

## Cowley and Crashaw on Hope

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In the Second Book of Sir Francis Bacon's *Of the Proficiency and Advancement of Learning Divine and Humane*, Bacon identifies the "parts of human learning [that] have reference to the three parts of Man's Understanding, which is the seat of learning."<sup>1</sup> Those parts—History, Poetry ("Poesy"), and Philosophy—are distinguished by their hold on a particular function of human intellect. History appeals to Memory, Poetry to Imagination, and Philosophy to Reason. As one might expect, Bacon gives considerable attention to Philosophy, less to History, and least to Poetry, which occupies only slightly more than three pages in a printed text, in contrast to over 100 pages devoted to the various dimensions of Philosophy and thirteen focusing on History. Nonetheless, poetry is given its due as a part of learning that frees one from what Bacon calls "the nature of things" (343).<sup>2</sup> Poetry, according to Bacon, pushes the human spirit beyond the natural order into the realm of a kind of cherished and instructive falseness. In contrast to history or reason, it values what is rare, surprising, and diverse. Because of poetry's capacity to advance beyond the natural and merely reasonable, it has been, says Bacon, "ever thought to have some participation of divineness, because it doth raise and erect the mind, by submitting the shews of things [i.e., outward appearances] to the desires of the mind: whereas reason doth buckle and bow the mind unto the nature of things" (343-44).

Nearly half a century after Bacon's *Advancement of Learning*, Abraham Cowley praised a poet quite unlike himself in many ways, one who transcended the natural order of things even beyond what Bacon intended or would likely have approved. To Cowley, this "Poet and saint!"—Richard Crashaw—not only poetically

transcended earthly conditions but, indeed, left behind poets of a different type, those whom Cowley identifies, and with whom he identifies, as the "wretched we, poets of earth!" (9).<sup>3</sup>

What Bacon identifies directly, and what Cowley hints at obliquely, are two ways of perceiving, two ways of understanding: the one identified with nature and reason, the other with the spirit and the imagination. More profoundly, we are reminded of a philosophical dualism fundamental to seventeenth-century thought, expressed variously as reason and faith, the body and the soul, the temporal and the eternal. Basil Willey identifies this dimension of Cartesian philosophy in terms of "thought and extension": "Outside, extended throughout infinite space, there is the world of mathematical objects strictly controlled by mechanical law; and that this is real we have seen. Within, there is the thinking substance which is the true "I," unextended, distinct from the body, and not subject to mechanical laws; and the reality of this is intuitively certain. Within the human individual, then, these divided and distinguished worlds mysteriously met and blended; soul and body, thought and extension being somehow inexplicably found in union."<sup>4</sup>

The most impressive poetic exploration into these dual modes of perception in the seventeenth century is found in John Donne's *Anniversaries*, where the poet, through an "Anatomy" of this world and a visionary portrayal of the "Progres" of the soul into a higher realm, reveals both the reality and the limitations of the body of humankind and the body of the world and encourages a perspective that is religious, intuitive, and anticipatory. In the *First Anniversary*, skepticism abounds, and the anatomy becomes a fitting metaphor in the effort to expose "the frailty and the decay of this whole World."<sup>5</sup> The eyes of the reader are cast consistently downward to a dead world that is void of health, of promise, of hope. It is a world in which sin and the governance of nature combine to doom humankind: "We are borne ruinous" (95) and, paradoxically, are decaying even from that state. The journey suggested by the motif of the "progres" is, fundamentally, a journey beyond the restricted vision this world would impose, and we are urged in the second poem, therefore, to "Forget this world" (61) and to "thirst" and "thinke" in a different way and of a different realm. In both poems a relentless pursuit of knowledge and truth is apparent, but the truth is gained through different means and yields very different emphases. The knowledge that, as Carol Sicherman observes, was "analytically achieved in the 'Anatomy'" is accepted in the

"Progres," the perspective of which is based on "knowledge intuitively attained."<sup>6</sup> In an important sense, therefore, the two *Anniversary* poems are inseparable, are, indeed, one poem, and thus are a telling poetic example where the "divided and distinguished worlds" of seventeenth-century thought "mysteriously met and blended."<sup>7</sup> And what can be claimed for Donne's *Anniversaries* can also be seen, not always so extensively, in metaphysical poetry as a whole, for, as we have often been told, it is grounded on both the dualities and the unity of human existence, thus assuring the survival into the seventeenth century of the "religious belief in the divine unity of all things physical and spiritual," even against "a developing background of philosophic and scientific scepticism."<sup>8</sup>

When Abraham Cowley went to Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1637, he was already an accomplished and published poet. Indeed, his *Poetical Blossomes* was first published in 1633, his fifteenth year, and a second edition was published shortly before his arrival in Cambridge. Such early achievement no doubt made a considerable impression on a number of Cowley's Cambridge fellows, among whom was the older student Richard Crashaw, who had been admitted to Pembroke College in 1631 and who had published his first volume of poems, his *Epigrammatum Sacrorum Liber*, in 1634. Most of the details of the friendship between Cowley and Crashaw are hidden by history, but contemporary records testify to their association at Cambridge and to their later contact when Crashaw was an exile in Paris. Furthermore, the poetry provides incontrovertible evidence of their impact on each other.

Crashaw's "Upon two greene Apricockes sent to Cowley by Sir Crashaw" is the older student-poet's self-mocking tribute to his young friend's early poetic fruition. Crashaw's poems, "times tardy truants" (1) and "Poore fruites" (30), are presented with modesty to Cowley, the "Young master of the worlds maturitie" (26). Cowley more than returns the compliment in his impressive elegy, "On the Death of Mr. Crashaw." In his poem from their Cambridge years, Crashaw had acknowledged the precocity, if not superiority, of his junior colleague's talents. His own poems, those "two greene Apricockes," are, he says to Cowley, evidence of "How much my summer waites upon thy spring" (34). In his commemorative elegy, Cowley sees Crashaw as the exemplar of sacred verse and begs the deceased poet for "half thy mighty spirit for me" (72) that he might "learn of things divine, and first of thee to sing" (74).

Cowley and Crashaw, themselves sometimes associated with the metaphysical tradition, sometimes not, offer an interesting example of a poetic approach to antithesis and resolution. As university students at Cambridge, they composed a joint poetic exercise on the subject of hope: Cowley rejected it, Crashaw praised it.<sup>9</sup> After the original publication Cowley wrote a further poem, answering objections raised in his initial verse. We see in both of Cowley's poems a relentless emphasis on what Bacon calls the "nature of things," a realm where logic, reason, and nature prevail. Crashaw's response acknowledges the "participation of divineness, because it doth raise and erect the mind, by submitting the shews of things to the desires of the mind." In the context of seventeenth-century humanism, Cowley instructs us with truth and consistency about the presence of hope in human experience; his poems are, in another sense, an "anatomy" of those occasions when hope is said to be useful, occasions which are found wanting, are found, in fact, often to be hopeless. In the context of seventeenth-century theology, Crashaw elevates our understanding, taking us beyond reason that "buckle[s] and bow[s] the mind unto the nature of things" and toward a recognition of hope that frees us from such earth-bound restrictions. Although there is no metaphoric journey in Crashaw's poem, the "progres" suggested by his superior vision is every bit as apparent as in Donne's effort. Taken separately, the poems represent three closely related but nonetheless distinctly different, even contradictory, views of the value of hope in human affairs. Taken together, however—as they should be, since no one poem is appropriately published by itself—they are a striking example of unity in the face of contradiction. Although Crashaw's transcendent vision makes his effort superior, no formal solution or resolution is proposed; rather, contraries are held in balance, each true, each different, the whole sustained through the capacity of the mind to admit of multiple truths, and, most importantly, the fundamental truths of dualism and unity, and thus, of paradox.

I

Cowley's position in the poem that forms the basis for both his and Crashaw's response is at one with a thorough-going skepticism about the efficacy of hope in a world where logic and reason prevail. That position is apparent in the first stanza, where Cowley, in a cold analysis of the meaning and purpose of hope, concludes that, since it is not a ultimate reality—since any given outcome has the effect of nullifying hope—it is vain and illusory. The logician's

basis for his conclusion is emphasized in the central image of the stanza: "Ill, and Good doth equally confound" hope, thus "both the hornes of Fates dilemma wound" (3-4). The futility of hope is underscored through a series of logical contraries—succeeding and missing, ill and good, "full noone" and "perfect night"—each of which causes hope to vanish. Since philosophically one may judge the worth of an undertaking on the basis of its eventual fulfillment and reality, hope is without purpose since the moment it is apparently realized it is, in fact, "ruin'd": "If things then from their ends wee happy call, / 'Tis hope is the most hopelesse thing of all" (9-10).

Logical arguments, even those using all of the advantages of wit and paradox, do not necessarily prevail, of course, and in his subsequent three stanzas Cowley accepts the presence of hope but demonstrates as well that it is false and unreliable, especially in its primary aim to bring joy. In stanza two the "worldly philosopher"<sup>10</sup> argues that hope deprives us of lasting happiness by anticipating, and thus diminishing, that possibility. If concern about diminished joys is not sufficient to end hope's appeal, then common sense demands that we accept that what we hope for seldom happens in fact. For "one prize" we experience "an hundred blankes" (52); hope itself is nothing more than a "Thinne empty cloud" (55); whatever meaning it has is strictly the product of "our owne fancie" (56). In the closing couplet of stanza three Cowley pits hope directly against Reason and shows the former to mislead through seductive sophistry: "When thy false beames o're Reasons light prevaile, / By *ignes fatui*, not North starres we sayle" (59-60).

Cowley ultimately dismisses hope by joining it to other things foolish and irrational: fear, "fond desire," the fraudulent alchemist, and the frustrated lover. In effect, hope is damned for the company it keeps. As Donne could demonstrate the weakness of Death by calling attention to its miserable companions "poyson, warre, and sicknesse,"<sup>11</sup> so Cowley derides hope for being the "Brother of Feare" (and, indeed, "The merrier Foole o'th'two, yet quite as mad" [71-72]), the "Child of fond desire" (73), and the obsession that drives the alchemist and the lover, "Still leading them insensibly on, / With the strange witchcraft of *Anon*" (75-76). The first believes that he can affect and change Nature; the second believes that he can pursue and control a woman. The foolishness of both quests, Cowley's abrupt ending suggests, is self-evident.

## II

About Cowley's two poems on hope, Robert Hinman has written, "Cowley maintains his personal tone while skillfully shifting personae. He achieves epigram and antithesis because he observes that truth is complex. He isolates portions of truth or partial truths, opposites that seem to cancel each other out. He recognizes that hope may be delusion as well as boon. 'For Hope' and 'Against Hope' are light and witty, but they present wise and dramatic statements about human nature."<sup>12</sup> Hinman rightly remarks on the two perspectives of the poems, yet the range of response is essentially limited. The speaker of "For Hope," unlike his counterpart in the first poem, acknowledges the usefulness of hope, but with a tone that is sometimes reluctant, even grudging, and with the suggestion that hope is of value primarily to those for whom there is no alternative.

The opening couplet of "For Hope" is curiously ambiguous as to the nature of hope:

Hope, of all ills that men endure,  
The only cheap and universal Cure! (1-2)

Is hope a cure for all of men's ills? Or is it—in a reading the lines would also justify—both an ill and a cure? And what are we to make of the conception of hope as "cheap" and, later, as a "Flatterer" (9)? In context these may be read as positive observations, yet the diction surely undercuts hope's worth. The remainder of stanza one would have us regard hope's capacity to heal, but those who experience it apparently have nothing else: it is the "Captiv's Freedome," the "sick-Man's Health," the "Loser's victory," and the "Beggar's wealth" (3-4). To be sure, hope is also "Manna," a "strong Retreat," and a "sure-entail'd Estate,"<sup>13</sup> but the stanza ends by acknowledging again that hope is of value mainly to the desperate: "Thou pleasant, honest, Flatterer! for none / Flatter unhappy Men, but thou alone!" (9-10). Hope is not here, as it was in the first poem, condemned for its associates, but it is not much invigorated either.

The remaining three stanzas maintain the affirmative, but limited, acceptance of hope's worth, much as if the skeptic reluctantly concedes that, from a strictly human standpoint, hope brings occasional pleasure as well as false joy. Throughout, however, the tone is subdued, at times ironic, as the poet characterizes hope as a quality of frankly minimal impact. At its best it is a

"gentle Dawning" (12), a "good Preparative" (13), the "Best apprehender of our joyes" (29); yet in these and other tributes hope is both brief and inferior to a more lasting virtue: Happiness, Success, Joy, or Faith. The language and imagery of the final two stanzas of "For Hope" take us further from the worldly skeptic's realm, advancing us closer to a Christian perspective that joins hope to faith and love. Yet, the tone and intent of the poem remain steadfastly earth-bound. As the "Brother of Faith," hope shares the "joyes of Heaven and Earth" (21-22), but its focus is constantly on the future and thus it has less to offer now. The greatest of these virtues, love, is notably lacking in vitality here, and hope ("sad Lover's only Friend" [13]) receives at times only backhanded praise. Both love and hope are associated with the possibility of deceit, of having "fruition" be less than anticipated :

For Love I fear's a fruit that does delight  
The tast it selfe lesse than the Smell and sight.

Fruition more deceitfull is

Then thou canst be, when thou dost misse. (33-36)

After reading "For Hope" one is struck mainly by the portrayal of this virtue as appealing to those who are virtually hopeless, yet as being apparently inevitable in human conduct. Neither view leads to resounding praise. In his final address to hope Cowley observes :

Men leave thee by obtaining, and strait flee

Some other way again to Thee:

And that's a pleasant Country, without doubt,

To which all soon returne that travaile out. (37-40)<sup>14</sup>

I do not wish to deny or understate the differences in the two poems, for they are apparent. I would argue, however, that the differences are largely on the surface. One speaker rejects, the other affirms, but each views reality with reason's eye, finding hope to involve at times self-deception, at times earthly comfort.

### III

In his recent study of skepticism, Nicholas Rescher observes that "Scepticism is, in a way, irrefutable, at any rate in the sense that the standard and straightforward sorts of refutatory argumentation cannot successfully be deployed against it. Discursive argumentation standardly proceeds from premises and it is clear

that scepticism cannot be refuted by counterargumentation proceeding along such standard lines."<sup>15</sup> In his response to Cowley's dismissal of hope, however, Crashaw adopts no such debate strategy. As Clarence Miller has remarked, he "never meets Cowley's arguments . . . but rather transcends them."<sup>16</sup> Neither does Crashaw merely affirm the useful, but limited availability of hope as human consolation, as Cowley does in his answering poem.<sup>17</sup> What Crashaw creates is an entirely different perspective, a new context in which the matter of hope can be considered. But the context is not one where logic, reason, and nature govern; it is a context where belief and its attendant virtues are accepted *a priori*. What remains for the speaker is to announce that belief through emphatic assertions, not proof, and to invite its acceptance by others.

The example of the *Anniversaries* is again instructive in this regard. For Donne fully to accomplish his aim to be prophet and teacher, to be the "Trumpet, at whose voice the people came" (*Progres*, 528), he must demonstrate the inadequacies of this world and of human reliance on it and promote a superior alternative. For him the alternative is not so much heaven as that embodiment of heaven's virtues which is accessible to humankind—the ever-present "shee" of the poems. Notwithstanding all of the effort that has been devoted to identifying what or who "shee" is, one dimension seems apparent. No where does Donne *prove* her to be any one of the figures with whom she has been associated—the Logos, Astraea, Queen Elizabeth, St. Lucy, Wisdom—nor does he *describe* her in terms that clearly link her to someone else. What he does, over and over again, is assert her worth and expect the audience to respond with understanding and acceptance. The audience does not acquire a new understanding but is rather reminded "of a commitment already made, in this instance a commitment to celebrate a departed soul through an imitation of her virtue."<sup>18</sup> So it is, in essence, with Crashaw's treatment of hope. He does not offer proof or evidence, nor attempt appeals on the level of logic and reason; rather, he reminds us of the spiritual dimension of human life, largely untouched by Cowley, where hope is genuine and efficacious.

As a matter of poetic strategy, Crashaw follows closely the images, and at times even the argument, of Cowley's original, but he does not answer argument with argument; he answers argument with enthusiastic affirmation and a multiplicity of images, a kind of Baroque fullness, that persuade through their very abundance.



In Crashaw's first stanza, for example, the speaker addresses the philosophical image central to Cowley's opening lines, the "Hornes of Fate's Dilemma." Significantly, however, he does so only after eight lines that describe and affirm hope in a series of images that, in addition, turn Cowley's earlier paradox ("hope is the most hopelesse thing") on its head:

Dear Hope! Earths dowry, and Heavens debt,  
The entity of things that are not yet.  
Subt'lest, but surest being! Thou by whom  
Our Nothing hath a definition.  
Faire cloud of fire, both shade, and light,  
Our life in death, our day in night. (11-16)

Cowley's negative image of hope as a "Vain shadow, which does vanish quite / Both at full Noon, and perfect Night" is transformed into the typological image of the "Faire cloud of fire." Not only does the image itself become a positive one—converted from a "Vain shadow" to a "Faire cloud" providing paradoxically both shade and light—but with the transformation comes a new, religious context for meaning. The cloud of fire that offered protection and hope to the Israelites (Exodus 13 :21-22) anticipates other instances of hope for God's people, notably the coming of the Messiah ("Our life in death, our day in night"), and thus Crashaw sets his poem in a new world of Christian understanding.<sup>19</sup>

After Crashaw's litany of hope's meanings, a denial of the Fates' ability to negate hope is both easy and inevitable. The poem has established a new force, God, who stands behind the presence of hope, and before hope and Him the Fates cower:

Fates cannot find out a capacity  
Of hurting thee.  
From thee their thinn dilemma with blunt horne  
Shrinks, like the sick Moone at the wholesome morne.  
(17-20)

The pattern evident here is characteristic of the remainder of Crashaw's effort, as he accepts and transforms Cowley's governing images. The transformation is not just a revaluation; it is an essential relocating of image and meaning. Throughout, we are reminded of the Christian understanding of hope and its bearing on another world. "Our Crown-lands lye above," we are told, yet what we have here is "A seemly portion for the Sons of Kings" (33-34).

Hope is "our earlier Heaven!" the vehicle by which "Young *Time* is taster to Eternity" (41-42).

The most revealing example of Crashaw's transformation is seen in the relationship between fortune and hope. Cowley first saw them as co-conspirators in the effort to entice and eventually disappoint their victims; hope, in particular, is "Fortunes cheating Lotterie." More generously, Cowley viewed hope in his second poem as standing apart, "out of Fortune's reach," and thus capable of being "a blessing still in hand" (15-16). For Crashaw, hope is quite simply of another, transcendent world and is not subject to the whims of fortune or fate :

above the worlds low warres  
*Hope* kicks the curl'd heads of conspiring starres.  
 Her keele cuts not the waves, where our winds stirre,  
 And *Fates* whole Lottery is one blanke to her.  
 Her shafts, and shee fly farre above,  
 And forrage in the fields of light, and love. (61-66)

In all stanzas but the first, love figures prominently in Crashaw's effort, and it is joined by faith to complete the theological triad. Cowley's love was cast in terms of the foolish earthly lover who vainly and futilely chases a circuitously roving woman. Crashaw momentarily glances downward toward such action and the similarly foolish chase of the alchemist searching for his "fugitive gold" (86). Enclosing that momentary sight, however, is the higher vision of faith, hope, and love as seen from the perspective of eternity. Hope is "*Faith's* Sister" and the "Queen Regent in young Loves minoritie" (81, 84). Of false hope and fanciful hope we have heard from Cowley. He cast hope as a Cupid-like figure, a "Fond Archer . . . who tak'st thine ayme so farre, / That still, or short, or wide thine arrows are" (53-54). Crashaw transforms the "Fond Archer" into a "glorious Huntresse" whose realm is the "field of Grace":

True *Hope's* a glorious Huntresse, and her chase  
 The God of Nature in the field of Grace. (89-90)

#### IV

In his elegy on Crashaw, Cowley provides appropriate, if unintended, commentary on the two dominant perspectives of the poems on hope. Contrasting the "Poet and Saint" to the "Poets of Earth" (1, 9), Cowley further expounds on the unchanging nature of this divine poet and his sacred verse:

Thou  
 Wert Living, the same Poet which thou'rt Now.  
 Whilst Angels sing to thee their ayres divine,  
 And Joy in an applause so great as thine ;  
 Equal society with them to hold,  
 Thou needst not make new Songs, but say the Old.  
 (9-14)

Although the claims for Crashaw's heavenly songs are not unexpected in this tribute to a friend, Cowley's focus is nonetheless instructive in view of the poetic worlds created in the poems on hope.

In his study of Crashaw and the Spanish Golden Age, R. V. Young remarks on a different "essential" in Crashaw's poetry: "Crashaw's poetry is essentially public," he observes; "the poet is a participant in a ritual, in a celebration of the Church . . . [I]n Crashaw the essence is impersonality."<sup>20</sup> If Robert Hinman is correct, as I believe he is, in arguing that in his poems on hope Cowley "maintains his personal tone while skillfully shifting personae,"<sup>21</sup> we have additional insight into the different tones and aims of these companion poems. Cowley speaks as a man of the world—witty, iconoclastic, sarcastic, at most with subdued acceptance—and tells us what he sees and knows. Crashaw speaks as a representative of the Word and thus takes us beyond individual moments, individual circumstances—in a very important sense, even beyond time. Together, the three poems—each true but differently true—provide a brief but valuable insight into the seventeenth-century world view, one that acknowledges the truths and limitations of this world and that sees beyond them to an eternal one.

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#### Notes

<sup>1</sup> In *The Works of Francis Bacon*, ed. James Spedding, et al. (1870; rpt. New York: Garrett, 1968), III, 329. Subsequent references are indicated in the text.

<sup>2</sup> Poetry is aligned with "Feigned History," as Bacon terms it, though he acknowledges that Feigned History might appear in prose as well as verse. At its best, poetry serves to reveal the greatness of the human spirit, for it is not to be restricted by the literal or the natural. The use of Feigned History, Bacon observes,

hath been to give some shadow of satisfaction to the mind of man in those points wherein the nature of things doth deny it; the world being in proportion inferior to the soul; by reason whereof there is agreeable to the spirit of man a more ample greatness, a more exact goodness, and a more absolute variety, than can be found in the nature

of things. Therefore, because the acts or events of true history have not that magnitude which satisfieth the mind of man, poesy feigneth acts and events greater and more heroical; because true history propoundeth the successes and issues of actions not so agreeable to the merits of virtue and vice, therefore poesy feigns them more just in retribution, and more according to revealed providence; because true history representeth actions and events more ordinary and less interchanged, therefore poesy endueth them with more rareness, and more unexpected and alternative variations. (343)

Sidney's discussion of poetry and history and his support of the "feigned example" that poetry provides strikes a similar chord. Cf. *A Defence of Poetry*, in *Miscellaneous Prose of Sir Philip Sidney*, ed. Katherine Duncan-Jones and Jan Van Dorsten (Oxford: Clarendon, 1973), pp. 87-91. See also Robert Hinman's lucid discussion of Bacon in *Abraham Cowley's World of Order* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1960), pp. 97-107.

3 From "On the Death of Mr. Crashaw." For this poem and Cowley's "For Hope," I have cited *The Complete Works in Verse and Prose of Abraham Cowley*, ed. Alexander Grosart, Vol. I (1881: rpt. New York: AMS Press, 1967). For the text of Cowley and Crashaw's "On Hope, By way of Question and Answer, betweene A. Cowley, and R. Crashaw," I have cited *The Complete Poetry of Richard Crashaw*, ed. George Walton Williams (New York: Norton, 1974).

4 *The Seventeenth-Century Background* (1934; New York: Doubleday, 1953), pp. 89-90.

5 From the full title of the *First Anniversary*. I have cited *The Complete Poetry of John Donne*, ed. John T. Shawcross (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967). Subsequent references will be indicated in the text.

6 "Donne's Timeless Anniversaries," *UTQ*, 39 (1970), 135.

7 On the oneness of the *Anniversaries*, see Sicherman, p. 128, and Ruth A. Fox, "Donne's *Anniversaries* and the Art of Living," *ELH*, 38 (1971), 530.

8 Douglas Bush, *English Literature in the Earlier Seventeenth Century*. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1962), p. 38.

9 In the joint effort on the subject of hope, Cowley's original poem, which in a later edition of his own poems is called "Against Hope," consists of four stanzas; Crashaw's effort, which both answers and soars above Cowley's poem, is five stanzas. In the 1646 and 1648 editions of Crashaw's *Steps to the Temple*, the poems are printed in alternating stanzas, though that arrangement may not be authorial. (See Clarence H. Miller, "The Order of Stanzas in Cowley and Crashaw's 'On Hope,'" *Studies in Philology*, 61 (1964), 64-73, and George Walton Williams, "The Order of Stanzas in Cowley and Crashaw's 'On Hope,'" *Studies in Bibliography*, 22 (1969), 207-10. I have adopted the order as printed in Williams' edition.) In 1652 the poems were printed separately in Crashaw's *Carmen Deo Nostro*, Cowley's first and Crashaw's following. Between the original printing in 1646 and the later printings of 1648 and 1652, Cowley's *The Mistresse* was published, containing his original ("Against Hope") along with a four-stanza answering poem titled "For Hope."

10 Miller, p. 69.

11 From the Holy Sonnet "Death be not proud," in *The Complete Poetry of John Donne*, ed. Shawcross.

12 Hinman, p. 84.

13 A "sure-entail'd Estate" is property that is assured of being bequeathed to a succession of individuals. Through the metaphor hope does indeed provide the prospect of something to be gained.

14 The pun on "travail"/"travel" again associates hope with a condition that is born of disappointment, if not of misery.

15 *Scepticism: A Critical Reappraisal* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1980), p. 7.

16 Miller, p. 70. See also my discussion in *Richard Crashaw*, Twayne's English Authors Series, No. 299 (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1980), pp. 100-03.

17 David Trotter (*The Poetry of Abraham Cowley* [London: Macmillan, 1979]) points to the remarks of Nathanael Culverwell as providing a useful commentary on the different views of hope as demonstrated by Cowley and Crashaw. Cowley adopts what Culverwell called the "Moralists hope," while for Crashaw hope is a divinely guided virtue: "There's a vast difference between the Moralists hope and that which is the Theological grace, and yet this is scarce took notice of; they require these three ingredients into the object of hope: that it must be (1) *bonum*, (2) *futurum*, (3) *incertum*; but Christian hope is certain & infallible, it looks upon good as to come, and as certain to come . . . Christian hope is nothing but a waiting and expectation of a certain good" (72).

18 See my study, "Poet, Audience, and the Word: An Approach to the *Anniversaries*," in *New Essays on Donne*, ed. Gary A. Stringer, Salzburg Studies in English Literature 57 (Salzburg: Universität Salzburg, 1977), p. 116.

19 For his suggestive readings of these lines and for his generous advice about this essay, I am grateful to my colleague Donald R. Dickson.

20 *Richard Crashaw and the Spanish Golden Age* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1982), p. 9.

21 Hinman, p. 84.