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Donne Cooking: Analogy, Proportion, Authority, and Faith

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When I was asked to join the succession of presidents for the John Donne Society and told that a plenary address was in my future, I supposed that future to be next year. Realizing my error, I felt a little like a cook who thought her dinner party next week, only to discover it was that night. Anxiously, I surveyed the ingredients on hand and began concocting: at the end you can tell me what it tastes like. A stew, perhaps?

My major ingredients are analogy, proportion, authority, and faith, not necessarily in this order. Analogy, obviously pertinent to Donne's writing and thinking, has at once currency—freshness, in my metaphor—and deep, traditional roots. Modern philosophers have rediscovered it: doing so, Giorgio Agamben, for example, makes a bow to ancient Greece and another to modern France—Michel Foucault in this instance.[1] Modern historians of science, theoretical physicists,

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[1]See Max Black, *Models and Metaphor*s (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1962); Paul Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language*, trans. Robert Czerny, with Kathleen McLaughlin and John Costello (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979); Agamben, *The Signature of All Things: On Method*, trans. Luca D'Isanto, with Kevin Attell (New York: Zone, 2009), chapter 1, especially pp. 17–18, 31. Agamben's analogical paradigm, which is neither the universal nor the particular, bears a suggestive relation to Katrin Ettenhuber's illuminating discussion of Donne's analogies between (and within) equity and charity and

literary critics, and cognitive scientists have also interested themselves in analogy of late.

The theorized roots of analogy trace back to Aristotle, most conspicuously to his *Poetics*, where he treats analogy as proportional metaphor with a basis in mathematics.[2] If we read Aristotle's theorizing back into Plato's practice, we can find something similar, as, indeed, Agamben has: the relation of Aristotelian chicken and Platonic egg come again. Aristotle's theory of analogy combines what Boethius, in late Antiquity, would separate in an ancient anticipation of C. P. Snow's two cultures, the one humanistic and the other scientific.[3] Latin philosophy in the Middle Ages was pervasively influenced by Boethian terminology, which encouraged a division of the sign systems pertaining to analogy into verbal and mathematical ones—not so much like the precedence of chicken or egg this time as like the splitting of the wholeness of the spheroid androgyyne.

In the Renaissance, Cardinal Thomas de Vio Cajetan (1469–1534)—Chair of Thomistic Metaphysics at Padua, a hotbed of science and Averroism, and himself also something of a Humanist—restored the Greek meaning of *analogia* lost in Boethian terminology. He nonetheless stumbled over the question of metaphor in relation to analogy, as had Aquinas himself. Ralph McInerny, a distinguished modern Thomist with three books on analogy to his credit, finds an impasse regarding metaphor and its relation to analogy in Aquinas before he reaches for a solution.[4] His solution attributes an existential meaning to metaphor—that is, a claim for reality—and therefore crosses into the context of faith. It is, in short, the counterfactual, fictive nature of metaphor—its *as-ifness*—that is always the rub in the game of true knowledge, whether in

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more generally of his treatment of the relation between general rule and specific circumstance (*Donne's Augustine: Renaissance Cultures of Interpretation* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011], pp. 163–183).

[2]Aristotle, *Poetics*, trans. I. Bywater, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle,* ed. Jonathan Barnes, rev. Oxford Translation, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 2:1447a10–1462b19. Subsequent references to Aristotle's *Works* are to this edition and cited parenthetically.

[3]Snow, *The Two Cultures* (1959; rprt., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

[4]McInerny, *Aquinas and Analogy* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1996).

theology or in physics. The role of the human imagination is basic both to this obstacle and to metaphor.

Cajetan was the Cardinal sent to negotiate with the young, rebellious Martin Luther: remember his portrayal by Mathieu Carrière in the 2003 film *Luther* in which Ralph Fiennes played the lead? Cajetan's biblical commentaries figure recurrently in Donne's prose. Although Donne might have found them in collections, they at least signal his awareness of, and interest in, the Cardinal's views and methods.[5] Cajetan's treatise on analogy is not a biblical commentary, and I'm making no claims for Donne's having known it. But it was very much in the cultural air: Joshua P. Hochschild describes it "as the most influential" work in the Aristotelian tradition over many centuries and deservedly a touchstone on the subject of analogy to this day.[6]

Like Cajetan, early modern scientists also stumbled over the metaphoricity of analogy. The efforts of Bacon, Galileo, Kepler, Descartes, and many another would systematize the use of analogy, albeit within differently conceived systems from Cajetan's. A proportional relationship between the unknown and the known in René Descartes's investigations—as Descartes put it, between "the matter sought for and something else already known"—was Cajetan's answer, too, and it greatly influenced subsequent thinking.[7] Even Galileo, more skeptical about

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[5]Geoffrey Keynes's list of "Books from Donne's Library" does not include an entry for a volume by Cajetan (*A Bibliography of Dr. John Donne, Dean of St. Paul's*, 4th ed. [Oxford: Clarendon, 1973], pp. 258–272). While inclusion would have been significant, its lack is not, particularly for an interest, like mine, in cultural relevance rather than direct influence.

[6]See Joshua P. Hochschild, *The Semantics of Analogy: Rereading Cajetan's "De Nominum Analogia"* (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2010), pp. xiv, xx. The Latin text of *De Nominum Analogia* (1498) that Hochschild uses is that edited by N. Zammit (1934) and revised by H. Hering (Rome: Angelicum, 1951). He invokes five other works by Cajetan, mainly in the commentary tradition. Hochschild's bibliography includes one English and two French translations of *De Nominum Analogia*, but the translations he offers are his own.

[7]See Peter Galison, "Descartes's Comparisons: From the Invisible to the Visible," *Isis* 75 (1984): 311–326, here qtd. and trans. Galison, p. 322 (his brackets), from Descartes, *Oeuvres de Descartes*, ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, 12 vols. (1897–1910; rprt., Paris: Vrin, 1964–1975), 10:439–440; *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, 2

analogy than most, was driven to it when he considered the so-called continuum, the notion that matter is infinitely divisible. The continuum, involving consideration of the subsensible and the infinite, is what—in the words of the historian of science Lorraine Daston—it took to make Galileo employ the analogical imagination, "however cautiously, in order to render the invisible and unintelligible visible and comprehensible."[8] Such rendering is a problem with which modern physics still grapples.

I'll return to the roots of analogy, especially in Aristotle, but other ingredients need preparatory attention. You know, dicing, blanching—that sort of thing. Oops, sudden boil: the analogy of faith. This analogy, with its Pauline and Augustinian bases, is active in the Protestant Reformation and in Donne's writing. The basic Pauline text—Romans 12:6—is translated differently in various Bibles and treated variously by the theologians. The translations open a vista of implications. For instances relevant to Donne, Greek *analogia* in the earliest record of Romans becomes Latin *ratio* in the Vulgate and English *proportion* in Geneva and King James. In Catholicism, biblical analogy includes both scripture and tradition; in radical Protestantism, it is scripture alone. In short, the analogy of faith is another of the touchstones of Reformation controversy. Later, I'll return to this kind of analogy, too, letting it simmer for now.

But first, the various biblical translations of St. Paul's Greek *analogia* have now put its Latin equivalent *proportio*, or English *proportion*, on the menu. For Boethius and later for the Scholastic philosophers in the Middle Ages, Latin *analogia*, or *proportio*, becomes mainly a linguistic phenomenon; in the meantime, Boethian *proportionalitas* (which is Greek *analogia* renamed) affords "a fundamental insight about relationships between things [and] retains a wide significance . . . in mathematics, music, astronomy, architecture, and the physical sciences," all having the first of these, mathematics, in common.[9] As earlier suggested, this division looks like a prognostication of Snow's "two cultures." It also looks like a recipe for confusion.

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vols. (1911–1912; rprt., with corrections, 1931, 1979), 1:53, 56 (translation modified by Galison).

[8]See Daston, "Galilean Analogies: Imagination at the Bounds of Sense," *Isis* 75 (1984): 302–310, here p. 307.

[9]Hochschild, p. 9.

Proportion, apart from its tangled roots, is a broadly cultural term in Donne's time—indeed, a greatly overdetermined term. Learned essays have treated its pertinence in the Jacobean period to double-entry bookkeeping, to the shipping of different-size barrels by merchants, to controversies about the percentages of gold and silver in the currency, to the arts, and thence to the popularity among the wealthy merchant class of paintings employing sophisticated proportionality.[10] But *proportion* is also George Puttenham's word both specifically for shaped poems and more generally for metrical composition in his *Arte of English Poesie*. Puttenham's second book bears the title: "Of Proportion Poetical" and includes chapters on such topics as meter, stanzas, cadences, and figures, which analogize form to content. At its outset, Puttenham invokes "the Mathematicall sciences" and specifies their proportion to be arithmetical, geometrical, and musical.[11] Boethius would have agreed, insofar as he distinguished *proportionality* from the less abstract notion of *proportion,* which was also confusingly designated *analogy* in the Latin tradition—that is, merely transliterated Greek *analogia* without the full meaning of this word in Greek, with its basis in mathematics.

Of course Puttenham's conception of poetry also includes words—verbal signs. In his conception, as in Sir Philip Sidney's, poesy, understood to be imaginative composition or fiction, once more joins what Aristotle had combined but Boethius had sundered: the mathematical is back with the linguistic. In a sermon, Donne, too, connects poetry and mathematics, memorably considering them both "counterfait Creation[s]."[12] Recalling that architecture, a science of

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[10]For a start, see the indexical entry for *proportion* in my *Translating Investments: Metaphor and the Dynamic of Cultural Change in Tudor-Stuart England* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005); see also E. J. Diksterhuis on proportion as the basis for some convergence between the activities of humanists and artists and craftsmen (*The Mechanization of the World Picture: Pythagoras to Newton*, trans. C. Dikshoorn [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986], p. 244).

[11]Puttenham, *The Arte of English Poesie* (1589; rprt., Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1988), pp. 78–148, here p. 78.

[12]Donne, *The Sermons of John Donne*, ed. George R. Potter and Evelyn M. Simpson, 10 vols. (1959; rprt., Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 4:87. Subsequent references to Donne's *Sermons* are to this edition and cited parenthetically.

relationships between things, is one kind of mathematically based, Boethian proportionality, I think of Philipp Melanchthon's "Architectural Mind," his term for the Deity who manifests Himself as the maker of a rational universe, and also of Sidney's "*architectonike*" in his *Defence of Poesie*, to wit, knowledge of one's own maker-mind as divine image.[13] I further recall Edmund Spenser's geometrical stanza describing Alma's House of the temperate body, which invokes the triangle, the circle, and the square, and then Donne's explorations in this mode: for example, the circle, or roundel, in "The Canonization"; the square in "The Computation"; and the triangle, the circle, the point, and the line in "A Valediction Forbidding Mourning." As I noted at the 2012 John Donne Society meeting in Leiden, the term "room" in Donne's "Canonization"—"We'll build in sonnets pretty rooms" (32)— carries an architectural meaning, along with its pun on Italian *stanze*, "rooms" or "stanzas." Dalibor Vesely explains that Renaissance architecture and perspective "share a sense of coherent space," embodied in "the concept of a 'room,'" and this Euclidean conceptualizing of space bears on the imaginative process—the *substantive idealizing*—of Donne's poem. Such a room is an "idealized representation" expressing the "isotropic space of geometry," and it is analogous to the geometric circularity of the initial and final rhyme word "love" both in each stanza of "The Canonization" and in the poem as a whole, which realizes the figure of a roundel, or circle, as described in Puttenham's rhetoric.[14] All these allusive, geometric forms point beyond the visible, *analogizing* higher things.

By now the stew broth, whose major ingredients are so far analogy and proportion, has surely thickened and, in fact, needs dilution. To this end, I return to Aristotle's discussion of analogy in the *Poetics* and then to his various other uses of this term. In the *Poetics*, Aristotle describes a type of metaphor of the A:B::C:D variety that is proportional, or

[13]See Robert E. Stillman, *Philip Sidney and the Poetics of Renaissance Cosmopolitanism* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2008), pp. 162–163.

[14]The citations in this and the preceding sentence are from Vesely's *Architecture in the Age of Divided Representation: The Question of Creativity in the Shadow of Production* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), pp. 140–141. See Puttenham's chapter on figures of proportion (pp. 111–113); Puttenham's figure of the roundel is conceptually and rhythmically, rather than visually, round. Unless otherwise specified, citations of Donne's poetry are from *The Complete Poems*, ed. A. J. Smith (1971; rprt., London: Penguin, 1996).

analogical.[15] The Greek word *analogia* combines *ana*, "according to," with *logos*: here, pertinently meaning English "ratio," or more broadly, "order"—an order that is rational and typically systemic. The kind of metaphor that Aristotle specifically terms *analogy* is proportional both in a similar sense and in a differential one: like any other form of metaphor, it both *is* in a figurative sense and in a literal one *is not*. As a form of metaphor, it is also constructive, an instance of *poesis*—"invention, creation, making." Certain of its terms can be exchanged for one another: B and D, for example. As Aristotle explains, transference is possible through

> analogy . . . whenever there are four terms so related that the second is to the first, as the fourth to the third, for one may then put the fourth in place of the second, and the second in place of the fourth. . . . Thus a cup is in relation to Dionysus what a shield is to Ares. The cup accordingly [can] . . . be described as the "shield of Dionysus" and the shield as the "cup of Ares."
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> (*Poetics*, 2:1457b16–22)

Again, A:B::C:D is the basic formula, and as Aristotle's examples of analogy continue, their poetic metaphoricity becomes clearer:

> As old age is to life, so is evening to day. One will accordingly describe evening as the "old age of the day". . . and old age as the "evening" or "sunset of life." It may be that some of the terms thus related have no special name of their own, but . . . they will be described in just the same way. Thus to cast forth seed-corn is called "sowing"; but to cast forth its flame, as said of the sun, has no special name. This nameless *act*, however, stands in just the same *relation* to its object, sunlight, as

[15] Aristotle, *Poetics*, 2:1457b16–30; cf. *Rhetoric*, trans. W. Rhys Roberts, 2:1406b30–1407a17. Discussing Aristotle, I hasten to add, I am not attempting an exhaustive review of every passage in which he talks about analogy or proportion but selecting those important to the later developments I treat.

> sowing to the seed-corn. Hence the expression in the poet, "sowing around a god-created flame."
>
> (*Poetics*, 2:1457b22–30, my emphasis)[16]

Aristotle uses the notion of analogy, or proportion, elsewhere in his philosophy in other ways that bear on later work—for instance, Cajetan's. Aristotle analogizes the working of odors to that of savors and the perception and memory of magnitude to that of distance and time; he finds the heart in sanguineous creatures functionally analogous to the vital organ in nonsanguineous ones; he refuses explanatory power to numerical correspondences, such as seven vowels, seven strings on the scale, seven Pleiades, and so on, considering them incidentally analogous; he also characterizes the notion of friendship to oneself as an analogous use of the term *friendship* rather than an absolute, or proper, one, and he recurrently invokes the concept of proportion in relation to politics and justice.[17]

Most pertinently, in the *Metaphysics,* Aristotle distinguishes numerical, specific, and generic unity (oneness) and then adds to these unity by analogy, which pertains to "those . . . related as a third thing is to a fourth," or as the number 3 is to 4 (2:1016b34–35); this is a unity of relationships, notably pertaining neither to genus nor directly to sensible being here. Elsewhere in this treatise, distinguishing otherness, sameness, likeness, and difference, he specifies use of the term *different* when things "though other are the same in some respect, only not in number but either in species or in genus or by analogy" (*Metaphysics*, 2:1018a13–14). In a final example, he discusses analogous relations of actual and potential existence, observing that "all things are not said in the *same sense* to exist actually, but only by analogy—as *A* is in *B* or to *B*, *C* is in *D* or to *D*; for some [analogies] are as movement to potentiality [as a man seeing to a sighted man with his eyes shut], and the others [are] as substance to some sort of matter [for example, a statue of Hermes in a block of wood]." Notably, the basis of analogy in such

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[16]This last example is an instance of catachrestic, as well as of analogous, metaphor, insofar as a proper word does not exist for the radiation of sunlight as the poet conceives of it.

[17]Aristotle, *Works,* 1:443b6–8, 452b10–13,469b15–20; 2:1093a3–b6, 1240a13–14.

instances is the *relation* of actuality to potentiality, not simply, in the last example, the confusion of a block of wood with the statue that could be made from it (*Metaphysics*, 2:1048a30–b8).[18] Analogy in this same example is also a semantic relation with a basis in human perception, insofar as it is said to exist in some sense rather than to exist absolutely. It belongs to the order of saying or, perhaps, of perception rather than to that of existence. In sum, Aristotle's use of the term *analogy* is various—subjective or objective, conceptual or empirical, semantic or existential. Anyone who has read Aristotle's treatise on economics against his ethics might doubt that it was his intention to create a totalized *summa*.[19] While I do not suggest that his varied use of *analogy* cannot be rationalized by specialists, the challenges to consensus and the opportunities for diversity it offers seem obvious.

Nonetheless, I puzzle over the assertions of modern scholars who try to separate Aristotelian analogy definitively from early modern uses of it, whether in the new science, in Donne's writing, or elsewhere. For example, the psychologists Dedre Gentner and Michael Jeziorski tellingly entitle an essay "The Shift from Metaphor to Analogy in Western Science" and thereby exclude Aristotle's view that analogy is fundamentally metaphorical.[20] The literary historian Brian Vickers likewise contrasts what he calls "Aristotelian philological science" to the new science, in which he includes figures ranging from Kepler and Bacon, to Descartes, Boyle, Locke, and others. Opposed by Vickers to these, are the likes of Ficino, Agrippa, Boehme, and, above all,

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[18]On analogy in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, cf. Steven A. Long, *Analogia Entis: On the Analogy of Being, Metaphysics, and the Act of Faith* (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2011), e.g., pp. 73–74. Cf. Ricoeur, pp. 272–280.

[19]Not surprisingly, Aristotle's authorship of the *Economics* has been doubted, but this work, possibly by a student of his, continues to be associated with his name.

[20]Gentner and Jeziorski, "The Shift from Metaphor to Analogy in Western Science," in *Metaphor and Thought,* ed. Andrew Ortony, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 447–480. Contrast Peter Dear, *Mersenne and the Learning of the Schools* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), chapter on "Aristotelian Science and the Metaphysics of Mathematics," pp. 48–79, especially pp. 63–64; Gerd Buchdahl, "Methodological Aspects of Kepler's Theory of Refraction," *Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science* 3.3 (1972): 265–298, especially pp. 277–278.

Paracelsus—quite a spread of views, though all of them associated with mysticism and magic. What Vickers means by "Aristotelian philological science" is evidently a knowledge based on words, tropes, and logic rather than on mathematics, observation, and experiment.[21] But this is hardly Aristotle the proto-biologist or, as the philosopher Claudia Baracchi describes him, the thinker of "truth as phenomenonal disclosure," who analogizes the function of the heart in sanguineous creatures to the vital organ in nonsanguineous ones or refuses explanatory power to incidental numerical correspondences; nor is it Aristotle the theorizer of poetic making.[22] Mary Thomas Crane, a cognitively oriented literary critic, has also sought to distinguish Aristotelian analogy from one she considers responsive to the new science, for example, Donne's image of the twin-legged compass in the poem "A Valediction Forbidding Mourning."[23]

Given constraints of time, I'll simply assert that Aristotle's view of analogy as a distinct form of metaphor, specifically proportional, was operative from his own time through Donne's, and that in modernity, it continues to be so. This is why the roots of analogy are an essential ingredient of my stew. To recognize that a scientific analogy in this

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[21]Vickers, "Analogy Versus Identity: The Rejection of Occult Symbolism, 1580–1680," in *Occult and Scientific Mentalities in the Renaissance*, ed. Brian Vickers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 95–163, here p. 103.

[22]Baracchi, "Contributions to the Coming-to-Be of Greek Beginnings: Heidegger's Inceptive Thinking," in *Heidegger and the Greeks: Interpretive Essays*, ed. Drew A. Hyland and John Panteleimon Manoussakis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), pp. 23–42, here pp. 36–37.

[23]Crane, "Analogy, Metaphor, and the New Science: Cognitive Science and Early Modern Epistemology," in *Introduction to Cognitive Cultural Studies,* ed. Lisa Zunshine (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), pp. 103–114, especially pp. 111–114. For Crane, Donne's "Valediction" engages in a process of relating the soul to the body, or, more abstractly, of making the invisible visible through analogy. She thinks Donne aware of the use of analogy for this purpose as problematic. I agree, but I don't agree that for this reason Donne's compass analogy is not Aristotelian in structure. The Renaissance drive to make the invisible visible through analogy, along with concern about the validity of analogy, is as typical of philosophers and theologians as of new scientists. Insofar as their methods of deploying analogy are distinguishable, the differences are based on content rather than on structure and, in short, on what is considered real.

period avoids a transcendent metaphysics is not to establish that its method is not metaphorical or even basically the same as earlier methods of analogy, its structure, or its transferential working.[24] The volume of Bacon's and Descartes's objections to the use of analogy in Scholasticism and Galileo's initial reluctance to employ it surely tell a cultural story, but it is not about the method or structure of analogy per se. Peter Dear, a historian of science and technology with a sharp eye for the cultural implications of mathematics, makes a broader point that pertains here: "the conventional image of the Scientific Revolution as a new beginning that swept clean the philosophies of the past" is "well on its way" to the historiographical scrap heap.[25]

Well, dinner still seems distant, even as the scent of an explicit connection with Donne wafts from the stew pot. But I want next to address Cardinal Cajetan's influential work on analogy before returning to Donne, the analogy of faith, and one of Donne's well-known *Devotions*. Hochschild, writing on Cajetan's *De Nominum Analogia*, finds in it Cajetan's effort to answer objections to the Thomistic notion that analogy is a mean between singleness and doubleness of meaning, univocation and equivocation.[26] For Scotus, such a mean was impossible,

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[24]Cf. Dear, *Discipline and Experience: The Mathematical Way in the Scientific Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 158–159. To imply that contrived, experimental situations, which could include Cartesian analogies, is what happens in nature is in fact to express "a metaphorical identification," according to Dear, which all too readily becomes a metonymic replacement of reality (p. 158 n. 24).

[25]Dear, *Discipline and Experience*, p. 96, cf. p. 123 (Descartes). With Thomas Kuhn, we also do well to remember that "the ontology of [modern] relativistic physics is, in significant respects, more like that of Aristotelian than that of Newtonian physics" ("Metaphor in Science," in *Metaphor and Thought*, pp. 533–542, here pp. 540–541). Cf. Catherine Wilson, *The Invisible World: Early Modern Philosophy and the Invention of the Microscope* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 39: "The assertion that the specific powers and perceptible properties of natural substances depend on the combined actions of homogeneous or minimally differentiated material particles lying beneath the threshold of normal perception is the main feature that distinguishes seventeenth-century matter-theory from the Aristotelian theory of substances and qualities."

[26]Hochschild, pp. 43, 60, 143.

and so he insisted instead on its singleness.[27] Much was at stake when, in the Renaissance, Cajetan sought to explain the validity of analogy for logical thinking and thus to preserve the proportional unity, or qualified continuity, of sensible and non-sensible things. Cajetan had both to avoid the univocation of the analogical concept that mediates two things and to establish its sufficient unity to enable valid argument, while also avoiding the fallacy of equivocation.[28] On the face of it, such a project seems impossible. Add faith, however, and everything changes, and Cajetan, like Aquinas before him, finally did so.

Cajetan holds that the only true form of analogy is *proportionality*—again, what in Greek is termed *analogia* and by Boethius *proportionalitas*: A:B::C:D.[29] He also recognizes that *analogia*, even as used in his lexicon, is actually metaphorical, yet he tries to distinguish metaphorical analogy from what he calls "proper analogy," whereas Aristotle does not. According to Cajetan, metaphorical analogy commits what we call a category mistake, as when a field in bloom is said to smile; such an analogy crosses from one "context" to another, human to floral in this instance. In contrast, a *properly* analogous term truly belongs both to the

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[27]McInerny's opening chapter is entitled "Where Cajetan Went Wrong"; see especially pp. 4–6, 28–31, and on the relation of Cajetan's treatise to Scotism, see pp. 25–28. Cf. Hoshschild, p. xvii (on Scotus), and chapter 1 ("Systematizing Aquinas? A Paradigm in Crisis"). McInerny suggests that Cajetan's 1498 treatise (con)fuses the real with the logical (p. 47 n. 21); Hochschild argues that Aquinas never adequately addresses the difference between analogous and fallacious equivocation, which became pressing after Scotus made an issue of it (e.g., pp. 44, 65–81).

[28]Hochschild, p. 44.

[29]In good humanist fashion, Cajetan employs the Latin rhetorical term *abusio*—in English "abuse"—to characterize the extension of the word "analogy" by Aquinas and his commentators to versions of analogy other than the true Greek one, namely, Aristotelian *analogia*, whose basis is mathematical. By definition, *abusio* is a far-fetched or exaggerated metaphor, such as Hamlet's "I will speak daggers to her" or else the more pedestrian use of a word to refer to something similar for which a proper word does not exist. The example from *Hamlet* is Richard A. Lanham's in *A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), p. 21. See also my *Translating Investments*, pp. 129–165. Hamlet's statement is cited from William Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, ed. Ann Thompson and Neil Taylor (London: Thomson Learning, 2006), 3.2.386. Subsequent references to *Hamlet* are to this edition.

original context and to the one "to which it has been transferred." Here is a familiar example: "*vision* is really in the body, and *understanding* is really in the intellect, [and] so the intellect can be said properly to *see*, by analogy with the sense in which the eye sees."[30] "But," *we* might ask, "does the intellect see as the eye sees, when the intellect is understood to be non-sensible and impassible, as it regularly was in medieval and early modern philosophies?[31] Does the analogy between physical and intellectual sight afford a viable mean between sameness and difference, or does it merely express a fallacy of relationship? Does it mask what is really a gap? The "mind's eye" in which Shakespeare's Hamlet sees and idealizes his dead father comes to mind, along with the many questions it raises about what he sees and why he sees it.[32] Certainly for a modern reader, the "mind's eye" of Hamlet is metaphorical, and a reader of Cajetan could fantasize that Shakespeare's play is a staging of the controversial status of analogy as a mode of thought. Such issues pervaded the cultural air of Europe: faith, vision, and real presence are just three of the code terms for them.

In a discussion resonant with late twentieth-century deconstruction, Hochschild seeks both to minimize Cajetan's eventual appeal to metaphysical considerations and to excuse the circularity of his argument by asserting that a metaphorical predication is spoken intentionally only *as if* it were true. Thus "the intention of a metaphorical predication is not to say what is literally true, or to say what is false, but to express some

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[30]Hochschild, pp. 11–12, 125.

[31]Pietro Pomponazzi (1462–1525), another Aristotelian, affords a telling early modern example of this sort of questioning. Like Cajetan, Pomponazzi was at one time a professor in the University of Padua, as well as a physician. "Pomponazzi made the soul . . . a natural inhabitant of an orderly universe" (*The Renaissance Philosophy of Man*, ed. Ernst Cassirer, Paul Oskar Kristeller, and John Herman Randall, Jr. [Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1948 (1956)], p. 257). Pomponazzi thinks the soul mortal, insofar as it cannot function or even exist without the body. Yet he also thinks that the intellective soul rises above these conditions in its working to understand universals and truth (*Renaissance Philosophy*, pp. 266–273, 281–381; e.g., pp. 305, 315–316, 319). He embraces individual immortality only in faith, not in reason.

[32]Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, 1.2.184; cf. 1.1.111: "A mote it is to trouble the mind's eye."

truth by way of an improper terminology."[33] Intention is all. Distantly, we might be reminded of Sidney's tricky argument as to why poets don't lie, namely, because they don't assert truth: the poet "nothing affirms, and therefore he never lieth."[34] Cajetan's version of this argument about the relation of truth to fiction and language to meaning lacks Sidney's investment in the value of fiction. In it, however, considerations of context, usage, intention, and judgment, especially judgment with respect to the other factors here interlinked, play key roles.[35] Not so coincidentally, you'll remember that Cajetan was one of the biblical interpreters Donne recurrently cited, if only as a variant.

Another distinction between metaphysical and metaphorical analogy that Cajetan offers involves reference: one analogue in proper analogy can be known without the other, while in metaphor both must be known.[36] This negative distinction granted to proper, veridical analogy seems made for divinity, as well as for speculation, exploration, and hypothesis, whether physical or transcendent: according to it, man:human being::God:divine being, an analogy in which the latter analogue exceeds earth-bound, human knowledge. The traditional example of metaphor offered in contrast is a version of blooms:field::smile:face, or "the field smiles," for which we need the second set to recognize the metaphor, whereas in proper analogy, we do not, since the unknowability of divinity is a given. This example of metaphorical analogy is strongly poetic in its projection of a human physiognomy and response onto nature. It also exemplifies Cajetan's ranking of kinds of analogy—indeed, kinds of metaphor—on the basis of their subject matter rather than their structure and, in short, on the basis

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[33]Hochschild, p. 127.

[34]Sidney, *An Apology for Poetry or The Defence of Poesy*, ed. Geoffrey Shepherd (1965; rprt., Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1973), p. 123. Sidney also refers to himself in this treatise as "a piece [i.e., a bit] of a logician" (p. 95).

[35]The influential modern scholar of Thomism Etienne Gilson considered the judgment of proportion to be at the very core of the Saint's writings on analogy (*The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, trans. L. K. Shook [New York: Random House, 1956], pp. 106–109). Hochschild makes the point that Gilson addresses the analogy of being, not "being" (p. 52), but, *pace* McInerny, these can hardly be hermetically separated in Aquinas's views of analogy.

[36]Hochschild, p. 156.

of what is considered real. I want to emphasize this point: it is subject matter, rather than structure, that makes the difference.

Now to the analogy of faith that I left simmering so long ago that evaporation indicates a need to refresh this topic, whose bases are in Paul and later in Augustine. The grounding Pauline text is Romans 12:6, which in the King James translation concludes, "let us prophesy according to the proportion of faith," namely, the proportion "given to us" earlier in the same verse. As noted before, *analogia*, the original Greek in this verse, becomes *ratio* in the Vulgate and *proportion* in Geneva and King James. Augustine, in *De Doctrina Christiana*, speaks of the "rule[, pattern, or model] of faith" (*regula fidei*), rather than of the analogy of faith, in interpreting the Bible: this is a rule perceived through the plainer passages of scripture and the authority of the church.[37] Augustine also urges that charity be the guiding principle of interpretation.[38] Charity thus becomes his fundamental analogue for scriptural understanding, an assertion I make with the recognition that the word *analogue* is drifting away from strict proportionality. For Augustine, charity definitively supersedes contradiction or obscurity and influences subsequent reception of Paul's *analogia* of faith, which becomes the basic *credo*, the litmus test for belief.[39]

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[37]Augustine's *regulam*, an uncommon word in the New Testament is used relevantly once by Paul in Galations (6:16, *κανόνι*, "rule, canon") and a century later by Tertullian in *The Prescription Against Heretics*, trans. Peter Holmes, in *The Ante-Nicene Fathers,* ed. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1980), pp. 243–265, here pp. 249–250 (chapters 12–14); chapter 13 is headed "Summary of the creed, or rule of faith," which is roughly equivalent to the eventually standardized Apostles' Creed. For the background to Augustine's use, see J. N. D. Kelly, *Early Christian Creeds*, 3rd ed. (New York: David McKay, 1972), e.g., pp. 55, 168, 175–181, 261, 358, 370.

[38]Augustine, *On Christian Doctrine*, trans. D. W. Robertson, Jr. (1958; rprt., Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1984), e.g., pp. 79–81, 93. Oxford Scholarship Online: *De Doctrina Christiana,* liber tertius, 3.2.2, 15.23 (accessed 8 June 12: www.oxfordscholarship.com). See Ettenhuber, especially chapter 5, but also *passim*.

[39]Cf. Psuedo-Dionysius, the Areopagite, *The Complete Works*, trans. Colm Luibheid (New York: Paulist, 1987), p. 50: the Good "generously reveals a firm, transcendent beam, granting enlightenment proportionate to each being." On a

Case in point: John Calvin, prefacing his *Institutes*, invokes "the analogy of faith . . . [as] a very clear rule to test all interpretation of Scripture; immediately, he proceeds to outline his scripturally-based beliefs in human degeneracy and utter helplessness before God, which he scornfully contrasts to the belief in meritorious free will of the venal, prideful Roman Church.[40] Outside this preface, Calvin addresses analogy a number of times in the *Institutes*, mixing reference to the crucial verse of Romans 12:6 particularly with interpretation of the Sacrament. More generally, he sees the believer rising by steps, conceived through analogy, from the physical sacraments to the mysteries hidden in them (2:1280). He also employs the traditional analogy of sense knowledge with spiritual illumination (2:1285). At one point, while rejecting transubstantiation, he specifically invokes "the analogy of faith, to which Paul requires all interpretation of Scripture to conform"—Romans 12:6 again—to support his belief "that, from the substance of his flesh, Christ breathes life into our souls—indeed pours his very life into us" (2:1404). Along with this analogy of faith, or basic *credo*, Calvin also refers more than once to what he calls "the analogy of the sign":

> Our souls are fed by the flesh and blood of Christ in the same way that bread and wine keep and sustain physical life. For the *analogy of the sign* applies only if souls find their nourishment in Christ—which cannot happen unless Christ *truly* grows into one with us, and refreshes us by the eating of his flesh and the drinking of his blood
>
> (2:1370, my emphasis)

With the word "truly," Calvin crosses into faith, effecting a shift from metaphor into reality. For Aquinas, *verius*, "more truly," is a coded word, in faith effecting much the same shift, for example, from physical to

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distinction between the traditional analogy of faith and the rule of charity in the works of John Milton, see Dayton Haskin, *Milton's Burden of Interpretation* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), p. 181. I suspect that Milton, too, conflates these in principle, agreeing with Calvin herein, although certainly not wholly agreeing with him in content.

[40]Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles, 2 vols. (London: S. C. M. Press, 1961), 1:12–14. Subsequent references to Calvin's *Institutes* are to this edition and cited parenthetically.

spiritual light, from metaphor to transcendent analogy, and from mere language to the metaphysically real.[41] I have observed a similar shift in Cajetan. A final passage in this vein finds Calvin explaining with respect to the Supper that "the name of the thing was given to the symbol," then acknowledging, "figuratively indeed," and finally adding, "but not without a most fitting analogy" (2:1385). The fit Calvin envisions is a special "affinity," a bond, between signifier and thing signified. Whiffs of mystery and reality linger. The reality comes from credence—faith.

Donne's older contemporary, Lancelot Andrewes, a bishop and translator of the King James Bible, invokes the analogy of faith when he addresses the interpretive authority and ecclesiastical structure of the church and objects to a reformed or Presbyterian use of Romans 12:6 to justify theirs.[42] While specifying this verse, he does not quote it. In another passage, however, this time treating the mystical body of Christ, he cites the earlier part of the Pauline verse, which indicates that the members of this body have "'diverse gifts according to the grace given'" to them; this phrasing is less open to contemporary controversy than is that of the last part, which specifies the analogy, or proportion, of faith given any member to prophesy. Yet the context of Andrewes's citation, which invokes the doctrine of the mystical body, is still polemical, since it becomes an objection to the sacramental interpretation of the Roman Church (5:265–266). In another sermon, Andrewes suggests that "If there be a measure of . . . [sin], so is there of . . . [repentance]; if 'an analogy of faith,' of repentance too, why not?" (1:449). Although he uses "analogy" rather than "proportion" here, he clearly means a measure of repentance proportioned to the offense. Avoiding polemics, he thus makes an analogy of the analogy of faith and thereby suggests his awareness of the wordplay that *analogy* invites, implying either a prophetic (that is, a veridical) or else a metaphorical reading. In each of these instances, Andrewes seems almost to want to keep his distance from the verbal and historical complications of prophesying, or interpreting, at the end of Romans 12:6, a fuller text of which reads,

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[41]E.g., see McInerny, p. 132; McInerny relevantly cites Aquinas, *II Sent.*, d. 13, q. 1, a.2.

[42]Lancelot Andrewes, *Works*, 11 vols. (1843; rprt., New York: AMS, 1967), 5:64. Subsequent references to Andrewes's *Works* are to this edition and cited parenthetically.

"Having then gifts differing according to the grace that is given to us . . . let us prophesy according to the proportion of faith."[43]

Andrewes's practice invites a brief reconsideration of the translation of *analogia* as *proportion* in the King James version of Romans 12:6. *Proportion* might look more specific than the Vulgate's *ratio*, but *ratio* is a standard Latin translation of Greek *logos*, the major component of *analogia*, and Latin *proportio,* the parent of English *proportion*, implies both English *ratio* and its parent, Latin *ratio*. Latin *ratio*, like Greek *logos*, indicates a rational order, or system, and English *proportion* likewise implies an agreeable or harmonious relation of parts to a whole. I could continue, but I think we have enough linguistic circularity for any stew pot! My point is to acknowledge the interpretive tangle in which proportional analogy is historically implicated, while *also* recognizing its cognitive utility and resisting oversimplifications of its cultural force. It defies credibility to suppose that the various human uses of analogy could be walled off, neatly or otherwise, from one another in this period—or in any other one.

With respect to the analogy of faith, Donne's practice in the sermons is more complex than Andrewes's, and he broaches the topic more often. He is, while contemporary with Andrewes, the member of a younger generation and has religious affinities that are more mixed. About half the time that he mentions this topic, he also refers to Cajetan, whom he characterizes as "a man great in matter of substance" and recurrently uses to represent a latter-day Roman view (*Sermons*, 8:183).[44] Starting with Jerome's notion that the key to a psalm lies in its title, Donne uses the figure of a lock, which is implied by this key, explicitly to exclude heretics and schismatics. "Our lock," he explains, "is the *analogy* of the *Christian faith*; That wee admit no other sense, of any place in any Psalm, then

[43]If Romans 12:6 is cited alone, the phrase I have omitted, "whether prophecy," makes no sense. In King James, the entire texts of 12:6–7 read, "Having then gifts differing according to the grace that is given to us, whether prophecy, let us prophesy according to the proportion of faith; Or ministry, let us wait on our ministering: or he that teacheth, on teaching. . . ."

[44]In addition to passages citing Cajetan that I discuss, see *Sermons*, 4:218: the reference is to Cajetan's assertion of the authority of Jerome's Vulgate in discussing which books of the Bible are canonical. Both the analogy of faith and the consensus of human testimony, compared to the validity of monetary currency, bear on this question.

may consist with the *articles* of the *Christian faith*," the basic *credo* (*Sermons*, 2:72). Because the title at hand indicates "a Psalm of Remembrance," Donne quickly turns next to the human memory and the image of the triune, divine maker within it. This turn is Augustinian with respect to the role of memory and to a deeper meaning of the analogy of faith. It is most Augustinian in tying faith and interpretive method together.[45] Here Donne accepts doctrinal authority even while he explores the words of scripture imaginatively. The imaginative component of this exploration could, in Greek terms, be considered a kind of *poesis*, an invention and a making, which reflects the divine Maker and attends to the dynamic working of the analogy of faith.[46] The balance of this working is a fine one.

In a sermon on a text with diverse interpretations—"What man is he that liveth, and shall not see death?"—Donne distinguishes "between problematicall and dogmaticall points," comparing them, respectively, first to upper buildings and foundations and then to "collateral doctrines and Doctrines in the right line"—the latter, basic doctrines. Interpretations of problematical passages are to be weighed "in the balance of analogy and in the balance of scandall." (Notice Donne's analogies so far: architecture, geometry, and a balance.) The result of

[45]For other methodological statements by Donne on interpreting scripture, see, for example, *Sermons*, 6:63; 7:61. In the first of these, Donne defends any figurative, allegorical, or mystical interpretation that neither destroys the literal sense nor violates the analogy of faith and also serves to advance devotion. In the second, he explains that "the Idea" of his sermons results from "the Analogy of Faith, the edification of the Congregation, the zeale of thy worke, [and] the meditations of my heart." In another statement about the debt of his method to Augustine's, Donne identifies the Augustinian core principles of scriptural interpretation as agreement with other scriptural places and edification. He then names his own four principles: the glory of God, the analogy of faith, the exaltation of devotion, and the extension of charity (*Sermons*, 9:95). See Ettenhuber, pp. 23–26, 58, 61; all of chapter 1 is pertinent. Ettenhuber sees Donne employing analogy as a means of location and definition, for example, between the concepts of equity and charity in his Lincoln Inn sermons (pp. 163–165).

[46]In a classic essay, "St. Augustine On Signs," *Phronesis* 2 (1957): 60–83, especially pp. 79–82, R. A. Markus illuminates the creative aspect of Augustinian sign theory and the intimacy of memory and imagination within it.

weighing must be held "so, as may be analogall, proportionable, agreeable to the Articles of our Faith," but also held charitably, so as not to offend our brothers (*Sermons*, 2:203–204). After offering several different readings of the text in question, Donne sums up the interpretive recipe for those who would prophesy regarding it:

> Consider the Scriptures then, and we shall be absolutely concluded either way. Consider Authority, and we shall finde the Fathers for the most part one way, and the Schoole for the most part another; Take later men, and all those in the Roman Church; Then *Cajetan* thinks, that they shall not die, and *Catharin* [another Dominican theologian] is . . . peremptory that they shall.
>
> (*Sermons*, 2:205)

The passage continues with the view of those in the reformed church, then Calvin and Luther. Here, the Pauline analogy of faith pertains to scriptural evidence, to the texts and opinions of various authoritative interpreters over time, and to the grace, ability, and authority to speak that each member is given. It offers no definitive answer.

In another eschatological sermon, Donne cites Cajetan again when he engages the weight to be given to the interpretations of the Fathers, noting that the Roman Church has often departed from them: "And then for a Rule, Cardinall *Cajetan* tels us, That if a new sense of any place of Scripture, agreeable to other places, and to the analogy of faith, arise to us, it is not to be refused, *Quia torrens patrum*, because the streame of the Fathers is against it" (*Sermons*, 7:201). The necessary reference to—that is, the proportionality of a scriptural reading to—the foundation of belief itself involves judgment, or interpretive weighing: and so we are back to a subjective requirement last observed in discussion of proper and metaphorical analogy and to the construction of Donne's "upper buildings," the "problematicall" edifices of theology and religion. But certainly in the seventeenth century, the constructs of natural philosophy, which was still considered a branch of metaphysics, the science of the real, and the beliefs of scientists were not walled off from the rhizomatous roots of analogy and its necessary use in reaching, whether in Descartes's words or Galileo's practice, from the known to unknown and from the sensible to what lies beyond it. The scientific ingredients at which I've earlier glanced tempt my attention, but the stew

is already thick, and dinner approaches, and so I'll settle for a quick dash of Donne's *Devotions*, a work saturated with analogy from its skeletal structure to its animating spirit and fevered flesh.

The fourth Devotion, like the others, begins with the physical world and immediate situation: the doctor is sent for. Meditating on the relation of microcosm to macrocosm, Donne declares that man is much more than a little world because he has more pieces and parts:

> If all the veins in our bodies were extended to rivers, and all the sinews to veins of mines, and all the muscles that lie upon one another, to hills, and all the bones to quarries of stones, and all the other pieces to the proportion of those which correspond to them in the world, the air would be too little for this orb of man to move in, the firmament would be but enough for this star; for, as the whole world hath nothing, to which something in man doth not answer, so hath man many pieces of which the whole world hath no representation.[47]

Donne expands his analogical meditation on this not-so-little world of man to an analogy between creatures the world produces and thoughts to which men give birth—thoughts "that reach from east to west, from earth to heaven," spanning "the sun and firmament at once"—before he sinks back to his present condition in the "close prison . . . [of] a sick bed" (*Devotions*, p. 20). His sickness leads to a more negative analogy that is almost a parody of his earlier one of human greatness. Now he analogizes the malignant creatures the world produces to the diseases we produce within ourselves, and he asks at the end what has become of the "extent and proportion, . . . of . . . [man's] soaring . . . [and] compassing thoughts" when he thinks of himself as "a handful of dust" (*Devotions*, p. 21). Donne's meditation is highly imaginative, proportional, and poetic, yet it is also painfully self-conscious, so much so as to seem skeptical: "What a piece of work is a man, how noble in reason, how infinite in faculties . . . yet to me what is this quintessence of dust?"[48] Earlier,

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[47]Donne, *Devotions upon Emergent Occasions*, ed. Anthony Raspa (1975; rprt., New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 19.

[48]Shakespeare, *Hamlet,* 2.2.269–274. On skepticism in Donne, see Anita Gilman Sherman, *Skepticism and Memory in Shakespeare and Donne* (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). See also Sherman, "Fantasies of

treating Thomistic distinctions between metaphor and veridical analogy, I suggested that for a reader of Cajetan, Shakespeare's *Hamlet* might resemble a staging of the controversial status of analogy as a mode of thought. Donne's fourth meditation might, too. In it, his initial analogies afford case-book examples of a Cajetanian category mistake—a metaphorical predication spoken only *as if* it were true and, in short, a fiction.

From a balanced resolution of conflict and doubt in the fourth Expostulation, Donne proceeds to a concluding Prayer in which analogy itself has been transcended, whether with respect to Man and the natural world, as in the fourth Meditation, or to the reasoned reconciliation of scriptural passages, as in the Expostulation, and thus whether with respect to analogy as metaphor or as Christian truth. Instead of appearing in an explicit or even a merely implicit, underlying proportion such as the doctor is to the body what the priest is to the soul, in the Prayer God is at once the source of all health, spiritual *and* physical, and the authorizer of ministers both to the soul and to the body. This is not the analogical and still metaphorical unity that Aristotle describes in his *Metaphysics* but one more absolute that resembles the proper, veridical analogy for which Cajetan argues, if only because it, too, shifts to faith.

The unity and the intensity of Donne's realization in his fourth Prayer, however, surpass Cajetan's rational, semantic analysis of a mediative analogy between the known and the unknown. As the single source of life and "all kinds of *Health*," the God Donne now envisions and addresses is Lord in himself of body and soul, and in his Son the physician—later, the "universall *Phisician*"—of both of these (*Devotions*, pp. 23–24). That God is One, a unity encompassing and exceeding the many, the binary, and the dual, is not news, and it is not a belief stated outright in this Prayer. What is surprising is the way this belief is instead expressed, indeed embodied, in Donne's actual praying. This way is

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Private Language in 'The Phoenix and Turtle' and 'The Ecstasy,'" pp. 169–184; Douglas Trevor, "Mapping the Celestial in Shakespeare's *Tempest* and the Writings of John Donne," pp. 111–129; and Judith H. Anderson, "Working Imagination: in the Early Modern Period: Donne's Secular and Religious Lyrics and Shakespeare's Hamlet, Macbeth, and Leontes," pp. 185–219, all three in *Shakespeare and Donne: Generic Hybrids and the Cultural Imaginary*, ed. Anderson and Jennifer C. Vaught (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013).

affective and, above all, operative—actual.[49] Donne would no longer "*reason with God*," as in the Expostulation (*Devotions*, p. 21). Now his voice can be said to enter into a *catena*, or chain, of biblical quotations in which *healing* is the central word, and he combines instances of judgment with mercy and instances of purposeful tribulation with salvation.[50] He also recalls (or anticipates) his own "Hymn to God the Father" when he recognizes that "My returning to any sinne, if I should returne to the abilitie of sinning over all my sins againe, thou wouldest not pardon" (*Devotions*, pp. 23–24).[51] Citing Ezekiel, he prays for himself, "Heale this *earth*, O my *God*, by repentant tears, and heale these *waters*, these teares from all bitternes, from all diffidence, from all dejection, by establishing my irremovable assurance in thee" (*Devotions*, p. 24). His biblically-sanctioned, figurative language assimilates and supersedes the analogy between himself and the natural world so painfully and self-consciously constructed in his Meditation, and it does so with the performative immediacy of faith. He *is* this earth, whose waters are his tears, and his penitent tears are its waters. The identification of God's creation with Donne and of Donne's repentance with God's providence is figuratively, grammatically, and emotionally complete. Issues of God's power and human responsibility, of election and agency, at least for this moment, are at peace. By the end of this Prayer, at once for Donne himself as an individual and as an exemplar, the readiness, simultaneously physical and spiritual, is all.

And ready or not, the time for dinner at long, long last has come.

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[49]Cf. Margret Fetzer, *John Donne's Performances: Sermons, Poems, Letters and "Devotions"* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2010), pp. 3–4, 225–270. Likewise, my *Translating Investments*, pp. 70–76.

[50]Ettenhuber sees Augustine as a model for Donne's citational practice. Characteristically, Donne's voice becomes a series of scriptural citations in the Prayers of *Devotions*.

[51]Robin Robbins tentatively suggests the date 1619 for the poem commonly known as "A Hymn to God the Father," and he retitles it "To Christ"; he also notes Walton's dating the hymn 1623, after the sickness that Donne recounts in *Devotions* (*The Complete Poems of John Donne*, ed. Robbins, rev. ed. [Harlow, UK: Pearson, 2010], pp. 575–576).