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# *The Advancement of Learning* and the Decay of the World: A New Reading of Donne's *First Anniversary*

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To date, neither of the two standard meditational explanations of the theme and structure of Donne's famous anniversary poems—Louis Martz's Ignatian paradigm or Barbara Lewalski's alternative Protestant schema—has been able to explain why a poet whose works had previously circulated only in manuscript should suddenly decide to publish these apparently private or at least personal elegies aimed at enlisting (as they did) the patronage of the Drury family. Still less are they able to explain why its supposed meditational or epideictic focus—the Christian virtues embodied in Elizabeth Drury—has so little to do with its principal topic: the decay of the world. Thus Martz admits that from the meditational perspective, "Donne's *Anatomie* . . . has . . . a central inconsistency which defeats all . . . efforts to bring its diverse materials under control." Similarly, Lewalski admits that although the poem seems intended as an epideictic funeral elegy, its very subtitle indicates that "Elizabeth Drury is 'occasion' rather than subject" of a work that therefore makes it necessary "to seek other literary contexts which may illuminate Donne's conception." But in pointedly ignoring the central epistemological/theological concerns that the poem itself announces, she expands these "literary contexts" so diffusely that the poem again appears blurred or unfocused.[1] Thus, ironically, both critics fail to find a unifying theme in the poem because they avoid the main issue announced in its title: the conventional "decay theory" to which Donne here returns after having rejected it in his youthful *Paradoxes and Problemes*. While the reasons for this return remain conjectural,

four related facts about the poem are abundantly clear: 1) Donne rushed his *Anatomy of the World* (the poem's original title) to press immediately before leaving England with the Drury family, whose patronage he had *already* secured through his "Funerall Elegie"; 2) this timing made its publication coincide with the decay theory's "greatest popularity as a poetic formula," to which it added considerable luster; 3) further defenses of the decay theory by such imminent theologians as Godfrey Goodman followed immediately in the wake of *The First Anniversary*'s publication; 4) the theory's chief (and in England, its virtually solitary) opponent was Francis Bacon, whose *Advancement of Learning* had "anatomized" the potential for renewing a most unmoribund world only six years earlier.[2]

All of these facts strongly suggest that Donne was publically contributing to a renewed debate about this theory rather than writing a merely private meditation. Not only is Drury's role in the poem largely honorary, subordinate, and/or occasional, as confirmed both by its critics and its original subtitle—"Wherein, By occasion of the untimely death of Mistris Elizabeth Drury the frailty and the decay of his whole World is represented"—but its defense of this "frailty and decay" has pronounced anti-Baconian implications.[3] There is also considerable evidence that these implications would have been warmly received by an educated audience which, like the king himself, had reacted to Bacon's message with considerable coolness. As the chief exponent of the "new philosophy" in England, Bacon had introduced his *Advancement of Learning* not only to anatomize the defects of previous scholarship but also to reconsider the venerable idea of the world as a hylozoic "body" subject to decay and death. Descending ultimately from Plato's *Timaeus* and the writings of St. Cyprian, in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries the classical decay theory of world history had received renewed attention and acclaim, becoming virtually canonical throughout that period. Its widespread influence is usually traced to the fact that it reflects two major intellectual/historical crises: the crisis of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, and the crisis brought on by the new philosophy. In this atmosphere, it

positively explains the rise of Protestantism as the culmination of Christian history, while it also negatively explains the findings of the new philosophy as the signs of that final end.[4] As distinct from its later revolutionary stages, this apocalyptic fervor supported an essentially passive, gloomy, but also marginally hopeful expectation of the world's imminent decline into the final destruction preceding the arrival of a wholly new heavens and earth. In support of this approaching Day of Judgement, many recently recorded astronomical phenomena—new stars, rings about the sun, new comets, and in fact the growing inaccuracy of the Ptolemaic "world picture" as a whole—could be and were interpreted not as Baconian indications of ascending human progress, but of the impending fall of the once immutable heavens into the all-too-mutable earth. As every reader of Donne's *Anatomy of the World*, recognizes, his poem precisely follows this "descending" apocalyptic interpretation of these phenomena.[5]

In contrast, Bacon follows a very different apocalyptic tradition that will only later (not at the time of his writing) be uncontroversially assimilated to an alternate, ascending strain of Protestant millenialism—the tradition of the Puritans whom Donne opposed along with Bacon himself. Whether or not Bacon encouraged their "radical" assimilation of his work (which remains debatable), it ultimately contributed to a competing and at least implicitly revolutionary theory, an activist approach to history that Milton would later describe as "the reforming of Reformation itself."[6] Following in the tradition not only of John Bale's "prophecy" of an apocalyptic era marked by the advance of both spirituality and learning, but also in the wake of continental new philosophers like Copernicus, Vesalius, and Galileo, Bacon's *Advancement of Learning* proposes that our understanding of the relatively constant (if not static) "fabric" of the celestial and human bodies is not decaying but improving. Vesalius—whose new anatomy was coincidentally published in the very same year as Copernicus's cosmology—was particularly bold in claiming that the decay of knowledge was reversible now that "those who are now dedicated to the ancient study of medicine, almost restored to its pristine splendour in many schools,

are beginning to learn to their satisfaction how little and how feebly men have laboured in the field of Anatomy from the time of Galen to the present day."[7] *The Advancement of Learning* attempts to reintegrate this continental new philosophy with the more native outlook of the English Reformers by situating the agents of human renewal in *this* world, not in an entirely new world to come. Proposing to wipe away the superstitions of the intervening ages, it seeks immediately to begin restoring Eden by embarking "upon a better plan, and to commence a total reconstruction of sciences, arts, and all human knowledge, raised upon the proper foundations."[8]

Even more radically, Bacon's *Advancement* held not just the "ancients" but the upholders of the decay theory as a whole directly responsible for the iron age into which the world had lapsed. Perhaps relying on James I's own partial modification of Protestant history, this first major work appealed directly to the king to aid him in making all superstitiously "received authors" give way "like Hercules's Columns, beyond which there should [once have been] no sailing or discovering," now that England had such a "bright and benign a star as your Majesty to conduct and prosper us."[9] But unlike Donne, Bacon gravely underestimated the King's conservatism. James was by no means ready to accept the strange new doctrine outlined in *The Advancement of Learning*, of which he famously remarked that "it is like the peace of God, that surpasseth all understanding."[10] Still less could he have endorsed the unqualified optimism later expressed in Bacon's *Great Instauration*, which while admitting that "man by the fall" lost both "his state of innocency, and . . . his dominion over creation," affirms that "Both of these losses . . . can even in this life be in some part repaired . . . in virtue of that charter, 'In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread.'" Thus Bacon construes this "sentence" not as a curse but as an incentive to "various labours . . . subdued to the uses of human life," which can be improved by copying the methods of technology and avoiding the "idle magical ceremonies" of the ancients. Hence he concludes "The Plan of the Work" with a prayer to God, "wherefore if we labour in thy works with the sweat of our brows thou will make us

partakers of thy vision and thy sabbath."[11] First and foremost, this labor requires forsaking Greek philosophy and its scholastic descendants, and instead sifting, testing, and more accurately redefining all human learning in preparation for the ascent to a New Jerusalem that we "moderns" have been scripturally "authorized" to build for ourselves. Toward that end, his "anatomy of learning" carefully catalogues the current "strength" of our building materials according to the Ramist subdivisions of the arts of memory, reason, and imagination.[12]

In light of Donne's sustained refutation of this optimistic program throughout his own *Anatomy of the World*, it seems hard to disagree with a recent Bacon scholar's conclusion that his *Essays in Divinity* refer to Bacon when they protest against "an enormous pretending Wit of our nation and age [who] undertook to frame such a language, herein exceeding *Adam*, that whereas he named every thing by the most eminent and virtuall property, our man gave names, by the first naked enuntiation whereof, any understanding should comprehend the essence of the thing, without definition."[13] If he is indeed referring to Bacon, Donne is very perspicacious on this point, for although the Lord Chancellor never attempted to rationalize or universalize language on quite this scale, many of his immediate followers (such as John Comenius and John Wilkins) did. Scholars usually trace their attempts to establish universal languages based on a "real character" in which names transparently designated their own definitions directly to *The Advancement*'s idealization of ideographic systems of Chinese and/or hieroglyphic writing, self-defining systems that bypass the previously privileged language of Adam altogether.[14] Yet whether or not Donne's remark refers specifically to Bacon or his innovative views on Adam's fall, there is ample evidence not only that he would have personally considered such an ambitious project presumptuous to the point of blasphemy, but also that he had abundant professional reasons for doing so.[15] His own *Anatomy* was written at about the same time as his *Essays in Divinity,* a time when he was preoccupied both with the problem of "whether he were worthy, and competently learned to enter in Holy Orders" and with the contrary doctrine of apocalyptic decline—the

doctrine that the world would not be renewed but destroyed and remade in a wholly spiritual "new heavens." His son gives us the first bit of information in a statement prefixed to the *Essays*, which its modern editor also dates to the period of the *Anniversaries,* 1611-1615, in light of the considerable verbal and thematic overlap between these works—including their common falling away from the excitement generated by the new astronomy and return to a traditional theological concern with apocalyptic collapse.[16]

Traditionally, this final end was traced to the earthly decline begun by Adam's sin, which inflicted the fatal "wound" that the world has been suffering ever since, and that will at last put an end to its lingering sorrows. *The First Anniversary* adheres closely to this conventional formula, taking Drury's untimely death as an exemplum of the fact that this shadow or "type" of the Last Day hovers over not only individual lives but the life of the whole world, which was aborted at its birth:

> The world did in her Cradle take a fall,
> And turn'd her braines, and tooke a generall maime
> Wronging each joynt of th'universall frame.
> The noblest part, man, felt it first; and than
> Both beasts and plants, curst in the curse of man.
> So did the world from the first houre decay,
> The evening was beginning of the day,
> And now the Springs and Sommers which we see,
> Like sonnes of women after fifty bee. (196-204).[17]

The centrality of this passage to the poem's argument is clear from its position immediately after its first refrain and before its most famous pronouncement: that the withering of "mother" earth is all the *more* evident now that "new Philosophy cals all in doubt" (205):

> The Sun is lost, and th'earth, and no mans wit
> Can well direct him, where to looke for it.
> And freely men confess, that this world's spent,
> When in the Planets, and the Firmament
> They seeke so many new; they see that this

> Is crumbled out againe to his atomis.
> "Tis all in pieces, all cohaerence gone;
> All just supply, and all Relation. (207-14)

There seems to be little question that Donne's poetic rejection of the idea of improving upon the unfallen Adam's "wit" reflects the broader professional concerns of the *Essays in Divinity* as a whole, since both uphold the *contemptus mundi* tradition that Bacon had recently challenged. Both works clearly follow this tradition's subordination of sensual, perceptual, and/or empirical knowledge to revelation because the senses are considered defective in consequence of Adam's fall. Bacon on the contrary would not only redeem man through empirical knowledge, but he actually locates the real curse of original sin not in Adam, whose sin was only moral, but in the "utterly vicious and incompetent" sins of the logicians. Thus as Achsah Guibbory notes, throughout history these opponents of progress have "reenacted the Fall by looking inside their own minds rather than by observing and studying nature as she truly is."[18] Yet her otherwise accurate summary almost understates Bacon's actual position, which is that these false philosophers have so much "wronged, abused, and traduced nature, which it is "the duty of Art to perfect and exalt," that our only recourse can be to the particulars that their false "essences" and "universals" have superstitiously "occulted" or obscured. Thus by abandoning their received "Principles or Axioms," he believes that the true work of "religious wonder" will reawaken us to the fact that the "footsteps of seducement" or human error are not dichotomous but synthetic: they "are the very same in divine and human truth," requiring us "to become as a child" if we would avoid the "vicious" consequences of received tradition. In line with this argument, Bacon goes on to describe the consequences of logical error in quasi-theological terms, since in his eyes, it constitutes nothing less than blocking the gates of a new heaven-on-earth: "he that shall attentively observe how the mind doth gather this excellent dew of knowledge, . . . distilling and contriving it out of particulars . . . *shall find that the mind of herself by nature doth manage and act an induction much better than they [the logicians] describe it"*

(AL 221, emphasis added). This project then seems very close to the substance of what Donne objects to in his *Essays in Divinity*, for his "pretending Wit" here proposes "exceeding Adam" by gathering a more instantaneous "manna" of knowledge from the natural "dew" of his epistemologically restored Eden.

Donne's negative response to this program is not hasty or "occasional," since both long before and after he contemplated taking holy orders, he remained deeply indebted to the older epistemology that Bacon attacked. This theory of knowledge continued to regard the tradition of the "ancients" as the pinnacle of human achievement, flowing from Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas, to the scholastic heirs of this essentially Greek lineage. Whatever inroads Donne's youthful skepticism might have made on these authorities, his *Essays in Divinity* fall back heavily on this tradition. Placing Aquinas squarely beside Augustine, they particularly praise the latter as a chief "instrument and engine of Thine, whom thou hadst so enabled, that nothing was too minerall nor centrick for the search and reach of his wit" (*ED*, 16). But Donne's debt here is by no means exclusively theological; epistemologically, he also follows Augustine by situating the source of "real" knowledge neither in "particulars" nor in sense perception of any kind, but in the mind alone. For as Augustine says, "the palm is always awarded to knowledge, to comprehension of truth. But no one can reach truth who looks for it outside the mind."[19] Donne's *Anniversaries* reaffirm this essentially Platonic view of knowledge when they urge their readers to get "up unto the watch-towre . . ./ And see all things despoyld of fallacies"; for there "Thou shalt not peepe through lattices of eies,/ Nor heare through Laberinths of eares, nor learne/ By circuit, or collections to discerne" (*SA*, 294-98). This Augustinian rejection of "this Pedantery,/ Of being taught by sense, and Fantasy" (*SA* 291-2) coincides with Donne's patristic disapproval of Adam's entire legacy, which in the *Essays*, he uses to incite a humble realization that we are but "the Children of the Lust and Excrement of your parents, they and theirs the Children of *Adam*, the child of durt, the child of Nothing" (*ED* 30).[20]

This background alone suggests strong grounds for his negative response to *The Advancement of Learning*'s combined exaltation of Adam and denigration of the scholastic tradition, which for Bacon represents the mere "cobwebs of learning" that have corrupted and obscured the "original" Adamic and/or Solomonic wisdom:[21]

> Surely, like as many substances in nature which are solid do putrefy and corrupt into worms, so it is the property of good and sound knowledge to putrefy and dissolve into a number of subtile, idle, unwholesome, and (as I may term them) vermiculate questions, which have . . . no soundness of matter or goodness of quality. This kind of degenerate learning did chiefly reign amongst the schoolmen; who having sharp and strong wits, and abundance of leisure, and small variety of reading; but their wits being shut up in the cells of a few authors (chiefly Aristotle their dictator) as their persons were shut up in the cells of monasteries and colleges; and knowing little history, either of nature of time; did out of no great quantity of matter, and infinite agitation of wit, spin unto us those laborious webs of learning which are extant in their books. (*AL* 140)

As opposed to this dismissal of Aristotle and his scholastic descendants, Donne's sermons rely directly on Rudolph Keckermann's *Rhetoricae Ecclesiasticae*, which according to Perry Miller was "the most influential Aristotelian treatise among English Protestants" of Donne's day and type. Thus unlike the Ramist method favored by Bacon and the Puritan faction who later took up his cause, Donne's metaphysical sermons use the characteristic method of "men who remained loyal to scholasticism, not merely in physics . . . but in logic and rhetoric."[22]

Their characteristic mode of verbal analysis most fundamentally differs from the Ramists' logical/dialectical discriminations into subordinate parts or particulars in their far more holistic "conception of the root as something that contains in original form all that may be visibly extended" or "known" about that form. Here, as Guibbory notes, the part is understood as an "epitome or microcosm" of the whole, which

is not segregated from it.[23] Again, the *Essays in Divinity* provide a convenient touchstone, since they explicitly oppose the practice of "excerpt[ing] and tear[ing] insignificant rags of a word or two," only to "stub up these severall roots, and mangle them into chips." Instead, Donne favors a hermeneutics in which words would not be "broken, but taken intirely." Thus the Bible like God's body (of which it is an epitome—"it is *he*," *ED* 39, 41) is essentially one: the first verse of Exodus "radically . . . comprehends all the book; which being a history of Gods miraculous Mercy to his [people], is best intimated or Epitomized in that first part" (*ED* 41). Nevertheless, this tracing of etymological branches back to their root in God by no means unites us with him; on the contrary, due to our fallen mental and linguistic abilities, the search is all: God will "be glorified both in our searching these Mysteries, because it testifies our liveliness towards him, and in our not finding them" (*ED* 49).

Donne thereby reserves both the ultimate truths of God's book of scripture and of nature exclusively for the life to come, which partly explains why his *Anatomy of the World* is conducted in the context of a funeral elegy: for Donne "Death is liberating not simply for the mortal subject but for the Logos or world soul; it restores a proper balance between man and God and preserves the voluntarism of God, who cannot be literalized in either scripture or nature."[24] Thus rather than revealing any affinities with natural law theologians like Richard Hooker, Donne's divinity has more in common with Montaigne's rejection of rationalism and his return to a more traditional *via media*, the program of his *Apology for Raymond Sebond*. For as John Klause remarks, like Montaigne, Donne believes that since "'we taste nothing purely,'" "our judgements about the 'quality' of each part of the mixture can have no claim to objectivity." Yet this skepticism about human knowledge and/or certitude (which seems later to evolve into Donne's obsession with spiritual tension and paradox) is even less compatible with Bacon than with Hooker. Hence it seems appropriate that what Klause regards as Donne's most "Montaignean" work—*Metempsychosis*—not only anticipates his later support of the decay thesis that Bacon opposes, but also takes clandestine allegorical aim at

the character of this "Thresher" or "Swordfish."[25] The poem then concludes by tracing our decline from the golden age (when "In this worlds youth wise nature did make haste" to make "Things ripen . . . sooner, and . . . longer last," 191-92) to "most of those arts" that claim to improve "our lives," but have actually "vext us" as much through "cursed *Cains*" inventions as through the "Astronomie" of "blest *Seth*" (515-17).

However, this dismissal of Seth's astronomy is potentially misleading to modern readers. While the *Anatomy of the World* will later clearly protest the confusions brought on by the new astronomy, construing these complaints as specific rather than as a generic obscures their explicit thrust against Bacon, who was neither the author nor the proponent of any "new" celestial system. Bacon's *Advancement of Learning* is in fact generally skeptical about the findings of both Copernicus and Gilbert, the latter of whom used his researches on magnetism to propose that the sun revolved the earth by means of its magnetic power. Thus it is important to remember that Donne literally objects not to the new astronomy in particular, but to the "new philosophy" in general, a term often associated with Copernicanism, but which is actually far broader in scope. For the new astronomers were also the new natural philosophers in the same sense that Bacon was: all rejected the authority of Aristotlean/Ptolemaic cosmos, and all to varying degrees wished to reform or overturn ancient learning. Although as we have seen, Donne illustrates the confusions brought on by the new philosophy with astronomical examples, these illustrations were commonplaces routinely cited by the defenders of the ancients. The typical rationale goes roughly like this: since for Aristotle and Ptolemy the heavens were eternal and immutable, if the new astronomy now indicates that they are changing, then: 1) the decay of the earth has at last spread to the heavens, signifying its final decline before the return of the great Platonic year and/or the Second Coming of Christ; and 2) the presumption of the new philosophers was most likely hastening this decay, for as in the original fall of man, moral corruption naturally "spreads" to the physical cosmos on the analogy of an organic disease.[26] Literary critics often refer to this complex of ideas as the

"pathetic fallacy," but it was hardly fallacious to those who, like Donne, regarded the world as an organism subject to all the ills that flesh is heir to.

Bacon's unique rejection of this hylozoist hypothesis again makes him the most likely focus of Donne's attack. Neither Copernicus nor Gilbert challenged this hypothesis, nor did either destroy the microcosmic/ macrocosm correspondences so dear to Donne as both poet and priest. Nor did either put out the traditional element of fire in the highest heavens, which Bacon derided as a false analogy based on the same faulty logic as the idea of man as "Microcosmus, an abstract or model of the world" (*AL* 208, 227).[27] The likelihood of an attack on Bacon becomes stronger still once the reader realizes that in order to "see" Elizabeth Drury as she really is, "no longer occluded from out view by the individuating properties of matter, which are unintelligible," one must accept the "consequences of hylomorphic theories of 'substance'" that make universals more easily perceptible than particulars in Donne's essentially scholastic system of thought.[28] Finally, both Copernicus and Gilbert can be eliminated as potential targets of attack on other internal or external grounds. Internally, *The First Anniversarie* is overtly sympathetic to Gilbert's "magnetique" theory, which it transfers from the sun to the powers that the poet claims for Drury herself (221). Externally, *Ignatius his Conclave* blandly dismisses Copernicus as an ineffectual "heretic" unable to affect the main tenets of Christian religion, the "location" of the afterlife in either heaven or hell. But Bacon does change these basic tenets, at least as Donne understands them, by upsetting both the locus and provenance of the new heavens and earth.

The only remaining objection to identifying his *First Anniversary* as a thinly disguised assault on *The Advancement of Learning* would then seem to be that the poem has not previously been recognized as such by either its modern critics or its contemporary audience. Yet as Edward Tayler has convincingly argued, modern critics have greatly erred in taking Ben Jonson's response to the poem as representative of Donne's audience as a whole. For in fact, his friend William Drummond of Hawthornden records a quite different response that implicitly

supports the new reading suggested here. Referring to metaphysical verse in general but most likely to Donne in particular, Drummond complained to the King's physician that "some Men of late (Transformers of every Thing). . . [have] endeavoured to abstract [poetry] . . . to *Metaphysical* Idea's, and *Scholastical* 'Quiddities' that would have been unintelligible to Homer, Vergil, Petrarch, or Bartas" (the latter of whom we know as an early anti-Copernican). As Tayler goes on to show, in Drummond's contemporary context, metaphysical "Ideas" were not understood as mere symbols of either a particular woman or of the *imago dei*, as Lewalski "anachronistically" supposes. Rather, they signified "species" or kinds in the Aristotelian/Thomistic sense of intelligible ideas or defining essences: patterns or plans that make the thing what it essentially is.[29] In the process of anatomizing these essences or epitomes of created things, Donne is thus reaffirming the idea that scholastic universals rather than Baconian particulars are truly and enduringly "knowable." Of course, as his complaint suggests, Drummond was not a very astute reader of such metaphysical "quiddities" or subtleties, although he was more on track than his friend Jonson, whose education (as Tayler points out) little prepared him to understand the "'*Scholastical*' conceit on which 'Dones Anniversarie' turns."[30] Jonson therefore literally assumed that he was praising a dead girl in terms fit only for the "Virgin Mary," while like his more philosophically sophisticated contemporaries, Drummond clearly grasped that the primary subject of metaphysical poems like this one was the status of scholastic essences.[31] Thus it is one of literary history's great ironies that Donne's exasperated response to Jonson—that he wrote not of an actual woman but of an Idea—has misled subsequent literary critics into thinking that his poem is not an anatomy in the sense he intended, but a literary symbol of an actual or transcendent persona—Queen Elizabeth, the Virgin Mary, Astrea, the Logos, and so on—a sense that is not only anachronistic, but almost certainly not what Donne or even Drummond meant by "Idea."[32]

Yet Donne's ideal audience was not Drummond or even the literate public at large, but sympathetic, well-educated upholders of the decay thesis like Joseph Hall, who not only encouraged his work but helped

to see *The First Anniversary* through the press as he left for the continent with the Drurys. However, since Bacon had not yet fallen from power, Donne would hardly have wanted his refutation to be spread promiscuously about, although through someone like Toby Mathew, Bacon's friend and confidante but also a prime source of Donne's court gossip, he would almost certainly have known that the king himself did not take Bacon's project seriously.[33] As a result, Donne seems to have aimed it at a highly discriminating, moderately conservative, but also philosophically well-informed audience, as the opening lines of his poem clearly reveal. As Tayler similarly observes, these lines "constitute in effect an act of literary criticism by posing an invidious contrast between two kinds of readers," the initiate and the obtuse who dwell in mere "sense, and Fantasy," whom his *Second Anniversarie* also assails.[34] Yet this obvious distinction seems to conceal a further double "sense," for it can equally refer to those "sensualists" favorable to Bacon's empirical project or to literalists like Jonson who thought he merely meant to flatter a young woman he had in fact never met. In contrast to these, the more discriminating audience he sought would be essentially the same as the one that had warmly received his *Pseudo-Martyr* the previous year; important, critical men like the Dean of Canterbury, who overenthusiastically (yet not completely inaccurately) responded to the treatise by comparing its author to Bacon as another original "modern" thinker.[35] For of course, in rigorously responding to an important epistemic crisis and its attendant debates, both *are* equally modern even though they take opposing sides of the debate.

In any case, Donne's side of the debate clearly won in the short-term if not the long-term of intellectual history. Despite his well-documented sensitivity to Jonson's criticism of its "blasphemous" elevation of an unknown "saint" as the anti-thesis of the fatally corrupt corpse of the world, the *Anniversaries* were so successful that they went through two more editions in Donne's life-time and were again reprinted in the first posthumous collections of his poems.[36] From the start, they helped to further the growing reputation that he first established with the success of *Pseudo-Martyr*, and by the time the Baconian George Hakewill attempted to refute Donne's by then well-entrenched decay thesis

fifteen years later, he had to begin by acknowledging it as "an opinion of very *many*," so many that he had first consulted "both the learned *Professours* in the *Mathematickes* at *Oxford*" before proceeding.[37] Yet by far the strongest evidence that this success was intentional—and that Donne meant publically to challenge Bacon's audacious new program—is contained in the structure of the *First Anniversary* itself. There its rebuke to *The Advancement* would have been easily apparent to the cognoscenti or in fact to anyone keenly interested in the outlines of Bacon's radical new philosophy, for Donne's *Anatomy* at once closely mirrors and inverts his carefully laid out, diagrammatic method in ways that allow it to be taken (as Martz later conceded it is) as a satire.[39] Although Martz like many contemporary readers may not have grasped the specific butt of the satire, its message is encoded in the medium of the poem itself. Refuting *The Advancement*'s content point by point, it differs in form from Bacon's work in only one very telling respect. For Donne dramatically reverses Bacon's negative assessment of the imagination—which the Lord Chancellor had linked to idle ceremonies and ancient wisdom—by removing it from the middle section it occupies in Bacon's argument and reserving it for the end of his own. There he "redeems" the imagination by associating true poetry with divine learning, which teaches the quite unBaconian conviction that in this dying world, this imaginative and/or prophetic art is the *only* branch of knowledge capable of producing true "bread," the manna of life that points beyond our inevitable apocalyptic decline to our final heavenly resurrection.

Otherwise, however, as Brian Vickers's convenient *Analysis* of *The Advancement*'s structure reveals [see *Appendix A*], Donne's *Anatomy of the World* precisely mimics Bacon's procedure in Book II, where the core of his project is laid out. After a polemical dedication to the king that Donne subtly mimics in his equally polemical praise of Drury—whom for that very reason, he frequently compares to an ideal if absent and/or "ghostly" Christian prince (7, 34-46, 70)—Bacon begins his work by subdividing and then surveying learning according to the traditional "three parts of Man's Understanding." In line with Ramist theory, these parts are memory, which produces the arts of history;

imagination, which produces the arts of poesy; and reason, which produces the arts of philosophy. Both Frank Manley and later Martz (who subsequently modified his five-part structure to accommodate it) have discovered a similar triadic structure in *The First Anniversary.* However, Manley had assumed that the three parts coincided with the traditional Augustinian "interior" trinity—the memory, understanding, and will—a structure that ultimately proved unsatisfactory to Martz, even though he still agreed that some sort of triadic system is embedded in the poem.[38] However, not only this difficulty but most of the previously unanswered questions about the poem surveyed above disappear by replacing the three-part and five-part structural systems that have tantalized so many scholars with a Baconian framework.[39] For in fact, as Vickers's *Analysis* indicates, while *The Advancement of Learning* is "officially" triadic in structure, it is even better described as having five main stems along with multiple Ramistically descending branches.

A quick glance at the *Analysis* should suggest an obvious reason for this expansion: because Bacon's chief concern is with the third and final part of understanding, reason or philosophy, he further subdivides this subject into two major categories, "natural" and "human," followed by a final adjunct, divine learning, all of which are thoroughly assessed as to the degree of progress attained in each [see *Appendix A*]. Bacon's substitution of the Ramist category of imagination for the Augustinian category of will also explains why scholars have found it is so difficult to fit *The First Anniversary* into the conventional mold. For while one can easily point to numerous didactic outbursts suggesting that human endeavor or will is misdirected in this world, like Bacon's, Donne's main concern here is not with primarily with *moral* but with epistemological, aesthetic, and of course, spiritual reform. As a result, even these outbursts often seem inversely to echo Bacon's exhortations to redirect our human energies, the significant difference being that while Bacon horizontally realigns his reader's gaze with the visible book of nature, Donne vertically returns it to the invisible "book" or epitome of the redeemed Christian soul exemplified in Drury.[40] This task by definition involves an imaginative *poesis* or (re)making, a verbal and homiletic art

that also helps to explain why he not only retains the Baconian substitution of imagination for will but expands it, at the same time reserving it for the grand finale of his anatomy, where after examining false or "fallen" art, he will reunite it with its proper inspiration and end: divinity, the "wife" of his mature age.[41]

Except for the category of imagination or poesy, then, *The First Anniversary* follows *The Advancement*'s structural organization. Subdivided by the five well known refrains that organize the poem—"Shee, shee is dead; shee's dead; when thou knowest this,/ Thou knowest," etc., the poem considers all five branches of learning in turn, the obvious difference being its conclusion that all *but* poetry and divinity are in a state of inevitable, irreversible decline. This decay is considered progressively: the section after the first refrain establishes "how poor and trifling thing man is" (184), the second "how lame a cripple this world is" (238); the third "how ugly a monster this world is" (325), the fourth "how wan a ghost this our world is" (370); and the fifth and final refrain, "how dry a cinder this world is" (428).[42] This diagnosis thus conventionally traces humanity's general weakness or lapse from its first "crippling" ailment, Adam's sin, which by "infection" produces its deformity and/or monstrosity, to the final death and extinction of a world "rotten at the heart" after the original "Edenic" marriage became "our funeral" (105). This demonstration also "corrects" *The Advancement*'s most notable weakness: Bacon's treatment of divinity, which effectively reduces faith to a branch of a branch.[43]

While necessary, for Bacon divinity has no central place of its own in human learning except as an adjunct to public worship. For unlike natural theology, which he considers a "logical" branch of *prima philosophia* [*Analysis*, IIIb], neither revealed nor ceremonial religion have any function whatsoever in remedying man's worldly estate. In contrast, Donne follows Augustine in making faith the primary prerequisite of all human knowledge and divine revelation the ultimate sum of all human understanding. Here Drury again serves a useful exemplary purpose, for no one who fails to apprehend what a "rich soul which to here heaven is gone" (1) can know anything whatsoever, certainly not his own soul, the traditional beginning of all wisdom.

Lacking this, "pretending wits" possess only an "inmate" or imprisoned soul that has never been truly "enlivened" or baptized by faith. Even more pertinently, they can have no real knowledge of the perceptible world, which by both faith and reason we *know* has fallen into the chaos of its final sickness, leaving behind only a "lethargy" (24) in which all "*sense and memory*" (29, emphasis added) have been plunged. In this late state of decay, the arts of history and philosophy prove alike unreliable, subject as both are to mutability and its traditional accomplice, illusion.

Both the poem's specific details and its general principles thus diametrically oppose those of Bacon's treatise, which regards the natural order as providential and the human will as a necessary part of that essentially benign order. Although therapeutic intervention on the part of science is necessary to restore nature to its pristine purity, this restoration can be achieved simply by designing inductive principles to accord with nature rather than pursuing the mental "illusions" of the scholastic logicians. While natural law theorists like Hooker had also regarded nature as having a providential design accessible to human reason, he used this design (in what is generally considered a hedge against strict Calvinist predestination) as a justification for saving souls. Bacon's reworking of these principles radically readapts this model to implicitly secular purposes: instead of justifying God's ways to man, he essentially justifies "man's ways to nature."[44] But as we have seen, the mature Donne is far closer to Montaigne than to either Hooker or Bacon; and when it became clear that he "had license to doubt 'wisely' but not forever," his turn toward the theological mainstream combines a Calvinist with a Montaignean pessimism about God's presence in nature after the fall.[45] As a result, it is hardly surprising to find that the preface preceding the first section of Donne's *Anatomy* (the section after his first refrain) seems deliberately to parody Bacon's prefatory "Dedication to the King."

Here Bacon identifies six sources of the current defects of learning: 1) learning is dedicated to specific professions rather than to science at large; 2) it receives little financial reward; 3) it lacks proper instruments; 4) it lacks sufficient royal attention, receiving no visits from or consul-

tations with princes; 5) it is provincial rather than universal; and 6) its lesser known branches receive no public attention or appointments [see *Appendix*]. To these appeals for action and redress Donne wryly responds that 1) the only "science" is to "see, and Judge, and follow worthiness," since the professions themselves are "sick" along with their own "physicke" or medicines (4, 21); 2) in the current situation, neither ceremonial nor "princely" remedies, instruments, or rewards are effective, their true efficacy having departed with Drury's soul (35-38); 3) this situation is *unfortunately* universal rather than provincial (47-58); but 4) "since no man can make thee live," the poet will at least appoint *himself* to "trie/ What we may gaine by thy Anatomy" (59-60).

After this polemical introduction, Donne then anatomizes each of the three Baconian parts of learning in turn, showing how each has been lost along with the whole. Under the first category of memory or history, he begins by examining how not only Bacon's first branch, natural history, but also his second, civil history [*Analysis* I], have become "speechless" due to an irreversible legitimacy crisis. True subjects (again symbolized by Drury) are no longer "baptized" or religiously united with their true but long-absence "princes," either Christ or his kingly vicar on earth (30-38). This non-coincidence of bridegroom and bride produces a crisis in post-Reformation Europe embracing both its ecclesiastical and civil worlds, which now alike languish as in a state led by an ailing king with no royal heir. Equally lacking any such "strong example . . ., equal to law,/ The cement which did faithfully compact/ And glue all virtues, now resolved, and slacked" (48-50), the world groans anew in the absence of the true "anointing" that an innocent Adamic language would have conferred upon nature. With both microcosm and macrocosm growing ever more "Corrupt and mortal in thy purest part" (62) after the flight of souls like Drury's, their "intrinsic balm, and . . . preservative" (57), the entire chain of being crumbles. Thus in this current precipitous state of human decline as Donne sees it, Bacon's next subdivision, ecclesiastical history, can receive only a ghostly "dissection," for "there is none/ Alive to study" it (66). In fact, all that saves such a project from complete futility is the lingering "undead," the "new creatures" whose souls survive this

world's living purgatory as the "weedless" remnants of Drury's virtue (70-82). So as the true or "divine" physician, "doctor" Donne must inform himself and his patients that "we/ At best, enjoy but a neutrality," itself a mere euphemism for the "worse sickness," which is to "know/ That we are never well, nor can be so" (91-94).

After this careful survey of natural, civil, and ecclesiastical history, Donne replaces Bacon's quick survey and dismissal of the defects of poesy with a savage denunciation of the insuperable defects of his *philosophia prima*, the category from which all branches of natural philosophy, Bacon's central focus, descend [IIIabc in *Analysis*]. Donne condenses this subject rather precipitously, since after Adam, both our reason and we ourselves "are born ruinous." Thus our "ominous precipitation" or double fall (through original sin, and through our individual births) aptly foreshadows "witty's ruin," here explicitly linked to Eve—the "woman, sent/ For man's relief" who only furthers his "languishment" (95, 98, 101-2)—a far cry from Bacon's beneficent curse. Not only do "We kill ourselves, to propagate our kind" (110), but our kind labors to kill its kind *throughout* the declining natural history of the world. This gloomy conclusion sets up an extensive consideration of natural/cultural decline in proper Baconian order: physics, metaphysics, experimental and operative arts and inventions both physical and mental, individual and civil or "conjugate" [see *Analysis,* IIIc-d], all of which Donne finds hopelessly degenerate. Again turning *The Advancement*'s thesis on its head, he shows that *only* the ancients were sufficiently close to the Edenic golden age to master either nature or culture. Giants in the earth, sun-like marvels both in themselves and in their arts, they led exceptionally long lives that gave them eye-witness knowledge of physics and astronomy (113-20). Relying on what they *saw* and recorded rather than depending upon faulty records of natural history, they proved equally self-sufficient in metaphysics: "thus erect,/ . . . that soul a good way towards heaven [was] direct" (125-26). In civics the same situation held when "every soul/ Did a fair kingdom, and large realm control" (123-24).

In contrast, modern men are pygmies (142) in size, vigor, and length of life, not to mention metaphysical and spiritual virtue. Unable to hold

"All the old text" of natural *or* revealed divinity, they can scarcely dream of disposing "into less glass" the "Spirits of virtue, which [after] then scattered was" (149-50). This remark is obliquely but almost certainly aimed at refuting Bacon's famous claim that learning will again advance once the mind of man is "delivered and reduced" from the "enchanted glass, full of superstition and imposture" to which its own imagination and the "idols" of previous ages have subjected it. The likelihood of a direct allusion is increased by the fact that Donne immediately afterward laments the lapse of the famed "element of Fire" that the new philosophy or rather Bacon has "put out" (*FI*, 206) in his *Advancement of Learning*, where he finds it merely "feigned" (*AL* 227) or imaginary.[46] For Donne, such cosmological innovations do not advance man's estate through a "close[r] weaving" of new discoveries, but rather set a net or trap for his sinful "ambition" to "shrink" and "undo" "God's whole work" (153, 155), until "With new diseases on ourselves we war,/And with new physic, a worse engine far" (159-60). So much, then, for Bacon's proposed improvements in either history (the art of memory) or philosophic reason. Not only are the individual and aggregate tools of these disciplines alike corrupt, but their objects—physics, metaphysics, and experimental advances in medicine or other related arts—only advance man's decay [*Analysis* IIIabcd].

Thus whereas in the waning glow of the first golden age "all faculties, all graces" found their natural place in "man, this world's vice-emperor," from whence they spread to other "creatures" as "man's ministers, and legates there/ To work on their rebellions, and reduce/ Them to civility, and to man's use," (161-66), by now all creatures, marvels, and their arts have turned into monstrosities as the new philosophy only further compounds man's original rebellion from God. In its wake, the inevitable failure of natural philosophy is exactly mirrored by the failure of human philosophy: the arts of the individual human body are as useless of those of the mind. Since reason and will (Bacon's further subdivision of those arts) have fallen together with Adam, the "conjugate" arts of the body social "naturally" collapse with them, especially now that the creatures are no more obedient to man than he is to his own superiors [*Analysis* IIId]. Later in the poem, Donne

will support these claims by arguing that even the apparently undisputed "advances" that inspired new philosophers like Bacon—man's growing skill in mapping the celestial and terrestrial spheres—are an illusion, since they only reflect the disorder and disproportion he himself has introduced into it. Not only does the sun's course no longer fit the traditionally "round" zodiac (268), but "he" can no longer "Perfit a Circle, or maintaine his way/ One inche direct; but where he rose to day,/ He comes no more, but with a cousening line,/ Steales by that point, and so is Serpentine" (269-72).

This witty "explanation" of the fact that the Ptolemaic system has become unreliable only because earthly corruption has at last infected the heavens themselves—an ironic acceptance *and* dismissal of the case for Copernican astronomy—is used to underscore both Donne's teleology and the moral lessons he derives from it:

> So, of the stars which boast that they do run
> In circle still, none ends where he begun.
> All their proportions lame, it sinks, it swells.
> For of meridians, and parallels,
> Man hath weaved out a net, and this net thrown
> Upon the heavens, and now they are his own.
> Loth to go up the hill, or labour thus
> To go to heaven, we make heaven come to us. (275-282)

Much as the "true" circular order of the spheres has been corrupted by man's rational sins, so they have also made the earth less rather than more navigable. There can thus be no advantage in sailing beyond the pillars of Gibraltar when both earthly and oceanic geography have become unreliable, mountains like Tenerife (286) "growing" monstrously high while oceans become so monstrously deep that the very whales drown themselves (289).[47] In sum, then, the only true arts remaining to man are those modeled by Drury, those of "a true religious alchemy" (179-80, 182), the only "science" to which Donne grants any real ameliorative powers. In it are condensed all the lost arts of proportion also embodied in Drury. Through her quasi-miraculous release from the "stain of Eve" (180), she also perfectly illustrates the

decay thesis, since as the last truly "harmonic" soul, she could only have been fully "alive" to the ancients:

> She by whose lines proportion should be
> Examined, measure of all symmetry,
> Whom had that ancient seen, who thought souls made
> Of harmony, he would at next have said
> That harmony was she, and thence infer,
> That souls were but resultances from her. (309-14)

The anti-Baconian "anatomy" condensed in Donne's prolegomenon is further detailed in each of his succeeding sections. The first details the natural history of the world's corruption through sin and its subsequent spread throughout human history, both civil and spiritual. Instead of the wonderful creatures, marvels and arts that the first section of Bacon's *Advancement of Learning* [*Analysis* I] would catalogue, Donne here records how "false-conceptions fill the general wombs" with hideous miscreations "as would have troubled much,/ Th' Egyptian Mages to have made more such" (386, 389-90) [*Analysis,* I]. Skipping over poesy, the second section focuses on how this corruption has infected not only *philosophia prima* but all the natural sciences, undermining all "proportion" in physics, metaphysics, and all their operative and experimental branches [cf. *Analysis* III a-c]. The third section takes on the corruption of the "colors" of nature, which are reflected in the human imagination and its capacity for beauty. This corruption simultaneously confounds all the branches of study relating to the natural body and mind: medicine (343-44), cosmetics (345-58), and sensual stimulation (359-68), [*Analysis* IIId.] The fourth section then sets up the triumph of true poetry and divinity by detailing how the subjects closest to them—cosmology and hermetic or divine philosophy [*Analysis* IIId, second subdivision]—have been tainted by the demise of the natural correspondences between heaven and earth. In this state, "natural" human art—narrative, representative, *or* allusive—has become thoroughly corrupt [*Analysis* II]. In fact, the quintessentially "Baconian" arts of civil or "conjugate" society [*Analysis* IIId, final subdivision] (whose false "colors" are also punningly associated with

corruption at the beginning of this section) themselves survive only in the afterglow of Drury's "gilding" of an age otherwise not just iron "but rusty too" (418, 426). This analysis allows Donne to prove in his final section and conclusion that his anatomy and/or autopsy is complete, for only one kind of knowledge is worth having, which is that "no thing"

> Is worth our travaile, griefe, or perishing,
> But those rich joyes, which did possesse her hart,
> Of which shee's now partaker, and a part. (431-34)

The careful reader will notice that these sections do not rigidly correspond to Bacon's diagrammatic outline, although they are extremely close. Thus for instance, Donne's consideration of conjugate or civil society is not fully contained in the third section, where it ought properly to be as a branch of human learning. Instead, it "enjambs" itself into the very beginning of the fourth section in order to show that the false "colors" of civil society characterize *all* of its arts, including the specifically literary arts considered in this fourth and penultimate section. This approach is characteristic of the poem as a whole, as it must be, for the sake of epistemological as well aesthetic coherence: Donne is not after all, writing a discursive treatise like Bacon's but a closely integrated poetic "anatomy." Rather than rigidly following the Lord Chancellor's Ramist method of precise dissection, Donne thus adopts the more appropriate poetic technique of pointing out a dramatic general example of the deficiencies of each of his predecessor's branches of learning, then drawing specific conclusions from them, and finally contrasting these defects with the superlative Christian virtues epitomized in Drury. A fuller consideration of each of the five sections should more concretely indicate how this method works.

As we have seen earlier, Donne's first section on natural and human history summarizes its course as the seventeenth century equivalent of sudden infant death syndrome: "The world did in her Cradle take a fall,/ And turn'd her braines, and took a general maine/ Wronging each joynt of th'universall frame" (196-98). This general analysis leads directly in the specific case of the "new Philosophy," which as everyone knows, not only "cals all in doubt" (205), but actually darkens the course of

natural and human history. Beginning in the "evening" of the first day in Eden (202), history marches ever faster on toward midnight under the new philosophy's malign influence: "And freely men confesse, that this world's spent,/ When in the Planets, and the Firmament/ They seeke so many new; they see that this/ Is crumbled out again to his Atomis" (209-212). At this point, through a famous pun on the word "Relation"—"'Tis all in pieces, all cohaerence gone;/ All just supply, and all Relation"—Donne connects his natural history to civil history: "Prince, Subject, Father, Sonne, are things forgot" (213-15). The specific reason for this crumbling of human "Relation" along with physical "Atomis" sets up the antithetical turn toward Drury and the metaphysical unity of her soul: "every man alone thinkes he hath got/ To be a Phoenix" (216-17), a unique creation that only further dissolves the "worlds condition" (219) into competing parts or atoms. In contrast, the "Magnetique force" of Drury's Christian humility "should all parts to reunion bow" (220-21) in ways that also epitomize the defects of the new philosophy's supposed "advancement of learning." For in place of the new arts and marvels Bacon's project promises mankind, Drury's example supplies both truly "magnetic" or cohesively healing science and true treasure: the embalming "spice" of immortality and the rich "gold" of spiritual virtue (230-34).

Deferring Bacon's consideration of imaginative art or poesy, Donne's next section follows the same process of beginning with a striking general analysis of his topic, the defects of *philosophia prima* and its physics and metaphysics, both theoretical and experimental (or "prudential"), then proceeding to specific examples and concluding with their Christian correction. Here his general analysis is once again brilliant, for by beginning with one of the two traditional Augustinian "elements" of beauty, proportion, he is able at once to illustrate the disproportion of science and the physical world on which it works. This passage (partly quoted above) is thus well worth repeating, for it makes the important point that while we may think the heavens still "enjoy their Spherical/ Their round proportion embracing all" (251-52), the celestial physics of the astronomers has drawn these spheres into earthly "disproportion" by "tear[ing]"

> The Firmament in eight and fortie sheeres,
> And in those constellations there arise
> New starres, and old do vanish from our eyes:
> . . . .
> They have empayld within a Zodiake
> The free-borne Sunne, and keepe twelves signs awake
> To watche his steps; . .
> For his course is not round; nor can the Sunne
> Perfit a Circle, or maintaine his way
> One inche direct; but where he rose to day
> He comes no more, but with a cousening line,
> Steales by that point, and so is Serpentine. (257-50, 263-64, 268-72)

Although when we look overhead, the sun still circles the earth, in point of fact the new astronomy introduces as many or more deformations of the spherical heavens as did the older Ptolemaic system, which had constantly needed to be "corrected" with "Eccentrique parts" (255).

Donne here stands on solid ground, for the Copernican hypothesis would not be able to make truly accurate predictions until Newton incorporated Kepler's laws into his own *Principia Mathematica*; and for that reason, the greatest practical astronomer of the time, Tycho Brahe (whose work Donne was well aware of) could not fully accept the Copernican theory. Hence, the poet could hardly have chosen a more strikingly example of the "disproportion" of the new physics, or a more clever way to extend those defects into metaphysics than through his pun on "Serpentine." For now the "free-borne Sunne" (264) steals and reels like a human thief and a drunkard, indicating that in his satanic old age the derelict at last "meanes to sleepe, being now falne nearer us" (274). The poet then illustrates these points in lengthy detail, perhaps because of his prior interest in the new philosophy. However, most of these points have already been covered: the face of the earth (its heights and depths) has become as disproportionate as that of the heavens, thereby becoming as off-balance or "lame" as its fallen but once "noblest part" (277, 199). Of course, human hubris or philosophic reason cannot accept this situation, so it instead designs a

rational "net' (279) to straighten the weaving world, even though the results merely repeat the curse upon the builders of Babel. But those who cannot understand why "solidnes and roundnes have no place" in the fallen, "pock-hole[d]"world will eventually be forced to recognize it in the hollow "Vault" of hell. (299-300, 295). Once again the obvious contrast to this state is that of Drury's soul, which he then compares to the perfectly proportioned "Arke" of salvation, one of those perfect "formes" (318, 316) that show the way to true physical and metaphysical advancement, for "Both Elements, and Passions liv'd at peace/ In her, who caus'd all Civill warre to cease" (320-21)

The next section considers Bacon's second major subdivision of the arts of reason or philosophy: knowledge of the human mind and body. Since in *The Advancement* this branch of learning reflects or mirrors natural philosophy, Donne echoes this reflection by considering it as the second part of beauty, which is color. This category serves his turn as well as its first part, proportion, since it allows him to focus on the faded or "crooked" colors of both individual and aggregate bodies. In general, since poor color naturally reflects sickness, the poor "lustre" of the human mind and body, which "now, is as neere spent" (340), again shows that we "advance" only in reverse. This aspect of the decay thesis proceeds "not onely [from] faults in inward parts/ Corruptions in our braines, or in our harts,/Poysoning the fountaines, whence our actions spring" (229-31), but also from our outward parts. Punning this time on the idea of the world as a "ring" that has lost its stone (342), he wryly proposes that if it still had a proper stone like a "compassionate Turcoyse," it would tell us that "the wearer is not well" (343-44). This failure of color is then cleverly tied to the failure of both physical and moral vision, for "sight . . . the noblest sense of any one," no longer has anything either to nourish, "feed" or encourage it, once both outward and "inward" or moral color are alike "decayd" and "sunke." Thus the only vivid color that remains is that of moral evil: "onely our soules are redde" (355, 357-58) instead of innocent white. Nevertheless, in that "unvext Paradise" to which Drury has gone, all "verdure" and "lustre" remain as in the original infancy of the world, when God "Himself his various Rainbow did allow" to "swadl[e] . . . the new-borne earth"

(364, 352, 348). Although the true colors of paradise—white, and redde, and blue/ (Beauties ingredients)" (361-62)—have fled the earth, Drury fully possesses and dispenses their full physical and mental "lustre" in heaven, in the "vision" of which the "liveliest" earthly jewels are "but drowsie, and pale" by comparison (368).

Earth's old, pale, and inauthentic colors are even more specifically connected to the individual *and* aggregate fall of physical, mental, and moral vision at the beginning of the next section, where Donne observes that man now uses them only "To color vitious deeds with good pretense,/ Or with bought colors to illude mens sense" (375-76). Since this point picks up the poet's discussion of the disjunction of action and motive earlier in the third section (332-38), he apparently reprises it here in order to help drive home an additional point about the failure of all narrative, representative, and allusive art. None of these are now even remotely capable of perfection because all must reflect the outward corrupt of the world. Since both "father" sky and "mother" earth are now generally "barren" (380), so that the very "Ayre doth not motherly sit on the earth" (383),

> What artist now dares boast that he can bring
> Heaven hither, or constellate any thing,
> So as the influence of those starres may bee
> Imprisoned in an Herb, or Charme, or Tree,
> And doe by touch, all which those starres could do?
> The art is lost, and correspondence too.
> For heaven gives little, and earth takes lesse,
> And man least knowes their trade, and purposes. (391-98).

Of course, if the general "commerce betwixt heaven and earth were not/ Embarr'd" (399-400), the situation would be radically different. Not only would each of these specific hermetic arts be restored, but the world would be imaginatively inspired to join in poetic unison, singing a divine funeral elegy for Drury as if one great "dying Swan" song (407). But instead, the world has progressed so far *away* from true aesthetic learning of any kind that even when she was alive, her role in

transmitting the power of these elemental/alchemical "vertues" was made "by Receivers impotence, lame" (414-16).

Yet since Elizabeth Drury has deigned briefly to sojourn on earth, "some graines" (424) of virtue do remain to lighten the rusty arts of this iron age. In consequence, Donne directs his final section to those souls who still cherish virtue, summing up their divine wisdom in a simple message: to turn away from any prospect of advancement in a world whose autopsy and funeral he then immediately conducts (435-42). Directly afterwards, in the thirty-two lines of his conclusion, the poet turns to the "blessed maid" herself, his most perfect audience, to announce that "Here therefore be the end" (443).[48] At this point, he celebrates the one "true" remaining art, the power of divine or prophetic poetry to commemorate and "immortalize" such truly miraculous births as hers, which even at her death, signals the "second birth" not only of her own life but of the world (450-51). In the meantime, like the lingering corpse of the world, man now lives only in his own corpse-like chrysalis, the "womb" in which his real eyes and real knowledge remain unopened:

> For though the soule of man
> Be got when man is made, 'tis borne but than
> When man doth die. Our body's as the womb,
> And as a mid-wife death directs it home. (451-54)

Nevertheless, by harkening to her example (455-57), those remaining behind can at least *temporarily* revive virtue, her "best concoction" (456), before the world's final end. Thus, as in his "Canonization," he pleads for the superlatively "canonical" power of poetry to deliver this "concoction" to those who might find such matters more "fit for Chronicle" (457-60) than verse. Invoking the higher example of Moses, to whom "God did make/ A last, and lasting'st piece, a song," as the only real means of improving human "memory" (461-62), Donne takes on "this great office boldly to invade./ Nor could incomprehensibleness deter/ Me, from thus trying to imprison her" (467-70). But in "imprisoning" or preserving her memory, the poet also clearly

concludes that the true invention and/or advancement consists in invoking the poetic equivalent of her "religious alchemy." Much as the whole law of Moses was obscurely "reduced" or "disposed" in his Song (cf. *ED* 92), Donne's perhaps "incomprehensible" imitation is the best that can be done in a forgetful and decaying world. By closely imitating Bacon's attempt to make "as it were a small Globe of the intellectual World, as truly and faithfully" as possible (*AL* 299), Donne thus also reverses his adversary's conclusion, ironically showing that true "advancement" comes from heaven downward, not from earth heavenward: from companions of "Abraham's bosom" like Drury, which to us represent not a presumptuous height but a *depth* from which "no *ignorance*, . . . *melancholy*, . . . *oppression*, [or] . . . *sin*" can eclipse the sight of God.[49] Leaving behind the corruptible earth Bacon vainly seeks to restore, Donne instead directs his readers towards the transcendent hope of eternity where they will find their only real chance of repairing either the "ruine" of Adam's or our wit.

*The University of Memphis*

# *Appendix A*[50]

## ANALYSIS

### BOOK II. OF WHAT HAS BEEN DONE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING HUMAN AND DIVINE, WITH THE DEFECTS OF THE SAME.

- Dedication to the King (169–75) defining
  - Acts of merit towards learning (169–71) as regards
    1. Places of learning (170)
    2. Books of learning (170)
    3. The person of the learned (170)
  - Defects of places of learning (171–5)
    1. All dedicated to professions and none to sciences at large (171)
    2. Smallness of reward for lecturers (171–2)
    3. Want of apparatus for experiments (172)
    4. Neglect of consultation in governors and of visitation in princes (172–3)
    5. Want of mutual intercourse between the Universities of Europe (173–4)
    6. Want of public appointment of writers or inquirers into the less known branches of knowledge (174)
- (A) Human learning divided into
  - I. History (175–86)
    - Natural (175–8)
      - Of creatures (175–6)
      - Of marvels (176–7)
      - Of arts (177–8)
    - Civil (178–86)
      - Memorials (178–9)
        - Chronicles
        - Narrations.
        - Lives.
      - Antiquities (179)
      - Perfect histories (179–80); their deficiencies (180–6)
    - Ecclesiastical
      - History of the Church (184)
      - Of prophecy (184–5)
      - Of Providence (185)
    - Literary (defective)
    - Appendices to history, orations, letters, sayings (185–6)
  - II. Poesy (186–8)
    - Narrative (187)
    - Representative (187)
    - Allusive (187–8)

(A) Human learning divided into
III. Philosophy
(a) Philosophia prima (189–91)
(b) Divine, i.e. natural theology (191–2)
(c) Natural
Science
Physics (195–6)
Metaphysics (193–5, 196–9), including mathematics (199–200)
Prudence
Experimental (201)
Operative (201–2)
Calendar of inventions (202)
Catalogue of popular errors (203–4)
Collation of ancient philosophy (204–5)
(d) Human
Particular, or individual (205–65), as regards the
Body
Medicine (205–14)
Cosmetic (214)
Athletics (214–15)
Sensual arts (215)
Mind
Its nature and faculties as regards the
Reason (215–18), to which belong the arts of
Invention (219–24)
Judgement (224–9)
Memory (229–30)
Tradition (230–43)
Will (243–5), which includes the
Nature of good (245–55)
Culture of the mind (255–65)
Conjugate or Civil (265–88), with reference to
Conversation (265–6)
Negotiation (266–86)
Government (286–8)
(B) Divine learning has two parts
The matter revealed
Of belief (297) including
Faith (297)
Manners (297–8)
Of service, including
Liturgy (298)
Government (298)
The nature of the revelation, its
Limits (292–3)
Sufficiency (293)
Acquisition (293–7)
(Use and limits of reason in religion (289–92))
Conclusion (299)

Notes

1. Louis Martz, *The Poetry of Meditation: A Study in English Religious Literature*, rev. ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 229. Barbara Kiefer Lewalski, *Donne's Anniversaries and the Poetry of Praise: The Creation of a Symbolic Mode* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 13-14. Lewalski claims to identify a "symbolic dimension which is neither nebulous nor arbitrary," a defect she rightly attributes to previous identifications of Drury with Queen Elizabeth, Astrea, the Blessed Virgin, Christ, or the Logos; for none of these adequately "account for the utter decay and death of the natural world which the *Anniversary* poems describe" (p. 108). But Lewalski never returns to this premise nor explores the "decay theory" chronicled in Victor Harris's book on the subject (see note 2 below), but for unexplained reasons identifies the poem's subject with far more nebulous, in fact infinitely expandable contexts: conceptions of the *imago dei,* the order of grace, and the typological patterns of Christian history (pp. 115-263). Yet in another sense, these broad contexts are also extremely narrow: by limiting them to Calvin, Hooker, and the Latin Fathers, Donne's engagement with important contemporary thinkers (except for a few Protestant theologians) and/or issues is almost completely omitted. For a convincing refutation of both the Martz and the Lewalski thesis (but not of Martz's five-part structural paradigm), see Edward W. Tayler, *Donne's Idea of a Woman: Structure and Meaning in the "Anniversaries"* (New York: Columbia UP, 1991). On the poem's failure to conform to the Jesuit paradigm, see especially pp. 85-87; for its failure to conform to a Protestant paradigm (as well as on the inadequacies of that paradigm itself), see pp. 12-18, 78-83, 141-43n., and 173-74n.

2. Victor Harris, *All Coherence Gone* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), pp. 121, 123; on Donne's earlier rejection and/or disinterest in the Cyprianic theory of universal decay, see pp. 123-25; on Bacon as the chief and for awhile, solitary upholder of the contrary theory, see pp. 129-32. However, as other scholars generally recognize, Bacon was most likely influenced or inspired (at least in part) by Robert Ashley's 1594 English translation of Loys Le Roy's book *Of the Interchangeable Course, or Variety of Things in the Whole World*, a cyclical theory which Bacon modified into an upwardly spiraling theory. He may also have been influenced by Bodin. See Ernest Lee Tuveson, *Millennium and Utopia: A Study in the Background of the Idea of Progress* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 57-67, especially pp. 66-67.

3. For a consideration of the anti-Baconian context of the *Anniversaries*, see Desiree E. Hellegers, "The Politics of Redemption: Science, Conscience, and the Crisis of Authority in John Donne's 'Anniversaries,'" *The New Orleans Review* 18 (1991): 9-18. Except for some oversimplifications of Bacon's position (none of the major texts are considered in detail) as well as Donne's, the article makes a valuable and relatively unique contribution to a neglected aspect of Donne studies, particu-

larly since (as she also points out, p. 13 n.17) Charles Monroe Coffin's work on *John Donne and the New Philosophy* (New York: Humanities Press, 1958) barely acknowledges that the *Anniversaries* reflect the poet's adverse response to Bacon's agenda: the improvement, "control, and domination of the natural world" (p. 181).

4. Donne clearly knew and used St. Cyprian later in his Sermons for much the same purposes; see *LXXX Sermons* (1640), 36, fol. 357.

5. According to Aristotelian/Ptolemaic doctrine (still widely accepted at the time), the heavens but not the earth are eternally stable, a point not contested by Christianity *except* during the Last Days predicted by the Book of Revelation. For a brief intellectual/historical survey of apocalyptic history, see Tuveson, *Millennium and Utopia,* pp. 13-14, and chapter 2, especially pp. 48-49. As Tuveson explains, the Church did not emphasize decay theory after Constantine because Rome did not fall as expected and because, in taking over its role, it spiritualized Christianity's eschatological and apocalyptic dimension. The concrete aspect of this dimension was not revived by Calvin or Luther but by the exiled English Protestant community in its post-Marian martyrology. For a brief summary of Donne's adherence to the decay theory, see Achsah Guibbory, *The Map of Time: Seventeenth-Century English Literature and Ideas of Pattern in History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), pp. 71-75.

6. Milton, *Areopagitica* in *The Complete Prose Works of John Milton,* ed. Don M. Wolfe. 8 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952-83), 2: 553. On Bacon's influence on him and Puritans of his generation and "type," see Charles Webster, *The Great Instauration: Science, Medicine, and Reform 1626-1660* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1976). On the controversial religious aspect of the scientific revolution, see Charles Webster, ed., *The Intellectual Revolution of the Seventeenth Century* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), and on the gradual ascent of the "moderns" in the controversy, see Richard Foster Jones, *Ancients and Moderns: A Study of the Rise of the Scientific Movement in Seventeenth Century England,* 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965).

7. See Marie Boas, *The Scientific Renaissance, 1450-1630* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1962) on Vesalius, p. 129, and on Copernicus, p. 74. On the English Reformer, John Bale, see Katherine R. Firth, *The Apocalyptic Tradition in Reformation Britain, 1530-1645* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), p. 49.

8. Quoted by Stephen Shapin in discussing how "Bacon's often-repeated architectural metaphor summed up the radical modernizing impulse": *The Scientific Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 66. However, as both he and Charles Webster point out in *The Great Instauration*, Bacon is always careful to authorize this impulse through a strongly millenarian interpretation of key passages in Daniel and the Book of Solomon, an approach that historically came to appeal to the radical Reformist element in the populace. Whether as a deliberate or unintentional "prophetic" form of competition, Donne also likes to cast himself in the Solomonic role; see Tayler, *Donne's Idea of a Woman*, pp. 89, 92-93.

9. On James I, see Tuveson, *Millennium and Utopia,* pp. 52-54. See also *The Advancement of Learning*, p. 169, in *Francis Bacon: A Critical Edition of the Major Works*, ed. Brian Vickers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), hereafter cited in the text as *AL.*

10. Cited by I. D'Israeli, *Curiosities of Literature* (London, 1838) p. 492.

11. *The Works of Francis Bacon*, ed. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heat, 14 vols. (London: Longman and co. 1860), 4:33, 248. These quotations respectively occupy the end of the introduction to the *Great Instauration* and the conclusion to its only extent part, the two books of the *Novum Organum.*

12. See M.M. Slaughter, *Universal languages and scientific taxonomy in the seventeenth century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1982), p. 89.

13. *Essays in Divinity by John Donne*, ed. Evelyn M. Simpson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), p. 23.

14. See M.M. Slaughter, *Universal languages and scientific taxonomy in the seventeenth century,* pp. 85-88. As Slaughter further explains, in such systems "definitions of things act as names for things," and to the extent that the system includes both definitions and names, "naming reflects taxonomic structure in the most transparent manner possible," so that "the taxonomy is an encyclopedia, nomenclature and dictionary all at the same time" (p. 66).

15. Thus, as Hellegers summarizes in "The Politics of Redemption," "Bacon's belief in the progressive knowledge of the natural world as a means to restore Adamic clarity, and implicitly to effect the redemption of nature, would strike Donne as at attempt to seize God's prerogative" (p. 15).

16. *Essays in Divinity;* see Simpson's introduction, pp. ix-x, xiii-xvii. Further quotations from the *Essays* themselves will be cited in the text alongside the abbreviation *"ED."*

17. This and all subsequent quotations taken from C.A. Patrides, ed., *John Donne, The Complete English Poems* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985). *The Anniversaries* will be subsequently cited in the text; unless specifically cited as *SA* (*Second Anniversary*), line numbers will refer to *The First Anniversary.*

18. Guibbory, *The Map of Time*, p. 47.

19. Augustine, "Of True Religion," trans John H. S. Burleigh in *Augustine's Earlier Writings* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1953), p. 274. See also Ronald H. Nash, *The Light of the Mind: St. Augustine's Theory of Knowledge* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1969).

20. Donne's epistemology can most accurately be described as a synthesis of Augustinian Neoplatonism and Aristotelian theories of cognition, the synthesis commonly subscribed to by the educated men of his day. See Tayler, *Donne's Idea of a Woman*, p.132 ff.

21. Cf. Louis I. Bredvold, "The Religious Thought of Donne in Relation to Medieval and Later Traditions," in *Studies in Shakespeare, Milton and Donne* (New York: Haskell House, 1964), pp. 193-232. Perhaps recalling this famous Baconian

passage, Bredvold further remarks in the same place that despite Donne's occasional scorn for the "doctrines of the schools," it would be mistaken to suppose that he "brushed away . . . all medieval philosophy as if it were cobwebs" (p. 208). More recently, Tayler has reconfirmed the scholastic basis of Donne's thought, which he specifically links to the method of the *Anniversaries*; see *Donne's Idea of a Woman*, especially pp. 68, 103. But in *John Donne and the New Philosophy*, Coffin seems deliberately to misrepresent the main thrust of Bredvold's argument, isolating the fact that he found Donne in "revolt against medieval rationalism" (p. 264) without noting Bredvold's subsequent qualifications of this point. Unfortunately, this omission is typical of Coffin's work; despite his undeniable learning, Coffin stops at nothing to defend his own highly romanticized view of Donne as a proto-modern rebel who precociously grasped both the "spirit" and the deficiencies of science that were only beginning to become apparent in the critic's day (circa 1936); see pp. 102-3, 214-16, 280-81, ff. Ascribing Donne's most assertive anti-scientific statements to a personal "mood" at the time (pp. 265-66, 272), Coffin also flatly contradicts himself in saying that Donne did not "really" believe in the decay thesis since he did not preach it, then quotes a sermon in which the thesis is clearly affirmed (pp. 272-74). At times he does not even scruple to put Bacon's words in Donne's mouth; see p. 284. This short list of logical and scholarly errors could easily be multiplied; the astonishing fact is that Coffin is still often quoted as an authority seventy-four years later, especially considering the rapid advances in history of science that have rendered his work largely obsolete.

22. Perry Miller, *The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 336-37. On the Bacon's use of the system of Peter Ramus and on the latter's critique of Aristotle, see Robert Leslie Ellis, Preface to *Valerius Terminus* in *The Works of Francis Bacon*, 3: 203-5. For a more extended discussion, see Paolo Rossi, *Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science*, trans. Sacha Rabinovitch (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968).

23. Guibbory, *The Map of Time*, pp. 84-85.

24. Hellegers, "The Politics of Redemption," p. 15. However, Hellegers's conclusion is far more questionable: "The project of *both the old and new philosophies* is, in Donne's estimation, a quest to control God by subjecting 'Him' to the evidence of the senses in conjunction with reason" (15, emphasis added). This statement conflates Donne's critique of the new philosophy with a disapproval of the old, which is not evident in either *Anniversary*, although he does briefly recognize the obsolescence of the Ptolemaic system; on this point see below. But as a result of the *new* philosophy, he find mankind further than ever from even an intermediate "truth" such as he seeks in the *Satyrs*.

25. See John Klause, "The Montaneignity of Donne's *Metempsychosis*," in *Renaissance Genres: Essays on Theory, History, and Interpretation*, ed. Barbara Kiefer Lewalski (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986) pp. 426, 429, 435. On Francis and Anthony Bacon as the "Thresher" and "Swordfish" who unjustly

conspire against the "whale" (Essex) in the poem, see Malvern van Wyk Smith, "John Donne's *Metempsychosis*, part II," in *RES* vol. 24 (1973): 148-49. I owe this point to Dennis Flynn, who also kindly supplied other historical hints.

26. For an illuminating survey of the characteristic links between the traditionalist argument against "presumption" and attacks on the new astronomy, see Howard Schultz, *Milton and Forbidden Knowledge* (New York: Modern Language Association of America, 1955). Schultz's title slightly obscures the relevance of his work: he mainly treats the traditionalist position *before* Milton, that is, in Donne's own generation.

27. On the adherence of both Copernicus and Gilbert to the ancient hylozoist hypothesis (as well as on Copernicus's relatively conservative Neoplatonic convictions), see Marjorie Hope Nicolson, *The Breaking of the Circle: Studies in the Effect of the "New Science" upon Seventeenth-Century Poetry* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), pp. 141-51.

28. Edward W. Tayler, *Donne's Idea of a Woman*, pp. 30-31.

29. Tayler, *Donne's Idea of a Woman*, pp. 26-30. On Lewalski's "anachronistic," Procrustean, and overly dichotomous reading of Donne, see p. 13. Tayler's critique is barbed but accurate.

30. William Drummond of Hawthornden is quoted from Edward W. Tayler, *Literary Criticism of Seventeenth-Century England* (New York: Knopf, 1967), pp. 215-16. On Drummond's inadequacies, see Tayler, *Donne's Idea of a Woman*, pp. 8-9; on Jonson's educational gaps, see pp. 9, 20.

31. Ben Jonson, "Conversations with William Drummond of Hawthornden," in *Works*, ed. C.H. Herford and Percy M. Simpson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925), I, 133.

32. In *Donne's Idea of a Woman*, pp. 8-12, Tayler reviews the almost comic list of candidates for what Drury symbolizes as well as the anachronism of the project as a whole. Repeating the lengthy list here would be both tedious and redundant.

33. See R.C. Bald, *John Donne: A Life* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 143-44.

34. Tayler, *Donne's Idea of a Woman*, p. 34.

35. On Donne's relationship with Hall, see Bald, *A Life*, pp. 243-44; on the Dean of Canterbury's bracketing Donne with Bacon as modern thinkers, p. 226.

37. For a useful correction of the idea that Donne was truly apologetic or deeply disappointed about the reception of the *Anniversaries* (an idea based largely on his 1612 letter to Goodyer), see Thomas A. Festa, "Donne's *Anniversaries* and His Anatomy of the Book," *JDJ* 17 (1998): 36-41. See also pp. 54-56, n. 21 and n.25, where he notes that Arthur F. Marotti's "coterie theory" of Donne's work just as signally fails to explain why he opted for publication as I suggest that the meditational theories do. See Marotti, *John Donne, Coterie Poet* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986).

37. George Hakewill, *An Apologie of the Power and Providence of God in the*

*Governement of the World*, wherein he undertakes an *Examination and Censure of the Common Errovr Touching Natvres Perpetvall and Vniversall Decay* (Oxford, 1627), p. 93

38. Tired of trying to resolve the inconsistencies involved with regarding *The First Anniversary* as a meditation, in "Donne's *Anniversaries* Reconsidered," Louis Martz concludes that as a satire the poem was "powerfully successful" for the same reason that he had previously considered it flawed: its "sharp division into parts, which I once saw as a flaw, now seems quite in accord with the central image of the dissection, the anatomy[, in which] . . . the world is appropriately cut up into . . . clear divisions and subdivisions, in order that we may see clearly the corruption in all those parts" (p. 38). The essay appears in *That Subtile Wreath: Lectures Presented at the Quatercentenary of the Birth of John Donne*, ed. Margaret Pepperdene (Atlanta, GA: Agnes Scott College, 1973), pp. 29-55.

39. See Louis L. Martz, ed., *English Seventeenth-Century Verse* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1973) pp. 473-75, and Tayler, *Donne's Idea of a Woman*, p. 106; on the traditional "trinity within a trinity" set forth in Frank Manley's edition of the poems, see pp. 39-40 ff. As Tayler also points out, since the bulk of scholarship has followed Martz's five-part system, the trinitarians are somewhat in the minority (p. 94); his book exhaustively surveys most if not all. However, even Tayler—who adheres to the system heroically throughout most of his study—admits that it ultimately breaks down when pushed too far.

40. Thus like Tayler, Martz, Lewalski, and innumerable others, I would agree that one of the primary audiences of the poem is the redeemed Christian community; but I would also argue that this is hardly the transhistorical community the latter mostly has in mind, for in its quite specific historical context, this community was largely committed to the ethical and epistemological implications of the decay thesis. On the exemplary or homiletic context of Donne's use of Drury, see especially Paul Parrish, "Poet, Audience, and the Word: An Approach to the *Anniversaries*," in *New Essays on Donne*, ed. Gary Stringer (Salzberg: University of Salzberg Press., 1977), pp. 110-39.

41. See "To the Most Honourable and my most honoured Lord, the Marquess of Buckingham," in *The Life and Letters of John Donne*, ed. Edmund Gosse (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1899; repr. Gloucester MA: Peter Smith, 1959), I: 176.

42. Although I agree with Martz that the poem has an introduction, five main sections, and a conclusion, and also that each main section has three similarly structured subdivisions (on this point, see below), my analysis differs from his in some important ways. The most important of these is that, unlike his, my sections begin *after*, not before, each refrain. This approach is more reader-oriented, because in a long poem structured by rhyming couplets with no predictable subdivisions (as opposed to short poems in stanzas or ballads in which the refrain typically "telegraphs" its introduction through an intensified use of internal rhyme and word

repetition), one cannot possibly know that the poem is divided by refrains until *after* the second refrain is read. Also, Martz nowhere justifies his somewhat arbitrary assumption that the poem's introduction ends at line 90, a most unremarkable line except for the fact that it occurs about half-way between the opening line and the first refrain. (Line 60, which considers "What we may gaine by thy Anatomy," seems to serve as the real the turning point in this long introduction.) But I have been able to attach no significance to numerical structure as such: the sections between the refrains are very irregular in length, and the fifth or final section quickly merges into the poem's conclusion. See, however, Martz, *The Poetry of Meditation*, pp. 222-23.

43. While in this short section Bacon suggestively recommends that scriptural paradoxes should be resolved through the invention of "a kind of divine dialectic"(p. 291), in the end he reluctantly admits that "perfection or completeness in divinity . . . is not to be sought" in this world. But, since he seeks to discredit the "artificial divinity" of the Scholastics and/or Aristotelians (p. 294), he ends up rationalizing revelation itself by subdividing it into belief and opinion, service and adoration, from which "two branches do issue four main branches . . . : Faith, Manners, Liturgy, and Government" (p. 297), all of which are defined as broadly and ecumenically as possible. Later, Hobbes's *Leviathan* will use a similar method to rationalize faith even further. Thus as Richard B. Wollman suggests, "The metaphysical conceit as mnemonic device is Donne's answer (in advance) to Hobbes's view of memory as nothing more than 'decaying sense,'" for "he locates the primary office of the poet: to 'enrol' the 'fame' in 'verse' . . . [in] that place of memory between the understanding and the will where Donne entrusts his poetry": "Donne's Obscurity: Memory and Manuscript Culture," *JDJ* 16 (1997): 129.

44. See Sidney Warhaft, "The Providential Order in Bacon's New Philosophy," in *Francis Bacon's Legacy of Texts*, ed. William A. Sessions (New York: AMS Press, 1990), pp. 151-67, quoted, p. 162. However, as Warhaft stresses, Bacon's notions are not secular in any strict sense, being roughly comparable to the "this-worldly" providentialism of William Perkins. For a discussion of Bacon's "therapeutic" vision of the sciences, see also in the same volume Johann Mouton, "'The Summary Law of Nature': Revisiting Bacon's Views on the Unity of the Sciences," pp. 139-50.

45. Klause, "The Montaigneity of Donne's *Metempsychosis*," p. 442. For an assessment of Donne's reasons for turning to Calvinist orthodoxy at this point in his life, see John Stachniewiski, "John Donne: The Despair of the 'Holy Sonnets,'" *ELH* 48 (1981): 677-795. Also still relevant here in George Williamson's classic essay, "Mutability, Decay, and Jacobean Melancholy," chapter 1 of his *Seventeenth Century Contexts* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969).

46. In *John Donne and the New Philosophy*, pp. 167-73, Coffin traces the elimination of fire to Kepler's work on optics, *Ad Vitellionem* and *Dioptrice*. But in *Ignatius His Conclave*, Donne's identifies Kepler only with his writing on the nova of 1604, which, as Marie Boas points out in *The Scientific Renaissance,*

represents the typical non-scientist's view of him (p. 293). Even Burton, who was particularly interested in such matters, does not include him in *The Anatomy of Melancholy*'s list of those argue against the element of fire in the heavens. Still more conclusively, *Dioptrice* was not published until 1611, *after The First Anniversarie* was begun in late 1610, or readapted at that time for elegiac purposes from an earlier work, as Tayler convincingly suggests, pp. 6-7. Moreover, since Kepler himself continued to believe in fire as one of the four elements of creation, he did not actually "put out" this element, as Coffin himself admits (p. 173). Identifying Kepler instead of Bacon–who *does* reject its elemental status–as the source of this objection thus seems another instance of Coffin's special pleading. Tayler identifies the far likelier sources of Donne's knowledge of optics (*Donne's Idea of a Woman*, pp. 61-66).

47. As Nicolson observed, the new astronomy disturbed its critics not simply because of its heliocentrism (which by reason of the sun/Son analogy could and did retain a positive mystical implications for its proponents), but perhaps even more importantly because (as Kepler's work attests) its findings called in doubt the divinely "perfect" circular plan of the universe (*The Breaking of the Circle*, pp. 47-80). However, these doubts did not disturb Copernicus or Kepler, who rigorously explore heliocentrism as an aspect of their Neoplatonic mysticism; see Fernand Hallyn, *The Poetic Structure of the World: Copernicus and Kepler* (New York: Zone Books, 1990). In contrast, Donne's identification of mountainous peaks as unfortunate "irregularities" introduced by sin is a clear indication that he favored the interpretation of the "ancients" over the "moderns"; while the former disparage "height" as sinful presumption, danger, difficulty, and post-paradisal disproportion, the latter associate it with legitimate aspiration, godly labor, and human progress. See Richard Foster Jones, *Ancients and Moderns*, and also John Steadman, *The Hill and the Labyrinth: Discourse and Certitude in Milton and His Near Contemporaries* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 1-16.

48. These lines seem to mark the poem's real conclusion, even though the side note to this effect is placed slightly above, where the poet is still cutting up the world's "carcasse." Such textual markers are often inexact in poetry of this period; I prefer to trust the poet's own words: "Here . . . be the end."

49. *Fifty Sermons*, 31, fol. 275.

50. Vickers, *Francis Bacon*, pp. 608-9.