, and doe but feel thy *pulse*; let thy pulse be intermitted, or stupefied, that thou feel not that, and doe but thinke, and *a worme*, a *weed*, thy *selfe*, thy *pulse*, thy *thought*, are all testimonies, that *All*, this *All*, and all the parts thereof, are *opus*, a *work made*, and *opus ejus, his work*, made by *God*. (p. 167)

Even when deprived of sight and other earthly senses, if we are able to recall images (formed at a time when our sense perceptions *were* functioning), we

have the raw materials from which we can learn of God's existence.

Having thus addressed the object of man's vision, Donne is now ready to discuss the extent and nature of it. The vision of God with which Donne is concerned is the vision described in Romans 1:20, quoted thus within the text: "*The invisible things of God, are seen by things which are made*" (p. 167). This verse is also the one upon which Aquinas bases his reply to the objection that because God is incorporeal there can be no image of him in our imaginations, and thus no knowledge of him through our natural reason. In reply to the question "how much of God?" (p. 168), Donne readily accepts the answer of the scholastics: "These bodily eyes, even then, when they are glorified, shall not see the *Essence* of God . . . ; but the eyes of our soul, shal be so enlightned, as that they shal see God *Sicuti est*, even in his *essences*, which the best illumined and most sanctified men are very far from in this life" (p. 168). The sight of God in the text under consideration, explains Donne, brings with it only the knowledge "that there is a God" (p. 168). This knowledge of God's existence is clearly that limited knowledge which arises from common reason and precedes faith.

Donne next raises the question posed by Aquinas, "can man as a *naturall man*, doe that [see/know God]?" (p. 168). His answer is essentially Thomistic. Initially, he replies to this question by posing another, the question which "hath divided the School," namely, "can he chuse but do it?" (p. 168). Considering the many possible relationships between seeing and knowing, several replies are feasible, each affording man different amounts of responsibility. Conceivably, it could be that all men not only see the visible signs of God, but also must *necessarily* deduce the existence of the invisible God whether or not they desire to do so. This position holds that it is totally beyond man's ability to escape knowledge of God. On the other hand, it could be that while all men see the corporeal "effects" of God, some might fail to "progress" from that perception to a recognition of the existence of the invisible God. This failure is the result of their own lack of initiative—they *could* know God from his effects, but choose, instead, to ignore or deny what lies beyond the corporeal signs.

Rather than choose either of these alternatives outright, Donne develops a third option which is really a variation of the first. This position involves all men at some time seeing the visible effects of God and gaining from this sight knowledge that God exists. There is no question of whether men *must* or only *may* receive knowledge of God from their perception of his handiwork; they simply *do* receive such knowledge. The passage in which Donne explains the position of the Thomists on the one hand (position one outlined above) and the Scotists on the other (position two) and then proceeds to outline his own view of the relationship between seeing and knowing (position three), seems to me to be essential to a clear understanding of his epistemology and the role of

memory in that epistemology. Donne sums up the difference between the two schools as follows: "*Thomas* thinks that it is so evident, that man cannot chuse but know it, though he resist it; The other thinks, in it selfe, it is but so evident, as that a man may know it, if he imploy his naturall faculties, without going any farther" (p. 168). Donne then suggests that the Holy Spirit, as "God of *Peace*," reconciles the two interpretations in the words of the text from Job. In Hebrew, the text "though it goe not absolutely, so far, as *Thomas*, every man *must*, no man can chuse but see God, yet it goes so far further than *Scotus*, (who ends in every man *may*) as that it says, every man *hath* seen God" (pp. 168-69). I see very little difference between Thomas's "must" and the Holy Spirit's "hath," for in both readings (unlike Scotus's) the end result—knowledge of God's existence by all men—is the same. In fact, in the sermon on I Corinthians 13:12, Donne quotes Aquinas and concludes, "The world is the Theatre that represents God, and every man may, nay must see him" (VIII, 224).

If all people know that God exists, however, how can we explain the fact that some deny such knowledge? There are two possible explanations. Those who deny God's existence could be lying, stubbornly refusing to admit what they know to be true. On the other hand, they may simply not be conscious of the knowledge of God which they do, in fact, possess. In other words, while all *receive* knowledge of God's existence through their sense perception of his handiwork, only *some* remember or are conscious of this knowledge—those who persist in their search for it. In fact, Donne suggests that the latter explanation is often the case. He argues, "Our labour never lies in this, to prove to any man, that he *may* see God, but onely to remember him that he *hath* seen God: not to make him believe that there is a God, but to make him see, that he does beleeve it" (p. 169). The emphasis here (as in position three outlined above) is Augustinian in that the preacher prompts his listeners to remember what they already know of God; it is Thomistic in that the knowledge of God comes not from direct illumination of innate ideas but through sense perception of His handiwork in the world. That being the case, when the preacher offers particulars for his listeners' consideration, he is duplicating what is available to them in God's creation.

Why do people need to be reminded of their knowledge of God? Besides the weakness of memory itself (we may simply forget what we once knew), recall that according to Aquinas, the strength or weakness of a man's intellectual light—the capacity "by which we make abstract intelligible concepts from [concrete] images"—is also a deciding factor. Thus, even though all people abstract God's existence from their perceptions of His effects (since all people have some degree of natural capacity), only those people with strong intellectual lights will clearly understand the knowledge. While this sounds remarkably elitist, Aquinas also assures his readers that the intellectual light can be strengthened by grace. Likewise, Donne explains in his sermon on John 14:26,

a sermon in which he discusses the function of the the Holy Spirit, that "*He shall teach you,* He, who can not onely infuse true and full knowledge in every capacity that he findes, but dilate that capacity where he findes it, yea create it where he findes none" (VIII, 254). With the Holy Spirit's aid, man's intellectual light functions optimally, allowing for more complete recognition of what is already known (though perhaps only vaguely) to be true. Memory and understanding can, likewise, be "dilated" for greater awareness of ultimate truths. The preacher, in his imitation of the Holy Spirit's method of teaching, assists in this dilation.

Donne concludes the second section of part one by pointing out that although every man has seen God in his works, men may nevertheless deny knowing him. Some in their perversity close their eyes to the easy, obvious sights and acknowledge God's presence only under duress:

> Miserable distemper! not to see God in the *light,* and see him in the *darke*: not to see him at *noon*, and see him fearfully at *midnight*: not to see, where we all see him, in the Congregation, and to see him with terror, in the *Suburbs of despaire*, in the solitary chamber. (p. 169)

But because all men are provided to some degree with the capacity to know God through his work, those who claim not to know him are left without excuse. "The inexcusablenesse," writes Donne, "goes over *man*, over all men: Because they would not see invisible things in visible, they are inexcusable, *all*" (p. 169). In ending part one, Donne concludes, "You can place this clod of earth, *man,* in no *ignorance*, in no *melancholy*, in no *oppression*, in no *sinne*, but that he *may*, but that he *does* see God" (p. 170). Furthermore, denial on the part of individuals does nothing to alter the basic fact that all have seen God, for as Donne remarks, "The Marrigold opens to the Sunne, though it have no tongue to say so, the Atheist does see God, though he have not grace to confesse it" (p. 170).[23]

The fact that all men are able to know God (though to greater and lesser extents) by seeing him in his works is very heartening news for a preacher faced with the task of "teaching God" to his listeners. By directing their attention to examples of God's handiwork and providing images of His creation for their consideration, he supplies them with the raw materials necessary for the initial seeing and understanding of God which precede faith. In this way he "[brings] God into the eyes of men." In doing so, Donne works to make sure that the images he provides are vivid and concrete and likely to be retained in his listener's memories where they can be worked on by the intellectual light; often, he even suggests to his audience what the examples are supposed to signify. Nevertheless, if, through negligence, an individual listener fails to recognize the universal truth behind each particular, then he

"heares but the Logique, or the Rhetorique, or the Ethique, or the poetry of the Sermon, but the Sermon of the Sermon he heares not" (VII, 293). The man who fails to see God in the particulars of the sermon simply misses the point. An example divorced from rule (or memory without subsequent understanding) is useless.[24]

In part two of the sermon on Job 36:25, Donne distinguishes between this seeing (knowing) of God and another. The object of this second sight is still God "but in another manifestation, then in his *worke*, in *glory*" (p. 170). The seeing is not in "his *works* abroad, but in his *working* upon [the viewer] at home" (p. 173). The person is not all men but the man, an Enosh, "who by having tasted Gods corrections, or by having considered the miseries of this world, is prepared for the joy and glory of the next" (p. 170). Hence, those who receive this second sight have already accomplished the first seeing and have recognized God in his works. Having acknowledged God's existence, they are "led to seeke his revealed and manifested will" in the Scriptures (V, 247). Finally they accept this will for their own lives through faith. The sight of God in affliction, unlike the sight of God in his works, affects the will as well as the memory or understanding for, as Donne explains, "his will shall be inclined, and disposed to it, and every first beame of Gods grace, every influence of the Spirit of God, shall open his eyes" (p. 174).

In fact, this sight, Donne points out, is more specifically denominated as "beholding" and is quite different in nature from the sight of God available to all: the afflicted man will "contemplate God, ruminate, meditate upon God" (p. 174). "Contemplation," "rumination," and "meditation" are the very disciplines described by Aquinas as essential to the cultivation of memory for devotional purposes (*ST*, 2a. 2ae, 49). Donne further distinguishes between the two visions as follows:

> Man *sees* best in the *light*, but *meditates* best in the *darke*; for our sight of God, it is enough, that God gives the light of *nature*; to behold him so, as to fixe upon him in meditation, God benights us, or eclipses us, or casts a cloud of medicinall afflictions, and wholsome corrections upon us. (p. 174)

In eclipsing us, Donne explains, what God actually does is remove from us those distractions which otherwise might interfere with our meditation. Simply recognizing the Creator's existence is not enough. Instead of inquiring further after the Maker as we ought, however, we often languish in the dazzling allurement of his effects. Sight is necessary in order that we might form the initial images, but afterwards we must turn our gaze inward and contemplate these images. In benighting us, God, in effect, puts blinders on us; he blots out whatever is diverting our attention so that we may see only him. Darkness best

befits meditation when the meditator is as easily led astray as humans have shown themselves to be.[25]

Donne describes the process of beholding God as follows:

> That man, who through his own *red glasse*, can see Christ, in that colour too, through his own miseries, can see Christ Jesus in his blood, that through the calumnies that have been put upon himself, can see the revilings that were multiplyed upon Christ, that in his own imprisonment, can see Christ in the grave, and in his own enlargement, Christ in his resurrection, this man . . . beholds God. (pp. 174-75)

What Donne describes in this passage is a man "remembering himself," contemplating his own experiences, and through them seeing Christ's. Through this sight of his experiences in affliction, then, he ultimately beholds God.[26] Such sight is what Aquinas identifies as a "prophetic vision" received as a "revelation of grace" and "formed in the imagination by divine power" (*ST*, 1a. 12, 13). Though these "prophetic visions" do not originate in the sensible world and though they provide more intimate knowledge of God than do the "lesser" images of his effects (which originate in sensible objects of God's creation and which point only to God's existence), prophetic visions are similar to the lesser images as Donne's description also makes clear in that they also are *apprehended* in sensible form: the visions formed within the imagination consist of concrete images. It is this characteristic which distinguishes them from Augustine's inner illuminations. For while in a sense the visions are a form of direct illumination, they are not innate, but rather, are subsequently given by God and remain inextricably bound to sense perceptions.

The link between sensible forms and such heightened knowledge of God as is afforded by prophetic visions is explained by the fact that grace itself (the necessary prerequisite for prophetic visions) is received through the senses. For example, in a sermon preached at St. Paul's in October of 1622 Donne writes, "The ordinary way of the *holy Ghost*, for the conveying of *faith*, and supernaturall graces, is (as the way of worldly knowledge is) by the senses" (IV, 225). In another, he writes, "It is said often in Philosophy, *Nihil in intellectu, quod non prius in sensu;* till some *sense* apprehend a thing, the *Judgment* cannot debate it, nor discourse it; It may well be said in *Divinity* too, *Nihil in gratia, quod non prius in natura*, there is nothing in grace, that was not first in nature, so farre, as that grace always finds nature, and naturall faculties to work on" (V, 176). In other words, regenerate Christians may receive certain kinds of knowledge of God through the direct ministrations of the Holy Spirit, unaccompanied by direct sense perception. Nevertheless, even this special knowledge of God is *comprehended* in the same form (concrete images) as the knowledge of God available to all men through common reason.

The fact that even such revelations of grace are in this way dependent upon sense-perceptions (in that they are received as images) explains why they too are subject to the distorting powers of sin. Donne makes this point clear in an Easter sermon on II Corinthians 4:6 in which he warns that "sometimes it is hard to distinguish between a respiration from God, and a suggestion from the Devil" (IV, 128).

Furthermore, the prophetic visions which one individual receives do not necessarily lend themselves to instructing others. The visions may be so personal or so complex as to be unintelligible to any but the receiver. In the sermon on the text from Job, Donne attempts to describe certain visions of God afforded by the Holy Spirit:

> I can see round about me, even to the *Horizon*, and beyond it, I can see *both Hemispheres* at once, God in this, and God in the next world too. I can see him, in the *Zenith*, in the highest point, and see how he works upon *Pharoah*, on the Throne, and I can see him in the *Nadir*, in the lowest dejection, and see how he workes upon *Joseph* in the prison . . . ; I can see him in the *South*, in a warme, and in the *North*, in a frosty fortune: I can see him in all angles, in all postures. (p. 175)

Clearly, Donne does not literally see these things, as he could God's effects. In trying to picture for his audience what can only be perceived directly through grace, he offers a range of reference that creates for the unbeliever only unmitigated paradox. At the same time, through the Holy Spirit's grace, the regenerate Christian accepts and understands these visions as clearly as he does the knowledge afforded to common reason through God's effects.

That this process is not automatic but requires not only genuine desire but also concentrated effort on the part of these regenerate Christians is a point Donne makes in closing the second part of his sermon on the text from Job and in other sermons as well. In the sermon on Job he instances biblical figures who not only saw God but who also beheld him, drawing lessons for his listeners from their experiences. For example, from the occasion upon which Abraham beheld God in form of the three strangers and ran to greet him, Donne concludes, "I can see God in the visitation of his Spirit come to me . . . but I must run out to meet him; that is, labour to hold him there, and to advance that manifestation of himselfe in me" (p. 175). In other words, even the heavenly visions afforded to the "new facultie of Reason" require attentive consideration on the part of the receiver. Bringing God into the sight of men is Donne's task as preacher. By focusing their attention on their own personal experiences and providing images of God's effects for his listeners' consideration, he imitates the Holy Spirit who provides prophetic visions. Nevertheless, ultimate responsibility for seeing God lies in the individual; if he is to see God, he must

be receptive to the images placed before him.[27] Grace is free but human faculties must be open to its reception.

## "Remembring our selves": Thomistic Tendencies in Donne's Appeal to Memory

The starting points for most critics who attempt to establish an Augustinian appeal to memory in Donne's sermons are his sermon on Psalm 38:3, a few isolated passages from a later sermon on John 14:26, and his sermon of valediction on Ecclesiastes 12:1. The sermon on Psalm 38:3 contains the often-quoted passage, "The art of *salvation* is the art of *memory*" (II, 73), while in the one on John 14:16 Donne describes the Holy Spirit's teaching us by means of "remembering, by establishing us in things formerly Fundamentally laid" (VIII, 253). Furthermore, in this later sermon Donne claims, "*He shall teach you*, He, who can not only infuse true and full knowledge in every capacity where he findes it, yea create it where he findes none" (p. 254). These statements along with the following lines from the sermon on Psalm 38:3 do initially seem to lend themselves to the Augustinian reading offered by Webber and Guibbory:

> *Plato* plac'd *all learning* in the memory; wee may place *all Religion* in the memory too: All knowledge, that seems new today, says *Plato*, is but a remembring of *that*, which your soul knew before. All instruction, which we can give you to day, is but the remembring you of the mercies of God, which have been *new every morning*. Nay, he that hears no Sermons, he that reads no Scriptures, hath the Bible without book; He hath a *Genesis* in his *memory*; he cannot forget his *Creation*; he hath an *Exodus* in his memory; he cannot forget, that God hath delivered him, from some kind of *Egypt*, from some oppression; He hath a *Leviticus* in his memory; hee cannot forget, that God hath proposed to him some Law, some rules to be observed. He hath *all in* his memory, even to the *Revelation* . . . . There may be enough in *remembring our selves*. (II, 74)

Guibbory and Webber identify this "remembring our selves" with an Augustinian rediscovery of universal truths already present in the memory but perhaps not recognized or understood. The two are not equivalent, however. As the rest of Donne's commentary in this and the other two sermons makes clear, by "remembering oneself" he means quite simply remembering particular events in one's own life which parallel those recorded in the Bible. As Paul Harland notes in his study of the relationship between the memory and imagination, for Donne the imagination functions optimally when it "recalls the events related

in Scripture or when it recollects the scriptural application of personal experience."[28] From the memories of these experiences men may abstract an understanding of God's dealings with his children in general. Thus, remembering one's self is one of the first steps *towards* understanding. And, in fact, even this first step may be difficult, for as Donne explains, "many times we are farthest off from our selves; most forgetfull of our selves" (p. 74). One of Donne's aims, then, is to assist his listeners in their process of self-knowledge.

Ultimately, in the sermon on Psalm 38:3 Donne hopes his congregation will come to understand one of the universal laws governing God's behavior toward his people. In concluding his introduction he explains, "And *that* that you are to remember, is that all calamities, that fall upon you, fall not from the malice or power of man, but from the anger of God; And then that Gods anger fals not upon you, from his *Hate*, or his *Decree*, but from *your sins*" (p. 75). If, in hearing the sermon, the audience acquires a personal understanding of the role of God's anger in their lives, then Donne's efforts will have been successful. As the rest of his sermon indicates, however, Donne does not (as in a Platonic epistemology) assume that the members of the congregation already possess an understanding of God's anger (in some unconsidered form which they need simply to recall to the conscious mind). By contrast, what Donne actually attempts is to lead them to an understanding of something beyond their comprehension, an understanding which they may never before have possessed. To do so, he begins by presenting them with images they should already recognize from their own experience.

A parallel passage in the sermon on the text from John presents the Holy Spirit's work on the memory *not* in terms of innately held intellectual visions directly enlightening the receiver but in terms of recalling specific instances (images) of God's presence in one's life:

> The ignorantest man that is, even he that cannot reade a Picture, even a blinde man, hath a better book in himself; In his own memory he may reade many a history of God's goodness to him. *Quid ab initio*, How it was in the beginning, is Christ's Method; To determine things according to former precedents; And truly the Memory is oftner the Holy Ghosts Pulpit that he preaches in, then the Understanding.
>
> (VIII, 261)

The emphasis in this passage on "[determining] things" on the basis of particular events actually experienced supports a distinctly different reading of the role of memory than Augustine's theory of illumination.

Donne's opening remarks in the sermon on Psalm 38:3 are also Thomistic in their suggestion of memory as a condition for understanding: the key by which we "get into the understanding of the Psalm, and profiting by the Psalm"

is that it is "a Psalm of Remembrance." "The faculty which is awakened here," he continues, "is our *Memory*" (p. 72). Memory, "so familiar, and so present, and so ready a faculty," is contrasted with "the stiffe perversnesse, and opposition" of the will and the general inability of the understanding to grasp "*the unrevealed decrees, and secrets of God*" (p. 73). Perhaps one reason for the memory's advantage over the understanding is that unlike understanding, it attempts to deal not with "*unrevealed decrees and secrets of God*" but rather with the concrete representations of those decrees which God *has* chosen to reveal.

In this sermon, then, Donne presents his hearers with images (illustrations or Examples) of God's decrees (Rules). Those illustrations which the memory actually retains are available to be taken up by the understanding. In adopting this method of teaching, Donne follows the lead of Aquinas who suggests, "It is necessary . . . to invent similitudes and images because simple and spiritual intentions slip easily from the soul unless they are as it were linked to some corporeal similitudes" (*ST*, 2a2ae 49).[29] Donne's examples are David, Adam, and Christ. In offering his *divisio* of the sermon, Donne writes, "first, *Adam* was the *Patient*, and so, his promise, the promise that he received of a *Messiah*, is our *physick*; And then *David* was the *Patient*, and there, his *Example* is our *physick*; And lastly, *Christ Jesus* was the *Patient*, and so, his blood is our physick" (p. 75). Dennis Quinn, in assessing Donne's treatment of the three biblical figures notes that "six-tenths of the sermon" is devoted to an examination of Adam and the moral sense of the passage (as opposed to the historical/literal sense [David] or the prophetical [Christ])." From this fact, he concludes, "It is the remembrance of one's self which is the action of the sermon; the reminders of David and of Christ are only prologue and epilogue."[30]

The assessment of David's example as "only prologue" seems to overlook what Donne himself saw as an important reason for introducing this particular example first. Though both Adam and David would ultimately be recognized as specific biblical figures by Donne's audiences, still, as Quinn himself points out, Donne will be concerned with Adam primarily as a moral representative of all men rather than as a single, historical person. For this reason, Donne explains, he will begin with David despite the fact that the universality of the human condition and the applicability of the text to individuals might actually emerge more completely from the study of man in general as represented in Adam. He justifies his approach by pointing out that a physician "concludes out of events: . . . therefore, in this spiritual physick of the soul, we will deal upon *Experience* too, and see first, how this wrought upon this *particular person*, upon *David*." Likewise, he proposes to begin his study of the "humane condition" (a rather general topic) by examining the specific experiences of an "exemplar mild man" (p. 77). By presenting to his congregation examples

from the life of David, he will help them understand God's anger in their own lives.

He reminds the congregation first of what a mild, long-suffering man David was. Even so, concludes Donne, "this exemplar mild man," knew that anger can be righteous as well. To illustrate, Donne vividly reconstructs an instance of David's response to a scornful enemy:

> [He] goes himself in person, into a dangerous war, against the Ammonites, assisted with 32000 chariots of their neighbours the Aramites, and there he destroys those great numbers . . . ; He takes the City Rabbah, and the people he cuts with Saws, and with Harrows of iron, and with Axes. (p. 77)

Immediately following this purposely gruesome illustration, Donne reiterates the Rule he originally set before his audience—"God's goodnesse hath that disposition, to bee long suffering; mans illnesse and abuse of that, is able to inflame God" (p. 78). Thus, the ways of God are made manifest through the striking example of the anger displayed by a particular man. More specifically, Donne presents his listeners with an image of David the bloody warrior from which their reason can abstract an understanding of God's anger.

The final part of this sermon consists of a demonstration that Christ, like David and Adam, also suffered the anger of God, and that God's anger was caused once again by sin, though not Christ's own. Unlike the other two examples, however, Christ is the Physician as well as the Patient. Taking his cue from Christ's example, Donne urges his listeners to become like the godly examples they have contemplated. From them, then, others might also learn of God (p. 93). The sermon on John 14:26 echoes this admonition: "And if the holy Ghost do bring these things, which we preach to your remembrance, you are also made fishers of men . . . men that assist the salvation of the world, by the best way of preaching, an exemplar life, and holy conversation" (VIII, 269). Clearly, "these things" are the particular examples provided by the preacher. These examples can serve as models only if they are stored in the memory and brought from there "to remembrance" by the grace of the Holy Spirit.

The "*A Sermon of Valediction at my going into Germany, at Lincolns-Inne, April 18.1619*," like the sermon on Psalm 38:3, repays close analysis. Donne's text this time is Ecclesiastes 12:1, "Remember now thy creator in the dayes of thy youth." As in his sermon on Psalm 38:3, Donne chooses to address memory rather than understanding or will as the starting point for instruction. The Holy Spirit, he explains, "takes the nearest way to bring a man to God, by awaking his memory; for, for the understanding, that requires long and cleer instruction; and the will requires an instructed understanding before, and is in itself the

blindest and boldest faculty" (II, 235). In contrast to the understanding and the will which are twice and three times removed from knowledge of God, memory, when it "doe but fasten upon any of those things which God hath done for us" is "the neerest way to him" (p. 235). The "nearest way" of the Holy Spirit is the shortest and most direct method of instructing men; it is also nearest in the sense of most intimate or personal. Donne concludes his introduction, "Remember therefore, and remember now . . . whilst God presents thee many lights, many means" (p. 235). These "means" belong to the concrete world of particulars, and from the start Donne warns his listener that "thy memory looks not far enough back, if it stick only upon the Creature, and reach not to the Creator" (p. 236). It is interesting to note that Donne demands only that the memory "reach" to the Creator. He nowhere implies that the memory alone actually *attains* the goal. Instead, he implies that the "reaching" of memory is a necessary first step towards knowledge of the Creator, a knowledge actually *achieved* by the understanding.

Donne begins by defining memory in concrete terms. Quoting St. Bernard, he calls it "the stomach of the soul [which] receives and digests, and turns into good blood, all the benefits formerly exhibited to us in particular, and exhibited to the whole Church of God" (p. 236). As in the sermon on Psalm 38:3, Donne here again associates the faculty of memory with particulars. The "benefits" which the soul receives and digests are "exhibited" and thus apprehended in the form of particular instances. By contrast, the understanding is intrinsically less "setled" than memory because "that which belongs to the understanding" is universal:

> Present any of the prophecies made in the captivity, and a Jews understanding takes them for deliverances from *Babylon*, and a Christians understanding takes them for deliverances from sin and death, by the Messias Christ Jesus; present any of the prophecies of the Revelation concerning Antichrist, and a Papist will understand it of a single, and momentane, and transitory man, that must last but three yeer and a half; and a Protestant may understand it of a succession of men, that have lasted so 1000. yeers already. . . .Thus it is in the understanding that's often perplexed. (pp. 236-37)

The "prophecies" to which Donne refers are examples of God's decrees—revealed, perhaps, but unexplained. God's decrees, the abstract prophecies, are universals in that, unlike specific "benefits" (particular actions he has actually taken towards individual persons in specific situations), prophecies may pertain to, extend to, or affect an entire people or his whole creation. It is no wonder, then, that man's understanding does not know what to make of such decrees.[31] In a sermon of 1619 (revised in 1630), Donne makes similar remarks

concerning man's inability to grasp the universals presented in the Scriptures by relying on reason. He compares the Gospel to a net, "full of knots, of scruple, and perplexity and anxiety, and vexation" (II, 308). "The Scriptures will be out of thy reach, and out of thy use," he asserts, "if thou cast and scatter them upon Reason, upon Philosophy, upon Morality, to try how the Scriptures will fit all them, and beleeve them but so far as they agree with thy Reason" (p. 308). The solution, as in the sermon on Ecclesiastes 12:1, is to seek out the particular, personal applications: "But draw the Scriptures to thine own heart, and to thine own actions, and thou shalt find it made for that" (p. 308).[32]

In the sermon on the text from Ecclesiastes, after restating "how untractable, and untameable a faculty the wil of man is" (II, 237), Donne further explains why the memory "is the faculty that God desires to work upon." Unlike the will or understanding, the memory deals not with "matter[s] of law" (universals) but with matters of "fact" (particular events of history):

> Present the history of Gods protection of his children, from the beginning, in the ark, in both captivities, in infinite dangers; present this to the memory, and howsoever the understanding be beclouded, or the will perverted, yet both Jew and Christian, Papist and Protestant, Puritan and Protestant, are affected with a thankfull acknowledgment of his former mercies and benefits, this issue of that faculty of their memory is alike in them all. (p. 237)

While the understanding can lose itself in multiple interpretations of God's prophecies (universals), the memory, when presented with particular instances of God's benefits to his people, simply accepts these events as "matter[s] of fact." Following such acceptance, all God's people may proceed to "thankfull acknowledgment" of what they agree are his former mercies.

Donne takes his cue for teaching from God and likewise works upon his listeners' memories. He begins by asking them to look within, to recall the images already stored within their memories. To help them understand how the memory functions, he asks them to think of it as "the Gallery of the soul, hang'd with so many, and so lively pictures of the goodness and mercies of thy God to thee, as that every one of them shall be a catachism [sic] to thee, to instruct thee in all thy duties to him for those mercies" (p. 237). He further amplifies the image, indicating as he does so the natural progression from memory to understanding: "And as a well made, and well plac'd picture, looks alwayes upon him that looks upon it; so shall thy God look upon thee, whose memory is thus contemplating him, and shine upon thine understanding, and rectifie thy will too" (p. 237). Within his Thomistic epistemological framework, Donne's *ands* are not merely conjunctive; they indicate an ordering: memory contemplates God who then shines on (illuminates) the understanding. In turn, when

the understanding has been illuminated by God's grace (and only then), the "perversnesse and opposition" (II, 73) of the will may also be rectified. For this reason, memory is the most appropriate starting point of instruction.

Donne again acknowledges the possibility that individual memories may not be able to "comprehend [God's] mercy at large shewed to his whole Church" (p. 237) (of which he mentions several examples), and urges his hearers, "If these be too large pictures for thy gallery, for thy memory, yet every man hath a pocket picture about him, a manuall, a bosome book, and if he will turn over but one leaf, and remember what God hath done for him even since yesterday, he shall find even by that little branch a navigable river, to sail into that great and endless Sea of Gods mercies towards him, from the beginning of his being" (p. 238). In this way, even while prompting his audience to search their memories for pictures of God's mercies from their *own* experiences, Donne offers them new images (Gallery, bosom book, river, Sea) to illustrate how memory functions.

Donne next turns his attention to the second word of the text, *now*. In this section, he elaborates upon the dangers of postponing our remembering. Besides the fact that, as Augustine warns, things entirely "blotted out" of the mind cannot be recalled at all (*On the Trinity*, XII, 14.23; p. 38), the usefulness of memory is also limited by the *accuracy* with which it recalls the images it holds in storage. Thus, Donne points out, remembering is "a work for the day; for in the night, in our last night those thoughts that fall upon us, they are rather dreams, then true remembrings" (p. 239). He illustrates the problematic nature of relying on our memory in old age or upon our death beds with the example of a man traveling by night to whom "a bush seems a tree, and a tree seems a man, and a man a spirit; nothing hath the true shape to him" (p. 239). Obviously, the "nearest way" to God, is not an infallible way. Even should men be able to recall particular instances of God's presence in their lives, the memory may distort these images into "dreams" or fantasies not in the least reflective of God's intentions. The conclusion is obvious. Remember God's mercies *now* while the memory is strong and recollection of its contents is accurate.

In this sermon, Donne also specifically discusses the means by which man can come to know God. The firmament, Donne asserts, is an image for the "limits of those things which God hath given man means and faculties to conceive, and understand." He illustrates with the following example: "He hath limited our eyes with a firmament beset with stars, our eyes can see no farther: he hath limited our understanding in matters of religion with a starry firmament too" (p. 241). What is the "starry firmament" by which the understanding is thus limited? In part, it may be the memory. Donne carries his analogy further. The "eternal decrees of God, and his unreveal'd mysteries"

(rules) are "waters above the firmament." What man can know has its roots in "visible sacraments" and in the teachings of the church (p. 242).

When Donne explains why the Creator is to be the object of our memories, the echoes of Aquinas are unmistakable: "First, because the memory can go no farther then creation; and therefore we have no means to conceive, or apprehend any thing of God before that . . . . *Moses* his *in principio*, that beginning, the creation we can remember; but St. *Johns in principio*, that beginning, eternity, we cannot remember" (pp. 245-46). The distinction here is between the abstract *logos* or word and a very specific notion of God, the Creator. The former, says Donne, lies outside the domain of the memory. What we are to apprehend is God, as Creator at Creation; our memories are to reach for God as he revealed himself at a particular event in time, Creation. "This," concludes Donne, "is the true contracting, and the true extending of the memory, to *Remember the Creator*, and stay there, because there is no prospect farther, and to *Remember the Creator*, and get thither, because there is no safe footing upon the creature, til we come so far" (p. 246). The paradox of staying and yet going thither is resolved when we consider that the memory, bound as it is to apprehension of sensible images only, has "no prospect further." At the same time, because these concrete images are representative of their non-sensible Creator, the memory must "get thither" (in conjunction with the understanding) until that Creator is acknowledged. In this way, through its apprehension of concrete examples, the memory may ultimately "reach" to the Creator.

In his closing remarks of the sermon proper (as opposed to his concluding farewell), Donne comments upon what happens to those who fail to remember their creator:

> That soul that descends to hell, carries the Image [of] God in the faculties of that soul thither, but there that Image can never be burnt out, so those Images and those impressions, which we have received from men, from nature, from the world, the image of a Lord, the image of a Counsailor, the image of a Bishop, shall all burn in Hell, and never burn out. (p. 247)

What Donne is saying here is that the man who perceives images of God in this life but fails to abstract and believe the eternal truths of salvation embodied in them shall one day find the memory of these reflections of God a source of endless torment. What is particularly interesting here is that despite their sensible, earthly nature, Donne emphasizes the durability of images. For though the images will burn with the unbeliever in hell, they will never be obliterated entirely; these images of God—recognized too late—will serve as a constant reminder of the blessings which could have been.

Obviously, within a Thomistic epistemology, feeble faculties and faulty memories are serious obstacles to accurate abstraction of universal truths from images based on sense perception. Rosalie Colie, in summarizing Donne's attitude towards this state of affairs, writes, "A crooked mind cannot measure a crooked world; men's ways of knowing are as skewed as the world they seek to know."[33] But while Donne is aware of such dangers, he nevertheless asserts throughout his sermons that in this world our initial knowledge of God, as limited and potentially distorted as that may be, does, indeed, derive from our sense perceptions of his creation.[34]

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Notes

[1] Joan Webber, *Contrary Music: The Prose Style Of John Donne* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963). For other claims that Donne's appeal to memory is in the Platonic-Augustinian tradition see Dennis Quinn, "Donne's Christian Eloquence," *ELH* 27 (1960) 267-97; John Chamberlin, *Increase and Multiply* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1976); Janel Mueller, *Donne's Prebend Sermons* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971); Achsah Guibbory, "John Donne and Memory as 'the *Art* of *Salvation*,'" *HLQ* 63 (1980), 261-74.

[2] *Fulfilling the Circle: A Study of John Donne's Thought* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), pp. 15, 42.

[3] Sherwood, p. 44.

[4] (XII, 11.22), *The Essential Augustine*, ed. Vernon J. Bourke (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1974), p. 96. All selections from Augustine are taken from this source. Further reference will be made parenthetically within the text.

[5] *Expositio super librum Boethii de Trinitate* (VI, 2) in *St. Thomas Aquinas: Philosophical Texts*, ed. Thomas Gilby (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 22-23. With the exception of some selections from the *Summa Theologica*, all translations of Aquinas are taken from this source. Further references to this work will be made parenthetically within the text. Quotations from the *Summa Theologica* not available in Gilby's work are taken from *Summa Theologica*, trans. L. Shapcote (London: Burns, Oates, 1912-1936). These selections will also be referred parenthetically (by question and article) within the text.

[6] Aquinas's beliefs on this issue are not confined to the *Summa Theologica*. Similar statements can be found throughout all his works. For example, in *Compendium Theologica*, he writes, "For man to understand he must also have a sense, a sign of this being that he who lacks a sense is without the corresponding scientific knowledge of sense-objects, as a man born blind has no scientific knowledge of colors" (p. 231). Concerning the necessity of imagination, he writes, "Imagining goes with thinking as long so we are in this present life, however spiritual the knowledge. Even God is known through the images of his effects" (Disputations, XVI *de Malo*, 8, ad 3; p. 234). And along similar lines, in *de Trinitate*, VI. 2, ad 5, he reasserts, "The image is a principle

of our knowledge. It is that from which our intellectual activity begins, not as a passing stimulus, but as an enduring foundation. When the imagination is choked, so also is our theological knowledge" (p. 234).

[7] As Anthony Low, who read this article before publication, kindly pointed out, what I also imply, though I do not develop the point in this essay, is that Donne's devotional method in his sermons relies heavily upon imagination, visual imagery, and meditation on the creature—points which recent approaches based on "Protestant politics" have attempted to deny. In *The Poetry of Meditation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954), Louis Martz discusses at length the place of concrete objects, pictures, and imagination in devotion. Debora Shuger, in *Sacred Rhetoric*, discloses similar things about sermon theory in the period. While neither book touches directly on Donne's sermons, both provide support for my reading of the preacher as working within a traditional Christian framework, Catholic or Anglican as well as Protestant or Puritan, going back to Aquinas, heavily emphasizing the creatures and the visual imagination without much attention to typology as such.

[8] (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 404.

[9] See in particular Paul Harland, "Imagination and Affections in John Donne's Preaching" *JDJ* 6 (1987), 33-50.

[10] *The Sermons of John Donne*, 10 vols. eds. George R. Potter and Evelyn M. Simpson. 1953 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), (IX, 357). All references to the sermons are from this source. Further references will be made parenthetically by volume and page number within the text.

[11] P. 37.

[12] P. 37.

[13] *John Donne: Preacher* (Princeton: University Press, 1962), p. 134.

[14] In *Essayes in Divinity* Donne identifies three books of God: "an eternall Register of his Elect," the Bible, and the book of creatures. Of the first he remarks, "So far removed from the search of learning, are those eternall Decrees and Rolls of God which are never certainly and infallibly produced and exemplified . . . but onely insinuated and whisper'd to our hearts . . . which is the Conscience it selfe." "The first book is then impossible," writes Donne, "the second difficult." But of the book of Creatures, quoting Sebund, he writes that it "teaches all things, presupposes no other, is soon learned, cannot be forgotten, requires no books, needs no witnesses, and in this, is safer then the Bible it self, that it cannot be falsified by Hereticks" (p. 7). Furthermore, though there may not be enough in the book of creatures "to teach us all the particularities of Christian Religion" yet "there is enough to make us inexcusable, if we search not further" (p. 8).

[15] In *The Imagery of John Donne's Sermons* (Providence: Brown University Press, 1970), p. 148, Winfried Schleiner notes, "In such figures the theater is not primarily a place where a play is staged; the relevant fact about it is that it is a place which allows for concentrated vision." For a thorough discussion of the field of imagery which includes the looking glass and spectacles as instruments of insight, see Schleiner's sub-chapter "Eyes of the Soul."

[16] The following passage from the *Summa Theologica* illuminates the relationship between the senses and the understanding born of reason:

> Rational knowledgeis in the middle state between sensation and pure intellection . . . rational knowledge is properly concerned with forms that in fact exist individually in bodily matter, and yet are not known immediately as existing in such or such individual matter. This implies abstraction of the form from the individual matter represented by sense-images. Through material truths thus considered we can reach some knowledge of immaterial truths. (1a. 85, 1; p. 244)

Since sense impressions are processed and stored as images in the memory, the precedence of memory with respect to understanding can be deduced as well. By contrast, pure intellection, according to Aquinas, refers to Plato's belief that "the object of the mind is a bodiless idea, and that understanding results rather by sharing in ideas apart from phenomena than by making an abstraction from individual experience" (1a. 85, 1; p. 244). Aquinas argues that men are incapable of pure intellection. To my knowledge, the actual phrase "pure intellection" is not to be found in Donne's sermons, and what he does preach concerning man's ability to think and know things suggests that he, like Aquinas, believes people are incapable of such direct, imageless understanding. It is on just this point that Donne's epistemology differs from Augustine's.

Whereas Augustine believes that the higher reason is distinct from the lower reason in that by the former men can contemplate things eternal *in themselves* while the latter is restricted to contemplation of temporal things, Aquinas holds that higher and lower reason "are in no wise distinct faculties" for the simple reason that "Eternity and time are so related that one is the medium in which the other is known." "In the order of discovery," he explains, "we come to the knowledge of things eternal through things temporal, according to the words of St. Paul, *the things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made*" (*ST*. 1a. 79, 9; p. 26).

[17] P. 20.

[18] See also IX, 355.

[19] See also IX, 85.

[20] Recall Thomas Browne's *Religio Medici* in which his "rational" and "scientific" observation of the natural world confirms his faith. For example, in Part 1, Section 48, he points to the "miracle" of "artificial resurrestion and revivification of *Mercury*" as confirmation of the resurrection and recompacting of our bodies after death (*Selected Writings*, ed. Geoffrey Keynes [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968], p. 55).

[21] In this sermon Donne makes the point that angels, unlike men, are not limited to knowing only those things "which arise from the Object, and pass through the Sense to the Understanding, for that's a deceivable way, both by the indisposition of the organ, sometimes, and sometimes by the depravation of the Judgment" (IV, 127). On the other hand, even angels do not possess ultimate knowledge of God for as Donne explains, their knowledge is "not in them *per essentiam*, for whosoever knows so, as the Essence of the things that flows from him, knows all things, and that's a knowledge proper to God only" (p. 127).

[22] (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1972), p. 136.

[23] This insistence on man's inexcusability is repeated throughout Donne's sermons. In the sermon on I Corinthians 13:12, he elaborates upon the issue at great lengths:

> God affords no man the comfort, the false comford [sic] of Atheism: He will not allow a pretending Atheist the power to flatter himself, so far, as seriously

> to thinke there is no God. He must pull out his own eyes, and see no creature, before he can say, he sees no God; He must be no man, and quench his reasonable soule, before he can say to himselfe, there is no God. The difference between the Reason of man, and the Instinct of the beast is this, That the beast does but know, but the man knows that he knows. The bestiall Atheist will pretend that he knows there is no God; but he cannot say, that he knows it; for, his knowledge will not stand the battery of an argument from another, nor of a ratiocination from himself. (VIII, 225)

This passage again distinguishes between merely perceiving something with the senses (which both men and animals accomplish) and abstracting from that perception, a function of the intellectual light of natural reason. Donne also suggests as he has in the sermon on Job 36:25 that, in fact, some men may reduce themselves to a state of bestiality by neglecting the promptings of their reason. See also IV, 212 and III, 264 for parallel passages.

[24] Donne makes the same point in another sermon with an anecdote of a young girl who had memorized large portions of the Bible, but "truly shee understood . . . nothing of the fundamentall poynts which must save us" (IV, 204).

[25] This theme of removing oneself from distractions in order to behold God is central to "A Hymne to Christ, at the Author's last going into Germany" where the speaker asserts, "Churches are best for prayer, that have least light: / To see God only, I go out of sight" (pp. 29-30).

[26] The visions described here resemble those experienced by the speaker of "Hymn to God my God, in my Sickness." Speaking from his sick bed, the Enosh of this poem also beholds Christ in his own suffering:

> We think that Paradise and Calvary,
> Christ's cross and Adam's tree, stood in one place;
> Look Lord, and find both Adams met in me;
> As the first Adam's sweat surrounds my face,
> May the first Adam's blood my soul embrace.
>
> So, in his purple wrapped receive me Lord,
> By these his thorns give me his other crown;
> And as to others' souls I preached thy word,
> Be this my text, my sermon to mine own,
> Therefore that he may raise the Lord throws down. (pp. 21-30)

Perhaps, too, what Donne pleads for in "Good Friday, 1613. Riding Westward" is this same ability to behold God through one's personal affliction. Having seen in his memory the image of Christ on the cross, the speaker of the poem prays for the second vision, the beholding. Such a vision comes not to the man caught up in "pleasure or business" as is the persona in the opening lines of the poem, but to the man who, like the Enosh of the sermon, is "moulded . . . kneaded, by the hand of God" (p. 174). This man "*shall* see God . . . whether he will or no, a holy, and a heavenly violence shall be offered him, it shall not be in the power of the world, the flesh or the devill, to blind him, he shall see God" (p. 174). Thus the speaker of "Good Friday" urges,

> O think me worth thine anger, punish me,
> Burn off my rusts, and my deformity,

Restore thine image, so much, by thy grace,
That thou mayst know me, and I'll turn my face. (pp. 39-42)

Such sight of God as arises out of affliction lies at the very core of the *Devotions* as well.

[27] In a sermon on Matthew 5:8, "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God," he explores the implications of personal responsiblity:

> Beloved in Christ Jesus, the heart of your gracious God is set upon you; and we his servants have told you so, and brought you thus near him into his Court, into his house, into the Church, but yet we cannot get you to see his face, to come to that tendernesse of conscience, as to remember and consider, that all your most secret actions are done in his sight and his presence; *Caesars* face, and *Caesars* inscription you can see; The face of the Prince in his coyne you can rise before the Sun to see, and sit up till mid-night to see; but if you do not see the face of God upon every peice of that mony too, all that mony is counterfeit. (VII, 346)

The point once again is that while a preacher can present appropriate images for the memory, individual listeners must make the effort of remembering them and considering what these images represent.

[28] P. 41.

[29] *Simple* is here used in the philosophical sense of "abstract, highly refined, subtle." In another passage on the same subject, Aquinas writes, "The [conceptions of the mind] are known directly in the light of the active intellect through meanings abstracted from sense-objects, whether they be simple concepts, such as being, unity, and so forth, or whether they be judgments" (*de Veritate*, I; p. 378).

[30] "Donne's Christian Eloquence," *ELH* 27 (1960) 290.

[31] See also comparison between memory, understanding, and will where Donne presents the worst case of will which is dependent upon understanding and has other problems associated with it besides (II, 73).

[32] Elsewhere Donne proposes that "though a man understand not a whole sermon or remember not a whole sermon, yet he doth well, that layeth hold upon such Notes therein as may be appliable to his own case" (VII, 393).

[33] *Paradoxica Epidemica: The Renaissance Tradition of Paradox*, p. 416.

[34] The concern Donne shows over these limitations in man's ability to know divine truths is not limited to the sermons discussed above. For example, he comments more generally on the discrepancy between man's perception of a situation and the reality of it in his sermon on Job 19:26. In this sermon Donne contrasts man's future heavenly sight of God with the knowledge he is now bound to as an earthly creature. At one point he offers the following illustration to demonstrate the limitations of our senses in correctly perceiving reality:

> What have I seen in this world, that hath been truly the same thing that it seemed to me? I have seen marble buildings, and a chip, a crust, a plaster, a face of marble hath pulled off, and I see brick-bowels within. I have seen a beauty, and a strong breath from another, tells me, that that complexion is from without, not from a sound constitution within. (III, 111)

In the context of a sermon concerned with man's sight of God this passage is more than a conventional observation on the disparity between outward appearance and inner

reality. Note the contrast between this passage describing man's sight here on earth and the passage immediately preceding it which describes the understanding man will be granted in heaven:

> I shall see all problematicall things to be dogmaticall, I shall see all these rocks in Divinity, come to bee smooth alleys; I shall see Prophesies untyed, Riddles dissolved, controversies reconciled. (111)

Gale Carrithers, in *Donne at Sermons* comments on the two passages, "Ontology and epistemology merge in the murk after the Fall. What becomes increasingly distinct are conditions *here* and conditions *there*." The result, continues Carrithers, is that even when one does obtain knowledge of divine truths, "either he cannot be properly sure he has it, or if he can confidently conclude (as Donne frequently does in his sermons) that he has grasped an element of truth in a given situation, he cannot be certain he has all the elements that matter. Or he cannot be sure he has applied the truth to himself, cannot be sure that he has related himself to it adequately and appropriately" (pp. 46-47). On the other hand, Paul Harland suggests that "Donne's ability to diagnose the causes of ima imaginative and emotional distortions frees him from a habitual distrust, common among his contemporaries, of these two faculties, and allows him to find ways to put them to wise and proper uses" (p. 48).